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This dissertation is a study of popular music and state-controlled radio 
broadcasting in the Arabic-speaking world, focusing on Syria and the Syrian radioscape, 
and a set of American stations named Radio Sawa.   I examine American and Syrian 
politically directed broadcasts as multi- faceted objects around which broadcasters and 
listeners often differ not only in goals, operating assumptions, and political beliefs, but 
also in how they fundamentally conceptualize the practice of listening to the radio.   
Beginning with the history of international broadcasting in the Middle East, I 
analyze the institutional theories under which music is employed as a tool of American 
and Syrian policy, the imagined youths to whom the musical messages are addressed, and 
the actual sonic content tasked with political persuasion.   
At the reception side of the broadcaster-listener interaction, this dissertation 
addresses the auditory practices, histories of radio, and theories of music through which 
listeners in the sonic environment of Damascus, Syria create locally relevant meaning out 
of music and radio. Drawing on theories of listening and communication developed in 
historical musicology and ethnomusicology, science and technology studies, and recent 
transnational ethnographic and media studies, as well as on theories of listening 
developed in the Arabic public discourse about popular music, my dissertation outlines 
the intersection of the hypothetical listeners defined by the US and Syrian governments in 
their efforts to use music for political ends, and the actual people who turn on the radio to 
hear the music. 
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 In the summer of 2007, I sat with a group of young Yemeni men in a small town 
outside of Sanaa, chewing qat and drinking soda.  I was visiting my Arabic teacher 
Mabkhout’s hometown, and before heading up to his family’s farm we stopped in to see a 
few of his childhood friends, the group of us all in our twenties except for a few of their 
young sons sitting quietly at the edge of the room, occasionally hopping up to fetch 
something for one of the adults. 
The men valiantly attempted to include me in the conversation, but at that time 
my novice Arabic meant that after a question was directed my way, I would usually turn 
to Mabkhout for a translation from the everyday Yemeni dialect into my limited 
vocabulary of Modern Standard Arabic. The questions I picked out on my own were 
generally those which I had come to anticipate when meeting new people, and I answered 
them haltingly. 
 “Where are you from?” “Are you married?” “Why are you studying Arabic?”  
“California, but I live in New York.  No, I’m not married.  I study Arabic because I am a 
music student, and I am interested in music and politics…umm…and political music.” 
“Arabic music?” 
 “Arabic music, and American music in the Middle East.” 
Struck by an idea, Ahmad, the man to my right, grabbed his phone out of a 
pocket, leaned over the cushion between us and held it out so that I could see the screen.  
After a few taps to find a file, we were looking at a clip of Michael Jackson, dressed in 





“Eddie are you okay? Are you okay Eddie? 
I assured him that I liked both the singer and the song, though I had always wondered 
who Eddie was, and he moved on to another video.   
With another tap we were watching an excerpt from a speech by Saddam Hussein.  
The language mostly went over my head, but it was clearly a speech from just before the 
Second Iraq War.  He let the video play for a moment before asking what I thought of 
Saddam. (He liked Saddam and thought it was terrible that he was executed on a 
holiday.)  With help from Mabkhout, I explained that while I didn’t personally think 
much of Saddam, I was against execution in general, and agreed with him on that point, 
adding that I thought Michael Jackson was a better singer. 
Laughing at that, Ahmad tapped his phone a third time, and with a mischievous 
smile held it out to me as it played a video of the second plane crashing into the World 
Trade Center Towers.  I pushed his hand away and began to object, but the man sitting to 
his right was quicker, hitting Ahmed lightly on the shoulder and admonishing him that 
the video was an inappropriate thing to show an American.  Ahmed immediately 
apologized, stating that he didn’t agree with the terrorists, and only wanted my opinion of 
the video.  After a moment, the conversation moved on as other people took over, asking 
what I knew about Yemeni singers. 
This awkward interaction, occurring before I had formulated any solid idea of 
what would eventually become my dissertation project, presented three of the 
quintessential images of the interaction between the US and the Arab World, recurring 
popular tropes of globalization and politics.  Michael Jackson, the symbol of the 





country which suffered the brunt of the US of response to the attacks of September 11th; 
and the attacks themselves, the lens through which much of America viewed the modern 
Arab and Islamic World.1 
In the context of that sitting room, the video of the 9/11 attacks was less a 
political or historical document than it was a tool for social evaluation, a blunt method for 
Ahmed to assess the personality and affinities of the newcomer sitting next to him, 
sidestepping the linguistic obstacles.  I recall this scene not because I think it grants any 
specific insight into the political lives of the Yemeni men I was sitting with, or into their 
relationship with the US, but because I am interested in the intersection of three facets of 
the US-Arab relationship implied by the three video clips: global cultural production and 
consumption (Jackson), the policies that arise in the context of globalized economies and 
ideologies (the Iraq War), and the lenses through which nations and peoples view one 
another (9/11). 
The literature on globalization, and specifically on musical globalization, has had 
to deal on a fundamental level with the ways in which transnational and translocal forms 
of expressive culture simultaneously serve as expressions of power.2  In the example of 
globalization which received the most early study from music scholars, the “World 
Music” industry, scholars such as Steven Feld, Louise Meintjies, Veit Erlmann and 
Timothy Taylor have addressed the ways in which the social and economic interactions 
which create that industry are fraught with exploitation and resistance, collusion and 
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 The attacks of September 11
th
 have become a quintessential example in the literature on globalization.  
For example, Manfred B. Steger, Globalization: a Very Short Introduction  (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) begins with a discussion of the attacks. 
2
 See Martin Stokes, “Music and the Global Order,” Annual Review of Anthropology 33, no. 1 (October 





compromise, and flows and eddies of power.3  This complicated landscape of cultural 
globalization belies the “flat earth” theory of some popular articulations of the 
phenomenon.4   
In the context of studies of music and expressive culture, the word “power” is 
typically used in a Foucauldian sense, based on the understanding that social actors are 
constantly negotiating and renegotiating the terms of control and the definitions of reality 
in which that social life takes place.5  While this conception of power as the politics of 
everyday life is vital to the modern study of social practice, the literature on music and 
globalization has spent less time examining music in the context of the traditional sources 
of power: governments, political groups, and their organs of popular communication and 
control.  
 More specifically, the narratives of post-national, hybrid cultures emphasized by 
globalization studies sometimes miss the ways that state-run or state-influenced media 
remain central to the experience of news, entertainment, and music audiences across 
broad areas of the world.  This is especially true in older media such as radio, where 
governments still exercise an enormous amount of control over the content of radio 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Steven Feld, “A Sweet Lullaby for World Music,” Globalization (2001): 189–216; 
Steven Feld, “From Schizophonia to Schismogenesis: The Discourses and Practices of World Music and 
World Beat,” in The Traffic in Culture George E. Marcus and Fred R. Myers eds. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995): 96–126; Timothy Dean Taylor, Global Pop: World Music, World Markets (New 
York: Routledge, 1997); Timothy Dean Taylor, Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and the World , 
Refiguring American Music (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Louise Meintjes, “Paul Simon’s 
Graceland, South Africa, and the Mediation of Musical Meaning,” Ethnomusicology 34, no. 1 (1990): 37-
73; Louise Meintjes, Sound of Africa!: Making Music Zulu in a South African Studio  (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003); Veit Erlmann, “The Aesthetics of the Global Imagination: Reflections on World 
Music in the 1990s,” Public Culture 8, (1996): 467-87. 
4
 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005). 
5
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison  (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); 





broadcasts.  The US, for example, through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), 
finances “one of the largest media organizations in the world” broadcasting radio and 
television in 59 languages to 100 countries.  Although the BBG claims a weekly audience 
of 187 million listeners, the American public is almost entirely unaware of the content, 
and in some cases even the existence, of these overseas stations.6  Despite the lack of 
attention within the US to this outpouring of international media, together these outlets 
form a central aspect of what international relations scholars refer to as American “soft 
power.”7   
This dissertation is a study of the use of music in politically motivated radio 
broadcasts in the Arabic-speaking world, focusing primarily on a set of American stations 
named Radio Sawa.  Beginning with the history of international broadcasting in the 
Middle East, I analyze the content of the broadcasts and the institutional theories of 
music within which that content is employed.  On the listening side, I situate these 
broadcasts in the Syrian radioscape, and specifically within the sonic environment of 
Damascus, Syria, examining the larger mediascape, listening practices, and public 
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 Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2011 Performance and Accountability Report  
(Washington, DC, 2012), 2. 
7
 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
8
 The language of “scapes” is drawn from Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 






Radio Sawa and Musical Meaning 
In 2002, the Bush administration replaced the Voice of America’s 51-year-old 
Arabic-language service to the Middle East and North Africa with a new set of stations 
called Radio Sawa (Radio Together).   Developed by the former CEO of the Westwood 
One radio corporation, and modeled on the American Top-40 radio format, the stations 
mix Arabic and English- language pop music with short news segments as part of an 
increased outreach to young people in the Arabic-speaking world following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  Sawa, along with its sister satellite television station Al Hurra, was 
billed by its originators in the US Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) as a departure 
from the “ineffective” practices of the VOA Arabic service, and a way for the US to 
break through what then-BBG Chairman Kenneth Tomlinson called the “distorting filter 
of radio and television stations controlled by those hostile to the United States.”9 
Radio Sawa’s dual mandate -- to capture the attention of Arab youth through 
music, and to move the needle of public opinion towards the United States and its 
policies -- requires both the conception of an imagined Arab listener as a receptive 
listening subject who is capable of being convinced or influenced in specific ways, and a 
utilitarian view of music that ascribes to it, at least in some limited sense, the power to 
convince that listener.  In this way, the question of music’s political utility rests on the 
communicative power of music, which raises the basic question of musical meaning, and 
the degree to which that meaning is the same for people on different ends of a mediated 
and asymmetrical act of musical communication. An examination of music broadcasting 
as political communication should then take into account the production, context and the 
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reception of a communicative act, while remaining cognizant that the meaning, and the 
political force, of that act may not play out for listeners as it is envisioned by 
broadcasters. 
  In describing the local media context for Radio Sawa, I examine American and 
Syrian politically directed broadcasts as multi- faceted objects around which broadcasters 
and listeners often differ not only in goals, operating assumptions, and political beliefs, 
but also in how they fundamentally conceptualize the practice of listening to the radio.  
On the production side of the interaction, my examination of political broadcasting is 
focused on the historically conditioned conception of music under which it has come to 
be utilized as a tool of American and Syrian policy, the imagined “Arab Youth” to which 
the music and news is addressed, and the musical and sonic content tasked with political 
persuasion.10  At the other end of the broadcaster-listener interaction, the dissertation 
addresses the auditory practices, theories of music, and technologies of listening by 
which radio listeners in Syria create locally relevant meaning out of music and radio. 
Drawing on theories of listening and communication developed in historical musicology 
and ethnomusicology, science and technology studies, and recent transnational 
ethnographic studies, as well as on the numerous theories of listening developed in the 
Arabic literature around music, poetry, media and religion, my dissertation attempts to 
outline the intersection of the hypothetical listeners defined by the U.S. government in its 
efforts to use music for political ends, and the actual people who turn on the radio to hear 
the music. 
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Chapter 1 - Learning to Broadcast 
 
This chapter traces the history of international broadcasting in the Middle East, 
focusing on the Cold War as the pivotal period for the development of American radio 
and cultural diplomacy.  Here I argue that Radio Sawa is not an unprecedented departure 
from the history of US broadcasting, nor is the attitude presented by Radio Sawa a direct 
or subconscious projection of American capitalist values.  Rather it is a learned posture 
towards radio broadcasting and music over the radio, one that grew out of the American 
narrative of the Cold War and the domestic history of American radio.  Some of the US 
government’s operating assumptions about the power of radio are contingent on the 
particular history of American radio as it contrasts with European or Middle Eastern 
radio, and the first section of this chapter addresses the reasons for that distinction and its 
significance for US radio culture.  The second section describes the general history of 
international radio in the Middle East and the significance of the Cold War to the 
development of American international broadcasting.  I focus particularly on 1956, the 
year of the Suez Crisis and a vital year in the history of international broadcasting in the 
Middle East, in order to describe the radio landscape and the position of US broadcasting 
within it.   
Within that history, I read two basic theories of music’s utility as a tool in 
politically directed media.  The first theory views music as a communicative medium that 
includes semiotic content beyond its lyrics.  In this framework, music is thought to 





affinity between the listener and the broadcasting country.  The second theory, which 
becomes more significant during and after the Cold War, conceives of music primarily as 
a medium of exchange, the currency with which listeners are induced to become 
audiences for non-musical content, whether that content is commercial, in the case of 
corporations, or public diplomacy and propaganda, in the case of states.   
 
Chapter 2 - Damascus Radioscape  
This chapter describes a 24-hour period in the radio life of Damascus, Syria.  
Employing Arjun Appadurai’s terminology of interlocking and overlapping “scapes”, I 
use this chapter to describe some of the ways in which radio and mass-mediated music 
inhabits the sound of the city, i.e. the points of conjuncture between the radioscape and 
the soundscape of Damascus.11  As a modern metropolis of two and a half million people, 
the greater Damascene soundscape is heard and voiced in innumerable contrasting and 
contradictory ways by the city’s inhabitants.12 Given the specific focus of this dissertation 
on mass-distributed music radio broadcasts, this chapter takes a broad view of Damascus, 
pointing out a few points of intersection between the radioscape and the sonic practices of 
daily life, rather than describing the soundscape of a single group of people, physical 
locus or daily practice. This chapter, based on time spent in Syria in 2009 and 2010, is the 
dissertation’s most ethnographic in nature, and draws on the fields of sound studies and 
the work of ethnomusicologists like Steven Feld to describe a few of the many listening 
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 Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 32. 
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 Damascus population via CIA World Factbook - Syria https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-





practices which define the sound of Damascus, and the way that people in Damascus 
might hear and understand radio. 
 
Chapter 3 – Popular Music in Syrian Mass Media Discourse 
This chapter outlines some of the categories used to market and define mass-
mediated music in Syria in order to explore counterpropositions and alternate theories of 
music and music listening that exist within the local media discourse in the target markets 
for Radio Sawa.  I differentiate between the discourses of state-controlled, state-
sanctioned, and cross-border Arab commercial media, and pose the following questions: 
how might these discourses differ from the musical discourses employed by non-Arab 
international political broadcasters?  Are there alternative theories of music and radio in 
play in addition to the alternative political viewpoints, and alternative versions of reality 
espoused by politically directed broadcasts?    Towards answering these questions, this 
chapter describes elements of musical mass media discourses both within Syria and in the 
pan-Arab mediascape of satellite television, newspapers and radio.  The sources that I 
draw on for this chapter include:  
- Hundreds of hours of radio broadcasts, and language used by radio DJs and station 
administrators and programmers to describe their playlists, both on the air and on 
station websites, and via published and personal interviews. 
- Journalistic and scholarly literary descriptions of popular music, in both the Syrian 
and the pan-Arab press 
- Televised commentary on music, including comedic references to music in the 





- Ethnographic encounters around popular music listening in Syria, especially public 
listening practices in Damascus cafes 
- Syrian state radio discourse about music, focusing especially on state-sponsored song 
contests 
More generally, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a context within which to 
position the music and institutional theories of musical communication broadcast by 
Radio Sawa, and in particular to allow the possibility of pitting Radio Sawa’s use of 
music against the institutional theories of music espoused by Syrian private and public 
state-controlled media outlets. 
 
Chapter 4 – Radio Sawa, Sonic Consumerism, and Western Music in the Syrian 
Radioscape 
Chapter 4 conducts an in-depth analysis of Radio Sawa’s musical playlist and 
formatting, based on hundreds of hours of listening, and a closer reading of a 24-hour 
period on the station’s Levant stream.  Building on the theories of music’s political utility 
outlined in Chapter 1, I categorize the music and formatting on Radio Sawa as defined by 
the second, transactional theory of international broadcasting.  Sawa does not primarily 
attempt, as is often portrayed in the press, to inculcate familiarity with and appreciation 
for American culture while demonstrating respect for local culture.  Instead it can be 
viewed as an effort to develop a pattern of radio listening based on a consumer capitalist 
relationship between listeners and radio, in which music is purely currency used to entice 
listeners to become members of audiences.  Far from an ancillary effect of the 





itself.  The fundamental idea communicated by the music and formatting of Radio Sawa, 
apart from any news content, is exactly that transactional, consumerist nature of listening 
that the station’s format engenders. 
Although I argue here that Radio Sawa is organized around a theory of music 
typified by exchange value rather than musical meaning, I don’t believe listeners 
necessarily perceive the music and musical choices as bereft of meaning.  Rather, 
individuals use patterns of listening shaped by the practices of daily life, local discourses 
about popular music, and decisions about aesthetic preferences and personal 
identification, in order to make sense out of foreign music, and integrate it into existing 
categories of listening.  To explore this aspect of music reception, the second half of this 
chapter shifts away from the direct content analysis of Radio Sawa to describe some of 
the ways in which Western music is integrated into the Syrian radioscape, relying on the 
discursive categories established in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 5 – Idhāʿat Sawa and Asymmetric Music Politics 
In this chapter, I examine the types of asymmetries involved in the relationship 
between a mass-mediated broadcast of a super-power state, and the musical and political 
ideas of the people to which that broadcast is directed.  As a counterpoint to the musical 
discourse of Radio Sawa, I analyze a 2009 album entitled Idhāʿat Sawa (Radio Together) 
by the Damascus band Kulna Sawa (All of Us Together), a rock group from what some 
writers have referred to as Syria’s new wave (al-mawja al-jadīda) or alternative music 
(al-mūsīqā al-badīla) scenes.13  This chapter explores the asymmetrical relationship of 
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the band’s brand of rock music to the US in the context of a local environment, and the 
implications of these efforts for the political project of Radio Sawa. 
The pan-Arab youth radio station imagined in Idhāʿat Sawa is certainly an 
example of a resistance to Western narratives about political justice and just force, but it 
is more than simply an inversion of the Radio Sawa and America’s political positions.  I 
argue that, in contrast to Radio Sawa’s attempt to use a musical frame to move listeners 
to consider an alternate political reality, Idhāʿat Sawa uses a political frame to posit a 
new musical reality.  In this difference not just of political content, but of theorization of 
the power of radio, I posit what may be the clearest demonstration of the essential 
differences between American and Syrian historical conceptions of the radio.  Where 
Americans tend to imagine radio as fundamentally musical, and only occasionally 
political, in the penetrated system of Middle Eastern politics, radio is fundamentally 
political and often, simultaneously, musical.  
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Sound Shifts and the Syrian Uprising  
 In Chapter 6 I describe the changes which have taken place in the Damascus 
radioscape between December 2010 and August 2012, since the beginning of the 
Uprisings.   In the regime’s new state of vulnerability, the basic format of Radio Sawa -- 
Arabic and English language music plus periodic news breaks -- has been adopted by 
Syrian private stations which for the first time are allowed (and required) to report on 
politics, albeit with a single perspective.  With reduced public spending on advertising in 
the failing Syrian economy, the private stations have come to mirror Radio Sawa, almost 
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parodying consumer capitalism in the face of economic crisis by aspiring to the status of 
commercialism, but without the necessary commercials or income.  Musically, the 
percentage of foreign language songs on Syrian radio has slightly decreased in relation to 
the playlists that were used when I was in Syria in 2010, as the regime’s rhetoric against 
foreign instigators and conspirators has increased.  There has also been something of a 
shift within the foreign language playlist, conforming to the process of Syrian genre 
assimilation described earlier. Though foreign song prevalence has decreased only 
slightly, the number of foreign songs which are fully Ajnabiyya (foreign), and do not fit 
in with Syrian genres, has decreased more dramatically.  That is, while continuing to 
program non-Arabic songs, the playlists have managed to sound less foreign.  
Syrians, growing up in what L. Carl Brown calls the “penetrated system” of 
Middle Eastern politics, in which all entities have a presumed political affiliation, are 
more accustomed than most audiences to listening ‘between the notes’ and assuming that 
political motivations lie behind all media.14  In the context of a repressive regime which 
controls locally produced media, though not anywhere near all locally consumed media, 
Syrians have mastered a practice of what I call skeptical listening.15 Finally I posit that as 
the playlists, discourses, and meanings of radio music have shifted, the way that Radio 
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Methodology and Literature 
With each chapter devoted to a different aspect of the broadcasting relationship 
between US and Syria and the larger Arab World, this dissertation employs several 
different methodological and theoretical approaches drawn from a range of disciplines 
including historical musicology and political science, ethnomusicology and sound 
studies, media studies, science and technology studies and popular music and genre 
studies.  I draw on a number of theories of listening from recent Western scholarship as 
well as Arabic-language sources.  From Western scholarship, I work from theories of 
listening that describe the creation of musical meaning as an active process by which the 
listener applies a specific set of cultural technologies to a given set of sounds and musical 
experiences in order to create locally and personally relevant meaning.  These 
descriptions of the act of listening come in a variety of forms.  Steven Feld describes a set 
of “interpretive moves” (locational, categorical, associational, reflective, evaluative) 
which “we employ to situate, entangle, and untangle this engagement/recognition [with 
music] and turn it into a kind of practical consumption.”16  Jonathan Stern’s The Audible 
Past explores a history of “audile techniques” and the way that they interact with and are 
shaped by technologies of sonic mediation.17  Suzanne Cusick, in her essay “On a 
Lesbian Relationship With Music,” describes the process of listening “on your back” as a 
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kind of psychological, physical, and emotional posture which allows certain interpretive 
subjectivites.18 
While most of the literature around these types of conceptions of listening draws 
on examples from single cultural areas, the study of mass mediated forms of music that 
cross political, social, and economic boundaries has necessarily foregrounded the wide 
range of interpretive possibilities that arise when music is produced and consumed in 
vastly different contexts.  In fact, the development of theories of active listening has 
always been engaged with the question of cross-cultural communication and cross-
cultural comparison.  For example, although Feld is most well-known for work that is 
profoundly embedded in the context of a single group (the Kaluli), it is worth noting that 
his classic “Sound Structure as Social Structure” grows out of an engagement with Alan 
Lomax’s fundamentally comparative process of “cantometrics”, and reflects his desire to 
initiate a “qualitative and intensive comparative sociomusicology.”19  In more recent 
scholarship, a number of transnational and cross-cultural studies like those by Marwan 
Kraidy, David Novak, Andrew Jones, and Amanda Weidman have described local active 
listening and practices that redefine music in ways that would have been impossible to 
predict at the point of production.20  
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However, despite the large body of literature that considers the active interpretive 
moves and culturally specific practices of listeners as fundamental to the creation of 
musical meaning, these theories of listening have rarely made their way into discussion of 
transnational cultural diplomacy and political broadcasting efforts.21 The literature on 
cultural diplomacy is enormous, and a good overview of this literature is available in 
Osgood and Etheridge’s introduction to The United States and Public Diplomacy: New 
Directions in Cultural and International History.22  Though not specifically music 
focused, Pinkerton and Dodd's 2009 article “Radio geopolitics: broadcasting, listening 
and the struggle for acoustic spaces,” presents a broad overview of the scholarship on the 
role of radio in international politics.23  While varied in terms of its approaches and 
disciplinary affiliations, this literature has historically tended to focus on the broadcasting 
side of international political communication, investigating political rationale and 
theories of propaganda rather than the specific manner in which that power is articulated 
in cultural products or understood by the people on the receiving end.    One of my goals 
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is to employ the discussion around active listening in ethnomusicology and historical 
musicology to strengthen the work on international broadcasting taking place in the fields 
of history, political science, and media studies, areas in which explanations of the role of 
music in public diplomacy and propaganda have tended to rely on relatively structural 
explanations of musical meaning. 
If the literature on public and cultural diplomacy is somewhat lacking in its aural 
sophistication, a welcome exception comes from a group of scholars writing historical 
studies of musical diplomacy, largely focusing on live concert tours. Penny von Eschen’s 
studies of the State Department sponsored jazz tours of the 1950s and 1960s have 
described how the political and personal goals of the musicians sometimes overrode 
official goals of “perception management.”24  Emily Ansari’s work on Aaron Copland has 
described both the composer’s participation as a cultural diplomat and the way that his 
political goals manifested themselves in his composition.25  Danielle Fosler-Lussier 
places the significance of musical diplomacy in the power of live performances to 
strengthen the interpersonal connections which constitute global flows.26  Jennifer 
Cambell has investigated how the early 1940s efforts of the Office of Inter-American 
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Affairs Music Committee help shape the paradigms by which the music in musical 
diplomacy was selected.27  
Although the literature on music and international radio is comparatively small, 
there is a significant amount of discussion to be found outside of musicology in studies of 
Cold War broadcasting, and I address this literature in Chapter 1. There is relatively little 
work on radio music in the Arab World, and Salwa Castello-Branco’s “Radio and 
musical life in Egypt” is one of the only articles to deal exclusively with radio music.28  
Virginia Danielson’s work on Umm Kulthum discusses her significance for the Voice of 
the Arabs, a pan-Arab radio station broadcast during the Nasser era, and Laura Lohman 
has documented the singer’s continued presence on Egyptian radio since her death.29 
Christopher Stone’s work on Fairuz and the Rahbani Brothers touches on their work for 
Radio Lebanon and Radio Sharq al-Ādnā.30  A forthcoming edited volume (to which I 
contributed one chapter) entitled The Soundtrack of Conflict: The Role of Music in Radio 
Broadcasting in Wartime and Conflict Situations, which grew out of a 2011 conference in 
Göttingen, Germany, will contribute a number of essays on the subject of music and 
political broadcasting.  
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Radio Sawa itself has been the subject of little scholarly attention ten years into its 
existence.  A few scholars have investiged its news credibility: Thomas Christie and 
Andrew Clark in the UAE, and Mohammed el-Nawawy for audiences in Jordan and the 
Gulf, and McCullough, Laura McGinnis, and Perszyk in Iraq.31  A number of scholars 
have critiqued the station in passing as part of the larger US diplomatic media effort in 
the Arab World.32  The online journal Arab Media and Society (formerly Transnational 
Broadcasting Studies) has published several articles on the station by current or former 
US broadcasters and BBG officials.33  There have been any number of short profiles of 
the station in the press, and I discuss some of these in Chapter 4, but while the fact that 
pop music is being used in the context of American public diplomacy efforts is usually 
the lede of the article, analysis of the music on Radio Sawa typically stops at joking 
headlines (“Britney vs. the Terrorists”).34  Douglas Boyd, the scholar of communication 
and media who has done a great deal for the study of international broadcasting in 
Arabic, consulted on the founding of Radio Sawa, and wrote an article contextualizing 
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the station within the history of international broadcasting in the Arab World.35  Among 
the only writers to give the musical side of Radio Sawa any consideration is Sam Hilmy, 
a former Voice of America official who is strongly critical of the decision to end the 
VOA Arabic service.  Hilmy stated of Sawa’s musical playlist that:  
 
[A]fter listening to endless hours of alternating Arabic and so-called 
"Western" pop songs, and trying to deduce some coherent, professional 
whole, we discover what a neglected, drifting wasteland all this airtime 
is… The music portions have no detectable character, personality or 
identity.36 
 
This critique has the virtue of being based on actual time spent listening to the station, 
seemingly unlike the vast majority of the articles written about Sawa.  There are no 
extended examinations of the station’s musical selections, its relationship to competing 
stations, nor attempts to theorize the relationship between the sonic and political goals of 
the station from a musicological perspective.  
The best-known theorist of music radio and propaganda is Theodor Adorno, 
whose work with the Princeton Radio Research Project led to a number of essays on the 
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topic of radio, popular music, and politics, including most significantly “A Social 
Critique of Radio Music.”37  For Adorno, the meaning communicated by music was 
bound up with the medium and type of listening with which it is apprehended, and he 
argued that “the commodity character of music tends to radically alter it.”38  Some aspects 
of my analysis of the music of Radio Sawa echo Adorno’s critique of radio music, and in 
Chapter 4 I argue at length that Radio Sawa attempts to create a kind of consumerist 
relationship to music in listeners.  However, despite the fact that the “sonic 
consumerism” which I identify in Radio Sawa resembles the Adornian language of 
“commodity listening,” I avoid using a primarily Adornian framework for my analysis of 
either US or Syrian broadcasting.  While I am interested in attempts to use musical 
commodities to create audiences amenable to certain political and economic structures, 
for the most part I find Adorno’s  concept of “commodity listening” unhelpful for 
examining the diversity of meanings and practices around radio listening.39 
Much of the language I use to describe the context for these acts of reception and 
interpretation comes from globalization studies, most specifically from Arjun 
Appadurai’s language of “scapes.”  In Modernity at Large, Appadurai outlines five 
dimensions of cultural flow that serve as the building blocks for “imagined worlds” 
which he describes (in an extension of Benedict Anderson’s work) as “the multiple 
worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups 
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spread around the world.”40 These five “scapes” are: “ethnoscapes, mediascapes, 
technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes.”  While all of these dimensions of cultural 
flow are significant to the way that politically directed media is received and understood, 
for my purposes the most significant aspects of Appadurai’s framework are the 
mediascapes which “provide large and complex repertories of images, narratives and 
ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world, in which the world of commodities and the 
world of news and politics are profoundly mixed,” and ideoscapes, “concatenations of 
images...often directly political and frequently hav[ing] to do with the ideologies of states 
and counter-ideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a 
piece of it.”41   
In an effort to focus on the radio medium, I use the narrower construction of the 
radioscape to refer to a variety of aspects of radio: the array of sonic possibilities 
confronting a listener as she tunes in, the set of practices and technologies that condition 
radio listening locally, and the historical and cultural memories by which the medium is 
defined in popular discourse.42  Appadurai’s fives scapes are in constant interaction with 
one another, overlapping and conflicting to create the imagined worlds which he 
describes, and this is similarly true for the radioscape.  In Chapter 1 for example, I 
discuss some of the ways in which the topography of the Middle Eastern radioscape 
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differs from that of the American one to the contingencies of political history (and 
ideoscapes) and the development of broadcasting technology (technoscapes).    
 One way in which my research has been influenced by ethnographic studies of 
listening and studies of mass media and globalization is in the choice to focus on a 
specific context for the reception of American Arabic-language radio broadcasts.  Radio 
Sawa’s various programming streams are broadcast from Morocco to Iraq, across a 
geographic expanse encompassing an incredible ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, 
linguistic and cultural diversity, and produce an equivalent diversity of listening practices 
and contexts.  This variety reinforces over and over again the notion that the globalization 
of mass media does not necessarily lead to a unification of social practices around media 
consumption, or to a unified understanding of what a cultural object means to different 
people.  A Michael Jackson song does not mean the same thing to an American 
musicologist that it does to a Yemeni construction worker, and neither does it mean the 
same thing to that construction worker and a Lebanese 16-year-old studying in a French 
school, or a banker in Dubai, despite the fact that all of these listeners can tune in to hear 
Michael Jackson on the radio.  A song can be a point of connection across cultures, but a 
song only achieves musical meaning, like a radio wave only achieves sound, when it 
achieves contact with a receiver. 
Against the setting of the globalized musical flows of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries, the debate of how producers and listeners create and understand musical 
meaning in mass media has been fundamentally bound up with power and the 
asymmetries of power.  Scholars of globalization and music have argued over musical 





industry vs. local listeners and performers, domination vs. resistance, techno-determinism 
vs. social practice, etc.  In each case the question of musical meaning is not simply one of 
hermeneutic interpretation, but contestation over whose reality provides the context in 
which meaning can be defined.  Ensuing scholarship on globalization and music has 
served to collapse these binaries and describe the ways in which musical meaning is 
constantly engaged with both sides of each pair.  Hybrid forms can serve as resistance to 
the hegemonic flows or, to quote Appadurai, play “havoc with the hegemony of 
Eurochronology”, but as globalization and media scholar Marwan Kraidy has stated, at 
times “hybridity is hegemonically constructed in the interest of dominant societal 
sectors.”43  Similarly, social practice is not forced inexorably into a single mold based on 
the structure of technology; rather, social practice evolves and develops in conjunction 
with technology.   
There is an analogy here between debates over the articulation of power and the 
creation of meaning in global media, and arguments over what exactly determines foreign 
opinion towards the United States, or any government attempting to exert influence 
outside of its borders.  Within the discourse around American international broadcasting 
one of the fundamental arguments is over the extent to which politically directed media 
(propaganda or public diplomacy) is able to “move the needle” of public opinion towards 
the US, especially in relation to actual government policies and their local outcomes 
(often referred by the military/journalistic trope the “facts on the ground”).  Constructed 
as a spectrum, the debate is over where public opinion lies in relation to the effects of 
policy and the public projection of that policy.   
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In American political discourse in the mass media, this often becomes an ideological 
question, in that politicians who view the international policies of the United States as 
fundamentally good or well-meaning (if occasionally imperfect) tend to assume that 
antipathy towards those policies must be based largely on ignorance, misunderstanding, 
or ideological disagreement, problems which in theory can be addressed through 
communication and education correcting the misunderstandings.  In the words of 
President George W. Bush: 
 
I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is 
about that people would hate us.  I, like most Americans, I just can’t 
believe it, because I know how good we are. 44 
 
In contrast, public critics of American foreign policy tend to understand negative 
opinions of the United States as the logical response to those policies, and fall towards 
the other end of the spectrum, assuming that efforts at positively influencing the reception 
of US policy can be successful only in the extent to which they obscure political realities.  
The more subtle analyses of politically directed communication fall somewhere between 
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these two poles, synthesizing the “media representation” and the “facts on the ground” 
explanations for public opinion.  Predicated on the idea that political reality is 
constructed, contingent on the media presentation and social construction of events, this 
synthesis also acknowledges that public representation of policy is limited by the real 
effects of that policy, and by an audience’s existing set of affiliations, beliefs, and 
incentives, which can override even the most unified media presentation. 
In the use of popular music as tool in political radio, we are confronted by both of 
sets of debates described above: those around cultural globalization and the creation of 
local meaning, and those around the efficacy of mass-media political communication in 
creating or altering public opinion.  This is where the theories of active listening drawn 
from music and sound studies become important for the scholars of public diplomacy and 
propaganda.  The active listener, practicing a culturally specific mode of listening, 
interpreting, and understanding music that is of personal, local value, is also a political 
listener and actor, not simply in the sense that every act of culture is a political act, but in 
a more specific formulation of media consumption’s relationship to political opinion.  
The “imagined world” created by the listener’s interaction with the global flows of 
culture determines the affinities and relationships that define attitudes towards foreign 
peoples and governments. 
Much of this dissertation is concerned with the social contexts that define political 
radio: the institutional theories of music and politics under which broadcasts are created, 
the social realities and listening technologies through which listeners derive meaning 
from music, and the public mass-media discourse around popular music.  Nevertheless, 





listening which more than anything else has defined the process of completing this 
project.   
Radio is inherently ephemeral as a medium, and broadcasts are designed to be 
disposable.  Specific segments or isolated programs may have a longer life, reappearing 
as a recurring feature with relevance beyond the initial airing, and songs are heard over 
and over, but the product that a radio station creates exists by and large only in the act of 
listening.  The sonic object that is the fully structured broadcast – the stations IDs and 
song bumpers, the transitions and sequencing of music, the startling juxtaposition of a 
horrifying news report with an upbeat love song – these exist only in the moment of 
listening.  A transmission does not sound without a receiver.  Within the ever dissipating 
radius of radio waves, producers and listeners experience broad tendencies and flows 
rather than the attributes of a fixed set of sounds.   
In the course of conducting research for this dissertation I have listened to 
thousands of hours of radio, in an enormous number of contexts, locations, and formats.  
For a researcher (especially one working in a second language), the ability to record radio 
broadcasts for closer study out of real time is invaluable, but this experience of listening 
to recorded radio has fundamental differences from the experience of simply turning on a 
radio to listen, even setting aside the differences between the ears of a foreign 
musicologist and those of a station’s targeted audience.  Any analysis of radio must be 
grounded in the experiences and practices of actual listeners, but I also begin with the 
presumption that the actual music and sonic content of radio is important.  In constructing 
a map of the Syrian (and to some extent the larger Levantine) radioscape and the place of 





definitions drawn from local mass-media discourse about music, and my conversations 
and interactions with Syrian listeners. An important precursor to my take on radio 
reception is Charles Hamm’s essay “Privileging the moment of reception: Music and 
radio in South Africa”, in which he constructs a “socio-historical analysis” of a single 
moment of reception of the song “All Night Long” by Lionel Ritchie as heard by two 
women on Radio Zulu.45 
The primary body of radio broadcasts that I discuss in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 come 
from several hundred hours of radio recorded in Damascus, and smaller chunks of radio 
recorded in Beirut, Amman, Cairo and Ramallah between 2009 and 2012, as well as 
streaming radio recorded from the internet and satellite radio channels.  In total I spent 
approximately one year in the Middle East during the course of this project, with the 
longest of these research trips consisting of six months in 2010 conducting media and 
archival research, and observing public music listening practices in Damascus.  This 
research, as well as my informal interviews and daily interactions with Syrians, was 
facilitated by languages skills acquired through several years of study in Modern 
Standard Arabic at Columbia University, a summer in Sana’a, Yemen on a fellowship 
from the American Institute for Yemeni Studies, and courses at the University of 
Damascus and with private tutors in Syrian colloquial Arabic during the early months of 
my stay in 2010. 
In the initial stages of this project, I imagined that my dissertation would discuss 
American political broadcasting in several countries, contrasting the radioscapes and 
media systems of several target locations for US Arabic broadcasting.  However, as I 
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spent time in Syria, I became more and more fascinated with the country and the 
particular relationships between radio broadcasting, public culture, and political power 
that occur within the context of the totalitarian state.  In future work on music and 
political broadcasting I hope to contrast the Syrian radioscape with that of other Arab 
countries (specifically on Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt), but for the present study the need 
to substantively address a local context for American broadcasts required a more 
sustained level of engagement with the media, politics and culture of a single locale than 
I could accomplish in a single chapter.  This dissertation then is as much about Syria as it 
is about American broadcasting.   
Syrian music has been severely understudied in the English-language music 
literature, despite the work of a small number of excellent scholars.  The most significant 
work in English to deal specifically with Syrian music is Jonathan Shannon’s Among the 
Jasmine Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria, and his discussion of the 
multiple, sometimes conflicting understandings of modernity and authentic ity in Syrian 
musical culture has been vital to my understanding of the country.46  Shayna Silverstein’s 
recently completed dissertation on dabke is an invaluable addition to the study of 
expressive culture in Syria.47  Kay Shelemay’s work on Syrian Jews in America, in 
additional to serving as a fascinating study of music, memory and diaspora, is an 
important document for the history of Jewish musical culture in Syria.48  There is a 
slightly larger amount of scholarship engaging with Syrian music and culture in French 
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and Arabic, but across the board very little scholarly work exists in English, French, or 
Arabic on recent popular mass-mediated music to Syria.49   
Contemporary critical writing on musical composition and performance in the 
Syrian state-controlled, Arabic-language press is largely devoted to art music (see for 
example the Syrian art weekly Shorufat), but even in this area one frequently  sees 
articles bemoaning the lack of sustained, Syria-focused music criticism.50  While the 
broader pan-Arab media includes a thriving industry of entertainment news and gossip 
about performers, popular music criticism in the sense of music reviews and style 
discussion is relatively scarce, and the literature on popular mass-mediated music tends 
towards the biographical.  Books on the older generations of Egyptian and pan-Arab stars 
(Umm Kulthum, Muhammed  Abd al-Wahhāb, ʿAbd al-Ḥalim Ḥāfiẓ, Asmahān, etc.) are 
available in most bookstores in Damascus, and usually pair a story of the musician’s life 
with collections of their song lyrics.  These books deal primarily with biographical details 
and, assuming a knowledge of their subject’s music on the part of readers, describe 
distinguishing stylistic features or musical trends mainly through invocations of well-
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known songs or genealogies of musical influences.51  Although there may not be a large 
field of popular music studies in Arabic, this does not imply the lack of a public discourse 
around popular music, and Chapter 3 addresses this discourse using newspapers, 
television, and radio broadcasts.  One example of the liveliness of this discourse can be 
seen in a collection of essays by the Lebanese journalist Ḥāzim Ṣāghīyah, whose cultural 
criticism references a wide variety of Arab and western popular singers including Sabah, 
Edith Piaf, Abdel Halim Hafiz, Amr Diab, Elvis, Fairuz and Madonna. 52 Entitled “Nancy 
Is Not Karl Marx” (Nansī Laysat Karl Marks) in a reference to Nancy Ajram, the 
Lebanese pop star and sex symbol, the book begins with a rebuttal to another cultural 
critic, who provocatively  proclaimed that “mu’akhira Nansy ʿAjram aṣbaḥat ahem min 
muqadima Ibn Khuldun” (Nancy Ajram’s rear has become more important than Ibn 
Khuldun’s Introduction [or front]).53 
Given the historical and cultural connections between Syria and the surrounding 
countries of the Levant or historical bilad ash-Sham (Greater Syria), much of the 
scholarship on Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan also engages with issues of great 
importance to mass media and musical life in Syria.  Ali Jihad Racy’s work, especially 
his foundational study of ṭarab, is an invaluable resource to scholars working around the 
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Arab world.54  This is also the case with Christopher Reed Stone’s Popular Culture and 
Nationalism in Lebanon: The Fairuz and Rahbani Nation, which is of vital interest to 
scholars of popular culture in Syria, where Fairuz has been adopted as a national symbol 
in ways which illustrate the complicated relationship between Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalism and identity.55  The permeability of national borders to cultural products is 
especially true in the case of radio, where the already contested borders of the region 
become illusory, and it is often more accurate to discuss a joint Syrian/Lebanese radio 
market than to attempt to divide the two countries.  Work by Elizabeth Cestor on music 
and broadcasting in Lebanon, and Thomas Burkhalter on the “Sound Memory” of the 
Lebanese Civil War in Beirut, are similarly useful for an understanding of popular music 
and broadcasting in Syria.56  Marwan Kraidy’s work on reality television singing contests 
does a masterful job of integrating media analysis into the political context of Syria and 
Lebanon.57  Additionally, the work on Umm Kulthum by Virginia Danielson and Laura 
Lohman, though centered on Egypt, is of vital significance to the rest of the Arab 
World.58 
The most useful overview of recent scholarship on mass-mediated music in the 
larger Arab world comes in the recent volume Music and Media in the Arab World, 
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edited by Michael Frishkopf.  Although none of the essays in the collection deal 
exclusively with radio, the contributions by Zein Nassar and Laith Ulaby both touch on 
the medium, and collectively the essays in this volume, some written in English and some 
translated from Arabic, form an excellent survey of the discourse around music and 
especially music videos. The volume is heavily weighted towards Egypt, as Frishkopf 
acknowledges.59  More generally, as the longtime center of Arabic music and film 
production, Egypt remains the most studied country in the region, and the study of Arab 
popular music genres, figures, and cultures is especially dominated by the country.  
Although the Egypt-central focus of Western scholarship can be problematic when 
discussing the musical cultures in the rest of the Arab World, much of this work has been 
invaluable in the face of the extreme paucity of work on mass-mediated music in Syria.  
Building on a foundation of scholarship on Egypt’s traditional musical genres, Arabic 
music theory, golden age singers like Umm Kulthum and Asmahān, and work on 
religious expressive practices, scholars have recently begun to address pop and  mass-
mediated music in ways which move beyond the tendency (still common in the literature) 
to dismiss popular music.60  James Grippo has addressed the differences between the 
shabābī music that grew up in Egypt in the 1980s and is associated with the most popular 
pan-Arab stars like  Amr Diab, and the working class shaʿbī popular music of urban 
Egypt.61  Jennifer Peterson has described the introduction of musical elements from Sufi 
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inshād religious chants into Egyptian dance music.62  Michael Frishkopf has explored a 
variety of explanatory theories around the “Spanish Tinge” in Egyptian popular music.63  
I address this growing literature in Chapters 3 and 4. There is a significant and growing 
body of films, academic literature, and journalism which deals with Arab musicians in 
Western genres, with the documentaries Heavy Metal in Bagdad, Slingshot Hip-Hop, and 
books including Mark LeVine’s Heavy Metal Islam.64 
 Regional music form outside the Arab world has had an abiding influence on 
both Arab art music and popular music, and the work of scholars like Martin Stokes and 
Walter Feldman on Turkey, and Stephen Blum on Iran and Central Asia, is essential for 
the study of Arabic music.65 
Much of the most significant scholarship on mass-media in the Arab World, such 
as the work of Lila Abu-Lughod and Charles Hirshkind in Egypt, W. Flagg Miller in 
Yemen, or Christa Salamanda in Syria, combines media studies and analysis with 
ethnographic methodology, and these studies have had a great influence on my own 
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work.66 This dissertation will not, however, take a primarily site-based ethnographic 
approach, though Chapter 2, especially, is informed and guided by the many hours I spent 
listening in cafes, shops, and homes in Syria. 
On the American side, US broadcasters have been extremely reluctant to allow 
access to their operations and employees.  Although I have put in countless interview 
requests over the past three years, I am still waiting for official permission to conduct 
interviews with Middle East Broadcasting/BBG employees.  Other areas of the American 
public diplomacy apparatus have been more amenable to my inquiries, and I have 
conducted interviews with State Department employees who run musical tours to the 
Middle East, and several of the musicians involved in these overseas tours.  Without 
access to Radio Sawa employees, my limited knowledge of the internal workings and 
procedures of the station comes from the public statements of BBG officials, government 
mandated reports, and a few unofficial conversations with a few reporters.  While I 
believe that an institutional ethnography of the BBG and American broadcasting, in the 
style of Georgina Born’s work on the BBC or IRCAM, would be of great scholarly value, 
such a study is not likely to be completed any time soon.67  In contrast, meeting with 
people involved with Syrian broadcasting was, until recently, comparatively easy, though 
the recent political situation has of course completely changed the Syrian landscape.  In 
                                                 
66
 Lila Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005); Walter Armbrust, Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Christa Salamandra, A New Old Damascus: 
Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Christa 
Salamandra, “Creative Compromise: Syrian Television Makers Between Secularism and Islamism,” 
Contemporary Islam 2, no. 3 (2008): 177–189. 
67
 Georgina Born, Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the Reinvention of the BBC  (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 2004); Georgina Born, Rationalizing Culture: IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the 





2010 I met with several people involved with radio production, and I had planned to 
return to Syria in the summer of 2011 to conduct interviews with programming managers, 
but my visa request in May 2011 was denied by the Syrian embassy (I was able to 
conduct a few relevant interviews in Lebanon during the summer of 2011 while waiting 
in hopes of getting a Syrian visa.) 
One issue which renders the study of Syrian radio listeners and their relationships 
with politically motivated broadcasting problematic is the vulnerability of potential 
informants.  The Syrian government does not generally allow any research on 
contemporary Syria which might have a political dimension, and I was wary about 
advertising my interests in politically motivated broadcasting for fear that doing so would 
cause problems either for me, or (much more likely) for the Syrians with whom I 
interacted.   
Although 2009 and 2010 was possibly the easiest period in the past several 
decades for Americans wishing to travel Syria, the oppressive ubiquity of the Syrian 
security state was an unavoidable fact of life.  Due to obvious safety concerns, I did not 
conduct surveys, interview listeners, or ask Syrians their views on foreign public 
diplomacy and propaganda broadcasts, even in the context of music.  Friends were 
certainly more familiar with my project, and knew that I was interested in music and 
state-sponsored radio and in Radio Sawa, but I never pressed them for opinions on even 
remotely political topics, though inevitably the “red line” topics of politics come up 
behind closed doors.  
In many ways, foreign visitors to Syria in the period immediately before the Arab 





surveillance state and let it fade into the colorful background of the country.  Although I 
was made aware of the mechanisms of state control in countless ways, as a foreigner I 
experienced this as a temporary and surreal if occasionally inconvenient layer of 
Damascus’ architecture, rather than a structuring force in everyday life.  Additionally, I 
frequently (though not exclusively) socialized, ate, drank, played, and watched sports 
with groups of Syrians who have as a class benefited from the regime’s control of the 
economy and especially its semi-liberalization in the decade before the Arab Uprisings.  
Among the elite classes of Damascus which I had access to as an educated foreigner, the 
ubiquity of the security state was mitigated by the feeling, however tenuous it turned out 
to be, that a phone call could always reach a cousin or uncle with the connections to fix 
the problems one might encounter with the bureaucracy.68  Moving outside of this social 
class however, or into any part of the city and country not usually frequented by foreign 
tourists and students, carries the constant, though slight, potential to arouse the attention 
of the state security apparatus.  While meeting a radio broadcaster or well-known 
musician to discuss their work might be acceptable for an American student, even casual 
interactions with people from social groups who do not typically interact with tourists 
and foreigners can on some occasions draw the attention of Syria’s ubiquitous secret 
police. 
To some extent, these kinds of risks are inevitable while living under the 
authoritarian Syrian state, and as an American, the only way to completely eliminate risk 
would be not to interact with anyone.  Certainly there have been and continue to be a 
number of excellent ethnographic studies of modern Syria conducted by foreign scholars.  
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However, my feeling was that an examination of mass-media discourse around pop 
music, grounded in descriptions of listening practices in everyday life, can provide a rich 
framework for a discussion of state-sponsored music broadcasting without necessitating 
the kinds of interactions which might put people at risk.  Becoming known as the 
foreigner who asks questions about the reception of American propaganda radio would, 
in 2010 Syria at least, have constituted an unacceptable level of risk to the people around 
me.   
With these many issues in mind, I limited my ethnographic engagement to the 
observation of public listening practices, and informal interviews and discussions of 
music and radio.  As it is, despite the fact that I articulated no special interest in the 
politics, on at least two occasions that I know of, friends were visited by the mukhabarāt, 
simply based on my presence in their homes.  Given the presence of any potential risk, 
however slight, I have avoided quoting individuals by name with the exception of a few 
public figures.69   
The current situation in Syria, which at this point that I write this can only be 
described as a civil war, has changed the thrust of this dissertation in countless ways.  
While I have not been in Syria since June of 2010, I have followed events in Syria 
through constant radio listening over the internet, obsessive review of newspapers and 
social media in English, Arabic and French, and occasional correspondence with friends 
in the country.  During this time, as events have reshaped the region and the country, the 
state of the radioscapes that I attempt to describe in this dissertation has changed, and I 
describe some of these changes in the Chapter 6.   
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Radical changes in the Arab world have also changed my relationship to the time 
that I spent there.  It is impossible, even in the moments during the course of these 
chapters when I resort to my own observations and experience, to maintain the fiction of 
an ethnographic present when it comes to Syria.  It is always the case that any description 
of the present immediately becomes a historical document, but in the case of Syria it is 
clear that the country I visited and lived in from 2009 to 2010 does not currently exist, 
and will probably never exist again.  With that in mind, unless otherwise noted, the 
descriptions of the Syrian radioscape in this dissertation refer to the period between 2009 
and 2011, immediately before the Syrian uprising. 
Syria is at a particularly unique moment historically, not just because of the 
potential for radical change, but because that change has been preceded by 40 years 
political stagnation under the rules of Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad.  This political continuity 
does not mean that Syria has remained changeless during this period, and Bassam 
Haddad has detailed the multiple and rapid changes in Syrian economy life under the 
Asad rule.70  However, there are probably few places in the world where the public 
discourse, the range of ideas it is possible to express -- what Stuart Hall has called 
“horizon of the taken-for-granted” -- has been more tightly controlled by the state than in 
modern Syria. 71  For many people, both Syrians and outside observers, the possibility of 
change was until recently hidden beyond that horizon.  In the age of satellite television 
and growing if still limited internet access, the mediascape in Syria is a blend of local, 
regional, pan-Arab, and global international sources, and the burgeoning literature on 
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satellite television and pan-Arab media is vital to an understanding of the Syrian 
mediascape and the presence of politically directed media within it.72  Nevertheless, Syria 
remains a totalitarian state which maintains tight control over all domestic media, and 
only allowed privately owned media outlets to operate at all within the last ten years.  
Although a number of scholars have described a variety of methods for resisting and 
asserting personhood in the face of a “culture of fear,” and despite a dramatic explosion 
on media options available to Syrians in recent years, the Syrian state still controls the 
boundaries of acceptable public discourse.73 
In his two studies of Arab news media (1987 and 2004), former US Ambassador 
William Rugh (to Yemen and the UAE, as well as Deputy Chief of Mission to Syria 
between 1981-1985) divided the Arab world’s national media into four categories: 
Mobilization Media, Loyalist Media, Diverse Media, and Transitional Media.74  Within 
this taxonomy Syria was grouped in the Mobilization media along with pre-2011-
revolution Libya, the Sudan (before the independence of Southern Sudan in 2011), and 
                                                 
72
 For an overview of the literature on Arab satellite television see: Tawil-Souri, H. “Arab Television in 
Academic Scholarship.” Sociology Compass 2, no. 5 (2008): 1400–1415; Naomi Sakr, Satellite Realms: 
Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East  (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2001); Marc Lynch, 
Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006); Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskander, Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News 
Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East  (Cambridge, MA: Westview, 2002); Marwan 
Kraidy, Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life  (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
73
See Panagiotis Geros, “Doing Fieldwork Within Fear and Silences,” in Taking Sides: Ethics, Politics, and 
Fieldwork in Anthropology, ed. Heidi Armbruster and Anna Laerke (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 
89–115; George Weyman, “Empowering Youth Or Reshaping Compliance? Star Magazine, Symbolic 
Production, and Competing Visions of Shabab in Syria” (M.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006), 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/WeymanThesis.htm; Paulo G. Pinto, “The Limits of the Public: Sufism and 
the Religious Debate in Syria,” in Public Islam and the Common Good , ed. D. Eickelman and A. Salvatore 
(Boston: Brill, 2004), 181–204; Paulo G. Pinto et al. “Dangerous Liaisons: Sufism and the State in Syria,” 
Crossing Boundaries: From Syria to Slovakia, Vienna, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences  14 
(2003); Rasha Salti ed. Insights into Syrian Cinema: Essays and Conversations with Contemporary 
Filmmakers, (New York: ArteEast/AIC Film Editions/Rattapallax Press, 2006); Salamandra, “Creative 
Compromise.”  
74






pre-2003 Iraq.75  In these works Rugh characterized the state-dominated mobilization 
media by a set of journalistic norms which included a general assumption of “no criticism 
of policy”, a public maintenance of the “sanctity of leaders”, a “non-diverse” set of 
opinions, and use as a “mobilization tool” to encourage adherence with state positions.   
This set of categories has met with some criticism, and in his overview of 
scholarly theories and taxonomies of Arab media, Adel Iskandar points out a series of 
objections to Rugh’s taxonomy from several media scholars, on grounds including the 
“possibility that the region’s media have been shaped by the specific social and cultural 
history of the Arabic-Islamic World” and a failure to adequately represent the interrelated 
nature of Western and Arab press in light of the post-colonial interpenetration of the two 
systems.76  Given the complex and shifting state of the modern Arab World, Iskandar 
argues that the construction of overarching taxonomies of “Arab Media” may at this point 
in history be an exercise of limited use, akin to drawing “lines in the sand.”77  
Nevertheless, Rugh’s concept of “Mobilization Media” is useful to a discussion of 
international media in that it situates foreign propaganda or public diplomacy broadcasts 
in the context of an already politically-focused domestic mediascape, thus highlighting a 
point of similarity between Syrian and outside media, rather than a point of disjunction.  
The reality of Syrian newspapers, domestic television, and radio as tools deployed to 
mobilize and shape the populace makes Syria a uniquely interesting site within which to 
situate American musical broadcasting. 
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The work that most strongly influenced my understanding of the relationship 
between state power, public culture, and individual agency in Syria is Lisa Wedeen’s 
Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria.78  
This study of the public cult of Hafez al-Asad in Syria is both the defining work of social 
science on the cult of personality in totalitarian regimes and an important contribution to 
the study of politics and public culture more generally.  As Wedeen describes it, the goal 
of Syrian regime in propagating the Asad cult of personality was not necessarily to 
inculcate belief or “legitimacy.”  Rather citizens are required to “act as if”, observing the 
public forms of loyal citizenship and belief even in the face of state rhetoric which is 
patently unconvincing or ridiculous.  This model holds a great deal of significance for the 
discussion of listening and political influence later in this dissertation. 
 
Terminology – Propaganda, Public Diplomacy, or a -      ā  a -Muwajah 
Radio Sawa is an example of the kind of mass media political project described 
by critics as propaganda and by proponents as “public diplomacy.”  According to scholar 
Nicholas Cull of the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, the modern use of the term is 
traced to Edward Gullion, the ex-foreign service officer who established the Edward R. 
Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tufts University.  Cull cites a brochure for the 
Murrow Center for an early definition: 
 
Public diplomacy… deals with the influence of public attitudes on the 
formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of 
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international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by 
governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private 
groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign 
affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job 
is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the 
process of intercultural communications.79 
 
Cull describes the origins of this use of the term in the need to develop a discourse 
untainted by the stigma associated with the word propaganda, despite the fact that 
Gullion himself preferred the unambiguous ‘propaganda’ even while conceding that the 
term was too tainted to be useful.80  Nevertheless, the basic practice of mass media public 
diplomacy, the act of attempting to influence a foreign public, falls within the tradition 
definition of propaganda, and scholars generally agree that this distinction is in the eye of 
the beholder.   
Within the frame of propaganda, scholars of media and international relations use 
finer definitions, such as the distinctions between white, grey, and black propaganda, 
wherein “white propaganda” refers to media that identifies its source, “black propaganda” 
falsely portrays its source, and “grey propaganda” does not directly identify its source.  
Even this kind of taxonomy, however, becomes more complicated when we analyze a 
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specific station taking listeners into account.  In the case of Radio Sawa, the station 
directly identifies its source both on its broadcasts and on its website, and makes no 
attempt to conceal the fact that it is funded by the U.S. Congress.81  Nevertheless, during 
my research in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan I met some listeners who, to my surprise, 
professed both to listen to the station and to be unaware that it is funded by the American 
government.  There are several possible explanations for this: Sawa’s Lebanon/Syria 
stream frequently advertises that it is broadcast “from Mount Lebanon”, and the most 
common acknowledgement of Radio Sawa’s source on the actual station, the occasional 
station ID bumpers which identify the station as “khidmat min Washington” (a service 
from Washington) might be confusing given that the large satellite television news 
networks frequently feature reports “from Washington” as well.  While Radio Sawa 
undoubtedly falls under the heading of “white” propaganda, what is white to one listener 
might have shades of grey to another.  
For much of the discussion of American broadcasting in this dissertation, I use the 
terms public diplomacy or politically directed media rather than propaganda.  I do this 
not because I think that public diplomacy and propaganda are always meaningfully 
different in an analytic sense, but because at least when addressing institutional theories 
of the political utility of music and radio, it can be useful to employ the terminology used 
by the broadcasting government.   Additionally, I should note that I do not believe the 
broadcasters at the Middle East Broadcasting Network (MEBN) conceive of their jobs as 
propaganda; Radio Sawa and Al Hurra have a large number of reporters around the Arab 
World engaged in journalistic endeavors, sometimes at the risk of their own lives, 
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motivated by a variety of interests not least of which is the sincere desire to convey 
accurate information to their audiences.  Veterans of international broadcasting (who 
have written much of the literature on the subject in both the American and British cases) 
tend to argue that the best advertisement for the broadcasting country is an accurate, 
impartial news service. 82 MEBN spokeswoman Deirdre Kline, discussing Radio Sawa’s 
sister satellite television news station Al Hurra, states: 
 
Alhurra's mission is journalistic. Alhurra is required, by law, to be 
conducted in accordance with the highest professional standards of 
broadcast journalism; and include news which is consistently reliable and 
accurate, objective and comprehensive.83   
 
One doesn’t need to agree with their assessment of impartiality, or even with the concept 
of journalistic objectivity itself, to acknowledge that broadcasters do not in most cases 
consider themselves propagandists in the classic sense of WWII disinformation 
campaigns.  When writing about the production side of these broadcasts, that terminology 
can sometimes obscure the subtler ways that power is articulated.  
When discussing the listener side of the equation, I find the “public diplomacy” 
terminology of the US government less useful, and less reflective of the way that political 
broadcasts are understood by critics and listeners.  In Arabic as in English, the choice of 
terminology used by critics and analysts generally conveys an author’s attitude towards 
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the media in question rather than any objective categorization.  In reading direct criticism 
of Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra in the Arabic-language press, the word I have encountered 
most frequently is the borrowed broboganda (propaganda), with all of its negative 
associations, but one also sees a variety of other terms in frequent usage by journalists 
and scholars.  In a 2007 article in Arab Media and Society, Adel Iskandar describes 
several of the terms used in the Arabic media for government sponsored media. 
 
 Three expressions are used commonly throughout the Arab media to refer 
to “public diplomacy.”   The most neutral of these is a direct translation of 
the same term, [al-diblūmasiyya al-sha‘biyya.]  The second, [al- i  lām al-
muwajjah], translates to “directional media.” The third term, [al- ikhtirāq], 
is the most common, and also the most subversive.  The term translates as 
“penetration.”  In a Freudian reading of the term, it signifies the violation 
and dispossession of the body and mind, especially when stated as [al- 
ikhtirāq al-dhihnī] (penetration of the mind).84 
 
Among these terms, “directional media”, or the close “politically directed media,” is most 
useful for the purposes of this dissertation in that it is broad enough to include the range 
of media types addressed in the following pages: the government broadcasts directed to a 
general Arab public, Syrian state-sponsored and state-sanctioned broadcasts to the Syrian 
public, and Idhāʿat Sawa’s conceptual broadcast directed to Arab and American publics.  
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The third term described by Iskandar, al- ikhtirāq, is the most violent iteration of the 
concept, and reflects by some definitions the attempt to influence public opinion inside a 
foreign country is fundamentally outside of the definition of diplomacy, veering instead 
into the realm of direct conflict.  According to British diplomat Charles Webster, 
“diplomacy sometimes attempts to obtain results by influencing the public opinion on 
which governments depend.  In the cold war it is one of the principal weapons on either 
side.  But this is war, not diplomacy.”85  
The relationship of music to war, and specifically to the “global war on terror” 
and the US’s military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (not to mention Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, Libya etc.) has become a small subfield of contemporary music studies.  A 
number of articles, including those in recent edited volumes Music and Conflict, Music in 
the Post-9/11 World, and The Soundtrack of Conflict (mentioned above), have dealt with 
music in the context of these conflicts.86  There has also been a great deal of attention to 
the use of music as a weapon and tool of war, with scholars such as Suzanne Cusick and 
Moustafa Bayoumi writing on the use of music as an instrument of torture, and Jonathan 
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Pieslak writing on music in the lives of active duty soldiers in Iraq. 87  While the 
multiplicity of meanings in music allows the possibility that even the same song can be 
used as both a tool of violence and a tool for diplomacy, and political history is full of the 
simultaneity of diplomacy and war, there is a conflict embedded in the idea of “public 
diplomacy” as a tool in a “war on terror.”  It is a dark irony that some of the same songs 
used to torture Arab inmates at Guantanamo Bay were simultaneously being broadcast to 
the Arab audiences as part of an effort to improve the public opinion the US.  88  
Echoing the idea that "All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means" - 
Chou En-Lai’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous dictum about war as a continuation of 
politics - American public diplomacy has often been described in the terminology of 
war.89   It is not just as a tool, but a “weapon” in the minds of many advocates in the US 
and critics on the receiving end in the Arab World.90  In contrast to the sonic and 
psychological violence at Guantanamo Bay described by Cusick, it can feel myopic to 
use the metaphors of “cultural violence” in reference to radio at a time when the people 
of Syria are experiencing a terrifying explosion of real, physical violence.  For some 
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readers the metaphor will seem more fitting when applied to state-sponsored media of 
Syria, where state-controlled radio has served as an instrument for the regulation of the 
public, and is at the moment documenting and even anticipating attacks on huge 
segments of that same population, interspersed with speech and songs that obliquely and 
sometimes directly advocate violence.91  However, in both cases I find that the metaphor 
of the “radio as weapon” or “music as weapon” is inadequate to the task of analyzing 
either the production or the reception of political broadcasting. 
As a weapon that doesn’t fire directly towards its targets, the Radio Sawa is not 
primarily designed to deter active members of terrorist groups who see themselves as 
fighting the US, the ostensible enemies in the global war on terror, though the US also 
engages in propaganda projects aimed at that group.  Rather American broadcasting is 
supposed to improve attitudes towards the US amongst the neutral parties (the imagined 
listeners) who form the vast majority of the societies from which a tiny number of 
dedicated anti-American fanatics spring, to change the attitudes of the general population, 
and in the most optimistic views of American broadcasters, serve as a kind of societal 
anti-extremist inoculation.  Despite the disturbing presence of “Islam vs. the West” 
rhetoric amidst many segments of the American bureaucracy, the majority of the people 
engaged in the prosecution of the GWOT, and certainly in Arabic language broadcasting, 
acknowledge that the direct enemies in that conflict are miniscule minorities of the 
population wherever they are to be found.92   
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Even without employing language that explicitly identifies public diplomacy with 
warfare, the link remains inevitable.  As Penny Von Eschen states in her essay “Enduring 
Public Diplomacy”: 
First, one might suggest that the fundamental problem with public 
diplomacy is the same as the problem of any U.S. diplomacy: there has 
been so little of it. Instead, at least since the end of World War II, the 
United States has relied more heavily on covert action, bombs, and war, 
and "going directly to the people" has most often been a screen for, or at 
the very least deeply entangled with, such actions.93 
 
Despite the spectre of political violence that looms over the relationship between the US 
and the Arab world, and over any writing on Syria at present, this dissertation will not 
primarily examine music through the lense of violence described above.  Although I 
address the broad issues of music and political radio in the following chapters, the central focus 
of this dissertation will be on the the ways in which the meanings of these large-scale efforts 
at political broadcasting and musical diplomacy are contingent on the local radio environments, 
sounds, and practices which define popular music in the soundscape of Damascus, Syria.  This 
dissertation argues that whether broadcasters conceive of music as a weapon or an enticement, a 
tool or a conversation, the study of that transnational music’s social, political, and personal 
relevance requires an engagement with sound, and the ways in which the sound of popular music 
is understood in local contexts. 
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Chapter 1: Learning to Broadcast 
 
  
When the Bush administration closed the Voice of America’s Arabic language 
service in 2002 and replaced it with the 24-hour pop-music-focused Radio Sawa, the 
move was described by both critics and advocates of the station as a sharp break with the 
historical precedent of the VOA Arabic Services.  Former employees for the VOA Arabic 
service, scholars of Arabic-language media, and the stations founders have, for varying 
reasons, described the station as fundamentally different from its predecessor. 
  Alan Heil Jr, former deputy director of VOA, stated in Voice of America: A 
History that in contrast to the “in-depth programming” of the VOA, “even relatively 
sophisticated youth in much of the Arab world may listen to Radio Sawa more to be 
entertained than to be informed.”94  Mamoun Fandy, a strong critic of the station, stated: 
Radio Sawa does not resemble VOA in any way.  When a veteran director 
of VOA’s Arabic service met with the newly appointed Radio Sawa 
director to discuss the lessons he had learned from the years he spent in 
international broadcasting, the new director called him an “interesting 
man,” told him to forget his experience, and sent him on his way.  Radio 
Sawa has a new name, a new strategy, and a new target audience.  
Therefore, management felt the station could not benefit from the lessons 
learned through previous American broadcasting initiatives to the Middle 
East.95 
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According to Radio Sawa founder Norman Pattiz, the new station "sounded so different 
and it was so appealing—because it really sounds like a Western contemporary music 
station, a pop station."96 
 In this Chapter 1 argue that Radio Sawa is not an unprecedented departure from 
the history of US broadcasting.  Nor is the attitude presented by Radio Sawa a direct or 
subconscious projection of American capitalist values; rather it is a learned posture 
towards radio broadcasting and music over the radio, one thet grew out of the American 
narrative of the Cold War and the domestic history of American radio.  Within that 
history, I read two basic theories of music’s utility as a tool in politically directed media.  
The first theory views music as a communicative medium that includes semiotic content 
beyond its lyrics.  Within this framework music is thought to illustrate, advocate, and 
instantiate the values and culture of the broadcasters, creating an affinity between the 
listener and the broadcasting country.  The second theory, which becomes more 
significant during and after the Cold War, conceives of music primarily as a medium of 
exchange, the currency with which listeners are induced to become audiences for non-
musical content, whether that content is commercial, in the case of corporations, or public 
diplomacy and propaganda, in the case of states.  These theories are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and they are both employed in attempts to ‘move the needle’ of 
public opinion towards the US, but they express profoundly different views about what 
music is and what it can do. 
This chapter addresses the history of international broadcasting in the Middle East 
in order to discuss the development of the operating assumptions which guide America’s 
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current propaganda or public diplomacy (the letter being the preferred term of the State 
Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors).  Some of the particular 
characteristics of Radio Sawa that I trace back through the historical record are as 
follows: 
-The commercial format for a governmental station. 
-The basic emphasis on advertising the American brand. 
-The employment of foreign nationals as announcers. 
 -The development of a long broadcast day. 
-The use of Arab and Western music. 
-The use of pop and rock music. 
-The targeting of youth. 
 
Some of the U.S. government’s operating assumptions about the political utility 
of radio come from the particular nature of American radio history as it contrasts with 
European or Middle Eastern radio.  The first section of this chapter addresses the reasons 
for that distinction and its significance for US broadcasting culture.  The second section 
describes the general history of international radio in the Middle East, and the 
significance of the Cold War to the development of American international broadcasting.  
For this section I focus particularly on broadcasts from 1956, the year of the Suez Crisis 
and a vital year in the history of international broadcasting in the Middle East, in order to 
describe the radio landscape and the position of US broadcasting within it.  
 This examination of the history of international radio broadcasting in Arabic, the 
immediate precursors to Radio Sawa and todays “public diplomacy” broadcasts, and the 
governing principles employed by these stations in regards to their use of music, will 








The Concept of Radio in America versus Europe  
 
 The history of radio broadcasting in the Middle East serves as a perfect example 
of what L. Carl Brown calls the “penetrated system” of the region, where local politics is 
inextricably linked to regional and global actors.97  Radio respects no border, and the 
interpenetration and overlap of various national broadcasting systems is inevitable in any 
region which includes multiple nations in a small area, but the particularly penetrated 
airwaves of the Middle East have been disproportionally dominated by the broadcasts of 
foreign powers.  While some regional powers (Egypt most dramatically) were able to 
mount early and successful broadcasting systems, media scholar Douglas A. Boyd states 
that “[i]t has only been since the mid-1960s that some Middle Eastern countries have 
provided their citizens with adequate internal radio so that they do not have to rely on 
outside broadcasts for information and entertainment.”98 
 The penetrated nature of the Middle East has confounded American officials for 
decades, and American broadcasters are no exception to this rule.  There exists any 
number of obstacles rendering the delivery of an effective international broadcast 
extremely difficult for the US (in addition to a long-running argument over what 
constitutes an effective broadcast).  One of the fundamental obstacles to American 
broadcasting efforts which has gone relatively unexamined in the scholarly literature has 
to do with how radio is understood within the American context, and the ways in which 
this understanding fails to acknowledge the realities of radio’s history in the Middle East.  
If, as I argue, American institutional understanding about the possibilities of international 
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broadcasting (and the use of music in these broadcasts) comes out of the dual histories of 
domestic commercial radio and Cold War propaganda, the way that American broadcasts 
are understood on the receiving end is equally shaped by the local histories of radio. 
While there is a great deal of scholarship on radio as pertains to international 
broadcasting and propaganda, especially dealing with Germany and the Soviet Bloc 
countries in the post-WWII era, most of the academic literature on the cultural history of 
radio has been written with a bias towards the perspective of American broadcasting 
history.  Despite the fact that much of the oft-cited theorizing about radio and other mass 
media comes from Europeans, especially European emigrants to the US, the specific and 
somewhat unique history of American broadcasting tends to influence the way in which 
scholars in the humanistic fields, as well as American policymakers, conceive of radio as 
a medium.  Scholars who study the impact of radio on smaller units of society, often 
writing from anthropology, have done an admirable job of describing local radio culture 
in their particularities, but this work has not yet made its way into the popular 
historiography of radio as a medium, and certainly not to an extent that would influence 
American policymakers.99   Given the lack of a body of comparative scholarship on 
American radio versus radio in other parts of the world, the following section focuses on 
that disjuncture.  
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Figure 1.1: Radio Corporation of America (RCA) advertisement “Freedom to Listen, 
Freedom to Look.”  The caption beneath the image reads “Our American concept of radio 
is that it is of the people and for the people.”100 
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American Radio Culture 
The classic radio advertising image above brings to mind a set of associations that 
define for many Americans a specific kind of radio content and set of meanings for the 
medium.  In the United States early radio (approximately 1920-1950) is associated with 
soap operas and other sponsored radio plays, music, and newscasts from corporations like 
GE and Westinghouse.101  These were often the same corporations which manufactured 
and sold the radio sets themselves.  Though the history of public and non-profit radio in 
the US goes back to the 1910s, American broadcasting was and still is dominated by 
commercial stations.  American radio history is a fundamentally capitalist one, and 
moreover the American style of consumer capitalism was developed concurrently with 
the radio; the fields of advertising, market research, and brand identification, born in the 
newspaper field, came to their full fruition in radio broadcasts.  Even the newscasts of 
early radio, which were initially conceived of as public service rather than a profit center 
for radio broadcasts, were part of a market exchange; they were the way in which 
corporations paid for broadcasting rights on a given frequency, as the airwaves 
themselves were conceived of initially as publicly shared property held in trust by the 
government and leased to corporations. 
 While the conception of radio as a capitalist endeavor is historically relevant for 
the United States, the early history of radio in the rest of the world was largely dominated 
by state-sponsored broadcasts to an extent that may be difficult for Americans to fathom.  
To be sure, this distinction is one of degree rather than kind, as commercial radio in 
Europe started not long after it began in the US in 1920, but the differences are hardly 
                                                 
101
 For an examination of the broadcaster-listener relationship in the US during this  period, see, Elena 
Razlogova, “The voice of the listener: Americans and the radio industry, 1920--1950” (PhD dissertation: 





subtle. 102  For example, there was no national public radio network in the US until the 
advent of NPR in 1970.103  The relative dominance of commercial radio in the US does 
not come from the inherently capitalist nature of American society, though capitalist 
ideology undoubtedly plays a role in the development of American broadcasting.  Rather 
the reasons behind this distinction between American and foreign broadcasting rest in 
part on the physical properties of radio itself, and the way in which these properties 
interact with political geography.   
 The development of radio broadcasting technology has followed a 
counterintuitive path as it progressed throughout the first half of the twentieth century in 
that the effective range of broadcasts shrank rather than grew as new technologies were 
adopted. As the most popular medium for radio broadcasting moved from shortwave to 
medium wave (both based on amplitude modulation) to FM (frequency modulation) due 
to the increased fidelity available through FM technology, the potential range of a 
broadcasting antenna shrank to the FM radius of as little as a few miles depending on 
signal strength.  Because the frequencies used for FM radio propagate by line of sight, 
FM signals cannot travel around obstacles or the curvature of the earth no matter how 
much wattage is applied to the transmitter.  Medium wave broadcasts in contrast can 
travel hundreds of miles, especially at night when electromagnetic distortion from the sun 
dies down and radio waves can travel higher into the atmosphere before bouncing back to 
earth.  Shortwave broadcasts can travel thousands in the right conditions, due to the 
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ability of these frequencies to bounce off of the ionosphere and around the curvature of 
the earth. 
 Because AM broadcasts in the short or medium wave are more prone to static 
than FM broadcasts due to the type of carrier wave used, music broadcasting has 
gradually shifted heavily to FM since 1940s, despite its much smaller broadcast radius.  
The solution to AM static is to raise the wattage of the transmission, but the second 
consequence of this is the tendency of high wattage AM transmissions to travel farther, 
such that a station trying to achieve broadcast clarity will necessarily increase its range.  
The necessarily wide propagation range of short and medium wave radio was one of the 
benefits of the technology, but this technology had different effects in Europe and the US.  
 
 
Europe vs American Radio Histories 
The map of the United States displayed below (Figure 1.2) is overlaid with the 
nighttime broadcast radii of hypothetical AM band radio stations centered on major 
population centers, all broadcasting at the same frequency.104   
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Figure 1.2: Hypothetical broadcast radii for powerful AM stations 




Figure 1.3: Hypothetical broadcast radii for powerful AM stations 
 As the above maps make clear, while AM stations in the United States are 
potentially subject to some interference from stations on the same frequency in other 
cities, the use of the same AM frequency by multiple stations in Europe would result in a 





competing for airspace principally with English language stations from other American 
cities, European stations are competing with stations broadcasting in other languages 
from outside of the legal jurisdiction of their state.105 
 The historical result of this interaction between geography and technology was 
that the competition for usable radio frequencies was much more intense in Europe than 
in the US.  While the apportioning of radio frequencies to various purposes in the US was 
primarily a domestic matter handled by Congress through domestic legislation, with some 
exceptions like the 1941 North American Regional Broadcast Agreement,106 in Europe it 
was a complex international process which required a series of treaties during the teens, 
twenties and thirties.107   AM  radio in Europe is to this day allotted in smaller frequency 
bands than in the US (a station every 9hz as opposed to every 10hz in the US), but the 
squeeze was even tighter in the early days of radio, when the imprecision of transmitters 
and receivers required stations to employ wider frequency bands.  
 In an environment where nations had to compete with each other for access to 
broadcast frequencies, European governments were much more likely to reserve 
broadcasting rights for state agencies rather than apportion them out to private 
corporations.  Thus, where in the US the state was only a minor presence on the radio 
dial, in Europe a very high percentage of radio stations were initially state-funded or 
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operated.108  Additionally, Britain’s introduction of a radio set license fee to fund the 
production of the BBC linked the government to both the transmission and reception side 
of radio in a way that was followed by countries across Europe (though the BBCs 
international broadcasts are not financed by the license fees).109 
 The concept of a radio receiver license fee was considered in the US during the 
1920 and 1930s when the idea of advertising aided by the use of a public resource still 
met with a significant amount of opposition, but it was never implemented, and the TV 
set license fee was similarly shot down.110  Instead something like the opposite of a 
license fee occurred, and American corporations offered radio sets at discounts in order to 
increase listenership for moneymaking commercials, selling audience to advertisers 
rather than selling content to audiences. 
 The basic American understanding of radio as a medium is thus significantly 
different from the European one.  This idea that radio is best handled by for-profit 
corporations, or the alumni of commercial broadcasting, appears over and over again in 
American decision-making, where multiple government agencies have tried in various 
ways to emulate for-profit broadcasting.  Sig Mickelson, former director of Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty, had previously worked as President of CBS News.111  Frank 
Shakespeare, who was director of the USIA from 1969-1973 (United States Information 
Agency, then in charge of the Voice of America) , and later Chairman of the International 
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Broadcasting Bureau and Ambassador to Portugal, had been Vice-Chairman of RKO 
General, the famous radio and film production company.112 
I have contrasted the U.S.’s history with Europe’s here because the system of 
radio broadcasts in the Middle East was largely conditioned by European powers.  
England, France and Italy were especially dominant in the Middle East and North Africa 
in the pre-WWII era when international broadcasting began, and they applied the same 
set of rules for radio to their colonies in the Middle East as they did back home, dividing 
up the airwaves among themselves.  In addition, the relative poverty of local populations 
meant that those broadcasts which did originate locally were at a disadvantage compared 
to large and well-funded Arabic-language stations broadcast by European governments.  
Given these factors, and the political geography of the region, the Middle East developed 
a radio landscape which is much closer to the state-led European than the American 
private model. 
Indeed, many of the most famous voices in the Arabic-speaking world spent much 
of their careers performing and composing for state radio.  Umm Kulthum’s famous 
concerts on Ṣawt al-  Arab are the best known example, but most of the greats of twentieth 
century Arabic music worked for state radio at some point.  The Rahbani Brothers got 
their start at Radio Lebanon (formerly Radio ash-Sharq before the French pulled out of 
Lebanon in 1946), and Fairuz first sang their music on the British-owned Idhāʿat Sharq 
al-Ādnā (Near East Radio).113  Government sponsored radio performance and recording 
became such a central part of the music market that the Egyptian composer 
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Muhammed  Abd al-Wahāb used an interview with the VOA in the 1970s as a chance to 
complain about the distorting effect of radio when asked why he composed fewer purely 
instrumental pieces than in his younger days: 
Of course this is necessary, but you cannot blame us for the current 
situation.  The radio is to be blamed for it.  The radio should direct more 
attention to music….it is the problem of the government’s routine itself, 
which gives a composer LE 150 or LE 200 for a song but give a musician 
LE 7 or LE 10 for an instrumental piece…114 
It is telling here that   Abd al-Wahāb traces the distorting effect of the radio on music 
composition directly to governmental actors.  For a musician in the Arab World for most 
of the twentieth century, radio as a medium was necessarily associated with government, 
whether local or foreign governments, in a way it was not for American musicians and 
listeners. 
Early History of International Radio 
First Voices 
International Radio in the ME and the VOA 
 
The history of international broadcasting begins with the Soviet Union, where 
early optimism concerning the possibility of socialist revolution around the world caused 
party leaders to initiate sporadic foreign broadcasts in 1927.  In 1929 the Soviet foreign 
language broadcasting department was founded, under whose auspices Radio Moscow 
was inaugurated in October of that year.  The station began with French broadcasts, in 
addition to its native Russian, and soon expanded to English and German.   Within the 
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first few years of its existence, Radio Moscow was also broadcasting in Czech, 
Hungarian, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, and Portuguese.115 
 In the same year that the USSR initiated its international broadcasts, the 
traditional colonial powers began broadcasting radio to the areas under their control.  The 
Netherlands began transmission in Dutch to Indonesia in 1927, France and Belgium 
followed with broadcasts to their African colonies in 1931, and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) began its English language Empire Service in 1932 (later to become 
the World Service).116 
BBC founder Lord John Reith’s ambitions for the early Empire Service were very 
limited:  
Don't expect too much in the early days; for some time we shall transmit 
comparatively simple programmes, to give the best chance of intelligible 
reception and provide evidence as to the type of material most suitable for 
the service in each zone. The programmes will neither be very interesting 
nor very good.117 
 
Despite the international audience of these programs, the first international 
broadcasters were not necessarily engaged in public diplomacy or propaganda operations 
of the type which we might envision today.  The BBC Empire Service, for example, was 
initially directed towards the sizeable English population living abroad.  Although British 
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listeners in foreign countries were almost certainly a minority of the listenership 
wherever the Empire Service reached, the content was tailored to their interests, focusing 
almost entirely on news from back home in England.   As Michael Nelson notes in War 
of the Black Heavens, in the BBC’s first broadcast to Continental Europe the British 
Prime Minister referred to the Czechoslovak crisis as “a quarrel in a far-away country 
between people of whom we know nothing.”118  Similarly to the Empire Service, early 
Soviet broadcasts were geared towards ideological sympathizers and ComIntern members 
outside of the Soviet Union, rather than attempting to address the general populations of 
foreign states.  Although the US government was not directly broadcasting during this 
period, Fred Fejes has argued that American private shortwave radio broadcasts to Latin 
America in the 1930s facilitated political and economic goals of the Roosavelt 
administration, and set out “the foundation for the post-war development of the Voice of 
America.119 
 The first broadcasters to explicitly target the general populations of other 
countries with their international broadcasts were the Axis powers of Italy and Germany.  
Hitler expanded Germany’s regular domestic broadcasts into international propaganda 
initiatives in 1935, under the direction of propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels and chief 
of radio Eugene Hadamowski, whose musings on the subject mirror the enthusiasm the 
Nazi regime had for the prospects of international radio: 
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We spell radio with three exclamation marks because we are possessed in 
it of a miraculous power—the strongest weapon ever given to the spirit—
that opens hearts and does not stop at the borders of cities and does not 
turn back before closed doors; that jumps rivers, mountains, and seas; that 
is able to force peoples under the spell of one powerful spirit.120 
 
Mussolini’s Italy was beginning its own international broadcasts in 1935, and by 1937 
Italy was broadcasting in 16 languages, in contrast to Germany’s six.121 
International Broadcasting to the Middle East 
Arabic is “the world’s most broadcast international radio language after English,” 
according to radio scholar Douglas Boyd.122  The following figure provides a list, 
compiled by Boyd, of the non-Arab countries which broadcast in Arabic at some point 
during the twentieth century.123 
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The rise of fascist parties in Germany and Italy changed the international 
broadcasting landscape in the Middle East just as it did in Europe.  Italy began Arabic 
language broadcasts denouncing British policy in the Middle East in 1935 (Radio Bari), 
and it was in response to this propaganda offensive that the BBC established its first 
foreign language service, in Arabic, in 1938.124  France also began broadcasting Radio 
Orient (Idha  at ash-Sharq) to Lebanon and Syria in 1938.125  Germany followed with its 
own Arabic broadcasts in 1939.  These broadcasts were largely in the long-range but poor 
quality shortwave bands, and thus the BBC Empire service was able to broadcast to the 
Middle East directly from London.    
The U.S. produced occasional news briefs in Arabic during World War II, 
broadcasting from Algiers after the Allied invasion of North Africa in November of 1942, 
but regular Voice of America Arabic service did not begin until January 1, 1950.126    The 
signal originated from the USS Courier, a Navy ship stationed in the harbor at Rhodes, a 
position from which the VOA broadcast in sixteen languages.127  The Courier’s 
transmitter broadcast a shortwave signal with potential to reach a wide expanse of the 
Middle East.128  Beginning with a half-hour per day of programming, VOA-Arabic 
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expanded by 1958 to six hours per day, and included cultural programming and English 
lessons in addition to the regular newscasts.129 
In a move emblematic of the VOA’s  general tendency to follow in the footsteps 
of the BBC, the first voice of the VOA Arabic news service was Isa Khalil Sabbagh, a 
former BBC commentator and analyst. Though the BBC was the model for the VOA’s 
Arabic service, there were significant differences between the two.  As a colonial power 
around the Middle East, the BBC had both a large stable of British Orientalists and 
military officers to draw on and a small but significant rotating population of Egyptian 
scholars like Taha Hussein who were available to give lectures from London.  The BBC 
also regularly invited Egyptian singers and musicians to London to perform on the 
radio.130  Italy’s Radio Bari had a famous advantage over Britain, in that the combination 
of the Bari transmitter’s relative proximity to North Africa and the Italian occupation of 
Libya allowed Italy to hire an entire ensemble of Arab musicians to work as the radio 
station’s famous house band.131   
Though the VOA was able to hire away some talent from the BBC or the 
Egyptian Home Service, the pool of Arabic specialists in government employ was 
extremely shallow.  The US also lacked the infrastructure of the BBC’s large 
newsgathering organization, comprised in part by reports from British embassies in the 
region.  The VOA’s relative weakness in terms of local capabilities was not seen as 
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completely damning to US broadcasters, partly because the purpose of the station was 
somewhat different from that of the BBC.   
The three principles embedded in the VOA’s congressional charter are as follows: 
(1) VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news.  
VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.  
(2) VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, 
and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of 
American thought and institutions. 
(3) VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and 
will also present responsible discussion and opinions on those policies.132 
 
The first principle has been subject to debate throughout the history of US broadcast.  
As recently as 2004 in a Congressional hearing on the subject of Al Hurra, Radio Sawa’s 
satellite television sister station, Rep. José E. Serrano (D-N.Y.) implied that a station that 
was not propagandistic was not worth funding, stating: "Do not tell us it's not 
propaganda, because if it's not propaganda, then I think . . . we will have to look at what 
it is we are doing,"133 




 Ellen McCarthey, “Va.-Based, U.S.-Financed Arabic Channel Finds Its Voice,” The Washington Post, 
October 15, 2004, Page A01. The degree to which the VOA’s newscasts truly served as an independent 
voice, outside of the control of Washington, is debatable.  Former VOA employees usually bristle at the 
implication that they were being told what to report by Washington, and suggest that their diplomatic 
function was best served by functioning as an impartial news source, but there are a few documented 
occurrences of direct interference.  Alan Heil has documented an incident when the State Department 
pressured the VOA’s Arabic news team to withhold a story about Iraqi military posturing toward Kuwait, 
in the period before the first Gulf War, when the U.S. had not settled on an antagonistic stance towards 
Iraq.   
Interestingly, some of the few documented uses of the Voice of America for clandestine purposes 
involved its music programming.  In his book on international broadcasting during the Cold War, Michael 
Nelson relates the following story: 
 According to court documents, the order to broadcast the clandestine message came from 





The second and third principles of the charter however, were never under dispute.  
The Voice of America has always been conceived primarily as an advertisement for 
America.   Where the BBC’s history of international broadcasting had begun with the 
Empire Service for Britons abroad and only later expanded its goals in order to address a 
primarily foreign audience, the US lacked Britain’s imperial background, and the VOA 
was always meant for foreign audiences.  Although the BBC World Service was the 
obvious model for the VOA, proponents of the service have traditionally tried to vouch 
for the quality of the broadcasts by comparing them to domestic commercial stations 
rather than to other national services.134 
The type and quantity of music used on the VOA’s Arabic services changed over 
time, but the use of music was primarily based on this goal of advertising America.  In 
contrast to the BBC, which began Arabic broadcasts with a reading from the Quran, and 
other foreign language broadcasts which began with local music, many VOA broadcasts 
opened with the beginning chords to “Yankee Doodle Dandy”.135   The use of jazz and 
rock music especially was initially proposed within this framework, as an advertisement 
for American popular culture.  Leonard Feather’s Jazz Club USA, begun in 1952, was the 
first regular jazz program on the Voice of America.  Feather’s stint was short-lived, but 
was followed by Willis Conover’s Music USA in 1955, another jazz program that would 
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broadcaster, was ordered to play a song at a specific time from the Rod Stewart album, 
“Foolish Behavior.”  Wick did not remember the Silverman incident, but said it would be 
appropriate under those conditions of national security and the U.S. national interest.  
Mary Bittermann, however, who ran the VOA under President Carter, said clandestine 
messages had no place there. 
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continue for more than 30 years.136  According to some commentators, during that period 
Conover was thought to be the “second-best-known American in the world, behind 
whoever was president at the time.”137  
Despite the primacy of American music on the VOA, local music was also fair game 
under the theory that music, as the “universal language,” has inherent communicative 
potential. Thus, in 1945, VOA music director Elizabeth Lomax advised programmers to: 
sample every kind of music which is truly part of the American scene… as 
well as music of your target area… We can create a bond of friendship by 
telling our audience in effect: ‘We in America know your music as well as 
our own’.138 
The VOA Arabic service eventually began broadcasting a large percentage of Arabic 
music (usually Egyptian), but this change developed over time as the station realized that 
local music was more popular, and was necessary in order to compete with some of the 
other stations to be discussed shortly.139  
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The other side of international broadcasting, as opposed to the “broadcasting the 
home country” model, avoids national affiliation with radio stations that attempt to act as 
replacements for local media, or pass themselves off as local broadcasts.  These 
replacement services can also be the so-called black or grey clandestine stations, using 
the terminology wherein “white propaganda” refers to media which identifies its source, 
“black propaganda” falsely portrays its source, and “grey propaganda” does not directly 
identify its source.  Both Britain and America had very important clandestine presences 
around the world during the Cold War, though the US did not have a full clandestine 
broadcast in the Middle East on par with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the US 
clandestine broadcasts to Eastern Europe.  Nevertheless, these stations, as well as the 
British Sharq Al-Ādnā, were significant in the development of American music 
broadcasting in the region. 
The Radio Landscape in the Middle East: Focus on 1956 
 
The first decade of American Arabic-language broadcasting, the 1950s, saw the 
rise of a crowded radio landscape in the Middle East, with regional and external powers 
waging public battles over the airwaves.  The traditional colonial powers of Britain and 
France saw their power weaken while the US and USSR increased their presence in the 
region, though all four steadily increased the number of hours of Arabic language news 
and entertainment to advance their goals in the Middle East.140   An accurate feeling for 
the complex relationships between the various broadcasters and states actors behind them 
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can be gleaned by sampling a few broadcasts from the early days of the pivotal year of 
1956.   
On January 7, 1956, the Arabic language program on Radio Tel Aviv (eventually 
expanded into Ṣawt Israel), claimed that “The Syrian Government issued an order 
prohibiting the people from listening to this radio in public places directly after the time 
of the Arabic evening program had doubled.”  Decrying the censorship of radio as a 
“grave moral and political wrong” the commentator went on to criticize Syrian broadcasts 
in Hebrew, saying:  
In Israel where the people are free to listen to any radio, the Hebrew program 
broadcast by Damascus Radio is a source of entertainment and ridicule, not 
because of the grammatical mistakes, but because of the very strange and untrue 
news broadcast.141 
 
Damascus did not take long to respond, denying the accusation of censorship in a 
broadcast two days later, and even more forcefully denying the accusation of poor 
grammar. 
We know that the majority of the people in occupied Palestine listen to the 
Hebrew Radio program of Radio Damascus.  As to the allegation that the 
school children listen to discuss with their teachers the mistakes made by 
the announcer of Radio Damascus, every person who really knows the 
Hebrew language realizes that this is a lie.  The Hebrew teachers in 
occupied Palestine advise their pupils to listen to Radio Damascus to 
imitate the Hebrew announcer’s pronunciation and style.   
Hebrew is an Oriental language which Orientals alone can pronounce 
properly. The Hebrew language reached its highest development under the 
rule of Islam in Medieval Spain.  We do not claim that our Hebrew 
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language is free from all faults, but our Hebrew is far better than the bad 
Hebrew of Radio Tel Aviv.142 
 
This kind of back and forth criticism of rival broadcasts in addition to criticism of 
the rival nation is typical of this period. Foreign broadcasters too were part of this 
inter-station criticism, as shown in this Soviet transmission from a few years 
earlier, broadcast in Kurdish to the Middle East. 
It must be stated that the Kurdish program of Baghdad radio also broadcasts 
a lot of Kurdish and European music.  This is to indicate that the Kurds of 
Iraq are very merry and well off, and they like to hear music.  The Kurdish 
masses of Iraq have no means of living except through hard labor.  The 
Kurds have no say in their country's affairs.  Those Kurds who venture to 
talk about Kurdish freedom are immediately accused of being Communists.  
Thus they are handcuffed by the police of Nuri Said and thrown in prison. 
… 
The Kurdish program of Radio Baghdad, instead of talking about the great 
campaign of the Kurdish Nation for its freedom and independence, plays 
American jitterbug music and British foxtrots.  Indeed they mean to indicate 
that the Kurds have everything they want in life and now their only 
necessity is to dance to imperialist music.143 
 
On January 6, 1956 in a commentary on Egypt’s Ṣawt al-  Arab, Ahmad Said 
accused the “imperialist powers” (i.e., Britain) of jamming the station in Jordan.144  
Regardless of whether the Jordanians were trying to jam the station, the Egyptians didn’t 
seem to think that their jamming process was too successful, as two days later Nassar’s 
Voice of the Arabs (Ṣawt al- Arab) broadcast a talk by the Jordanian-born Mohammed 
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Mahmoud al-Khatib, calling on his fellow countrymen to oppose the imperialists, and 
assuring them of a high level of support among the Egyptian populace.145   
In response to the rising popularity of Nasser’s broadcasts, King Hussein of 
Jordan began his own station on January 9, with the strong encouragement and backing 
of the British, who hoped that a pro-British Arab radio station coming from either Jordan 
or Iraq might be created to counter the rising power and popularity of Ṣawt al-  Arab  from 
Cairo.146  Broadcasting from Amman, the station used the name “Radio Ramallah” for 
sympathetic effect, and King Hussein himself penned two of the first editorials (not 
attributed to him on the broadcasts), in which he referred to Egypt as a “stooge, an 
obedient tool” and the Saudis as a “primitive tribal party.”147  In their enthusiasm to 
counter Nasser’s brand of bombast, the British imported Younis Bahri to Jordan, who 
began broadcasting for Radio Ramallah on January 26.  Bahri, an Iraqi, had gained 
notoriety during World War II for radio commentaries across the Middle East.  The fact 
that Bahri gained his fame as a rabidly pro-Nazi propagandist evidently did not deter the 
British in their efforts to find and an Arab voice who would oppose Nasser.   
Radio Ramallah was unsuccessful and short-lived, partially because King Hussein 
himself would not remain quite so friendly to the British for long -- by March he had 
dismissed the British General John Glubb from his post as head of the Arab Legion.   In 
the early part of the year however, the British were so pleased with these commentaries 
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that they rebroadcast them on their own nominally clandestine station, Sharq al-Ādnā. 148  
Of course, all this did for the Egyptians was confirm the relationship between Jordan and 
Britain, as by this time the source of Sharq al-Ādnā was so well known that the station 
was referred to in Lebanese papers as the Cavalry of St. George, after the image on a 
British coin.149 
Sharq Al-Ādnā was simultaneously a failure for Britain in terms of its clandestine 
purpose (its British sponsorship was suspected or assumed in most places) and a great 
initial success in terms of its popularity and influence on international broadcasting.  
Founded in 1942 in Jaffa, the station continued broadcasting from Palestine until 1948 
when the British withdrew, after which it moved to Cyprus. The station is described here 
by Peter Partner: 
The Sharq al-Ādnā was amply financed, and it soon had a good supporting 
Arabic entertainment programme as well as a news programme.  Its first 
Director was Squadron Leader A. H. Marsack, who had served in Egypt 
and the Sudan before the war, and had converted to Islam.  The Egyptian 
State Broadcasting Corporation loaned experienced staff, and Sharq al-
Ādnā rapidly got a reputation for slick and effective programmes: 
broadcasting on the short wave, it could still reach a mass audience 
throughout the Middle East and not just in Palestine.  Its broadcasting 
hours were longer than those of any other Arabic-language station at that 
time: in February 1943 the BBC reckoned that Sharq al-Ādnā was 
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transmitting between ten and twelve hours daily, at a time when the BBC 
Arabic Service was only on the air for 1¾ hours, and even Egyptian State 
Broadcasting at Cairo only for seven and a half. 
Sharq was definitely a ‘light programme’: it transmitted news 
bulletins, but the proportion of music to other material was more than 
three times what it was in the BBC service.150 
 
 Operating under the control of the Foreign Service, Sharq al-Ādnā employed 
primarily Christian Egyptians and Palestinians (thought to be less loyal to their home 
country) along with a few British specialists.  The station was something of an odd mix 
of different sides.  Primarily a music station, it was based closer to the action in the 
Middle East, and included more fluent speakers of Arabic.  Sharq al-Ādnā thus was often 
able to address news much faster than the BBC Arabic from London, and with its much 
longer broadcast day, the Sharq al-Ādnā take on an event would be repeated more often 
than the BBC take.151  Funded through the Foreign Office and intended as a Mandate 
government propaganda outfit from its inception in Palestine, the station nevertheless 
often took editorial stances which tilted farther towards the pro-Arab side of things than 
the official line out of London, especially on issues of Israel and Palestine.  
Simultaneously it was “unique in the Arab World at this time in that it was – despite its 
affiliation with the British government – a commercial station.”152   Musically, the station 
featured in the early 1950s the work of Assi and Mansour Rahbani, the legendary 
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Lebanese composers and playwrights, who wrote songs, musical-theatre sketches, plays, 
and music for advertisements.153 
  It is clear from CIA documents that American officials were wary of Britain’s 
continued involvement in Jordan and Iraq,154  and the American Embassy in Amman took 
some pleasure in noting that Bahri’s Radio Ramallah broadcasts were generally received 
as laughable and crude, but the last few years had given the Americans radio problems of 
their own. 155  Following the coup by the Free Officers of Egypt in 1952, the Truman 
Administration was bullish on the new Egyptian regime.  Yaya Abu Bakr, the head of the 
Egyptian News Department received advice and assistance from the United States 
Information Service and Voice of America on expanding Radio Cairo, and the CIA may 
have provided monetary and technical assistance for the radio project in 1953, which 
allowed Nasser to vastly expand the reach of Egyptian international broadcasts after 
taking power in 1954.156  The Eisenhower administration hoped to eventually bring Egypt 
away from the USSR and into the American camp, and although CIA analysts predicted a 
strong reaction from Egypt, Nasser’s reaction to the American withdrawal from the 
Aswan Dam project surprised them in its strength. 
 US officials found Nasser’s oratorical style “crude and bombastic”.157  However, 
there is some degree of subtlety to Nasser’s use of radio which does not come across in 
the English translations U.S. officials were reading in the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast 
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Information Service dispatches.  Nasser was extremely canny in the way that he used the 
medium of radio, including music.  He famously made sure that the music of Umm 
Kulthum was returned to Egyptian airwaves after the revolution of 1952, and often timed 
his speeches to follow her usual radio concerts.158  There was nuance even in his 
bombastic speeches, like the one he gave on July 25, 1956 denouncing the American “lies 
about the Egyptian economy” broadcast on the VOA: 
If a shameful clamor rises in Washington and devoid of all 
principles of international usage announces by lies, deceit and 
delusion that the Egyptian economy is impotent and unstable, I 
shall look at them and tell them: Die in your rage, You shall not 
dominate or tyrannize us. 
The phrase “Die in your rage” (mūtū bi ghaiẓikum), stands out from the speech, 
and indeed was adopted as a mantra by Ahmed Said and a number of other 
commentators on Ṣawt al-  Arab  in further broadcasts in the following days.159  
While a number of scholars have focused on this particular passage from the 
speech as an expression of Nasser’s anger towards Dulles, I would argue that it is 
a subtler rhetorical gesture. 160  The section is a reference to a well-known passage 
from the Quran, Sura 3:119, and a glance at the Sura from which the quote is 
taken actually illustrates a different attitude.  
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“Ah! ye are those who love them, but they love you not,- though 
ye believe in the whole of the Book. When they meet you, they 
say, "We believe": But when they are alone, they bite off the very 
tips of their fingers at you in their rage. Say: "Perish in you rage; 
Allah knoweth well all the secrets of the heart."161
 
In the context of the full passage, the allusion is to disappointment with another party’s 
duplicity and animosity rather than direct aggression.  As a rhetorical gesture, Nasser 
gains not just the mantle of righteous indignation, but the aura of the generous but 
betrayed friend.   
 I focus on this point not to argue that Americans were somehow misinterpreting 
what Nasser’s stance toward America meant in policy terms.  On the contrary, CIA 
internal documents projecting Nasser’s response to a possible British-French military 
action were fairly accurate.162  In reality, at the time Dulles and Eisenhower were less 
concerned with bombastic rhetoric than they were with dry dispatches like the following 
from July 23: 
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Authorities in Cairo have decided to send 20 cultural missions to Russia 
and People’s China.  Among these are 12 missions of atomic scientists to 
be sent to Russia in preparation for the large atomic unit that will be 
erected in Egypt in 1958.  Eight missions will be sent to People’s China in 
compliance with the cultural agreement between the two countries.  In 
compliance with the same agreement, during the current year People’s 
China will send similar missions in scientific, cultural, and agricultural 
fields.163 
 
 The point about the shades of meaning in Nasser’s July 25 speech illustrates the 
difficulty that US broadcasts had competing on the same rhetorical playing field as the 
Egyptians.  It was strikingly difficult for American broadcasts to be perceived as anything 
other than tone-deaf in comparison.  Nasser’s appeal rested not just on policy, but on his 
authenticity, and his expert manipulation of media to portray it.164   
 
Suez and the Voice of Britain 
 The Suez Crisis itself was a central event in the development of radio in the 
Middle East, and is described very well by Daniel Boyd in his article on Sharq al-Adna.  
When Israel attacked Sinai, beginning the Suez War on October 30, Britain announced 
that it had “requisitioned” Sharq al-Ādnā, changed the name of the station to the “Voice 
of Britain”, and began broadcasting anti-Nasserist propaganda as well as messages telling 
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civilians to avoid military targets.  On November 1st the British Air Force bombed the 
Egyptian radio antennas, but failed to destroy all of Egyptian broadcasting capabilities, 
and Ṣawt al-  Arab was brought back online, albeit with a lower powered transmitter.165   
 The Egyptian radio itself fired back at the Voice of Britain with a much more 
effective attack, though they did so without the aid of an air force.  According to 
Muhammad Abd al-Qadir Hatem:  “while making it clear that active co-operation with 
those broadcasts was nothing short of treason, the Egyptian government wisely left the 
door open for the rehabilitation of announcers and others who ‘genuinely regretted their 
unpatriotic acts’.”166  Nearly the entire staff of Sharq al-Ādnā resigned, including Ralph 
Poster, the British director of the station, who joined the Arab staff members in 
announcing on air their support for Egypt before leaving.167  Composer Mansour Rahbani 
claims that it was actually he and his brother Assi who first quit and instigated the other 
employees to join them in protest.168 
 A number of Arabs from the BBC service were flown in to operate the station, but 
their performance was by all accounts a disaster.  According to Muhammed Heikal:  
The broadcasts displayed a surprising ignorance of Egyptian affairs and 
thinking. In just one instance, when the propagandists suggested a list of 
eight names of Egyptians who would be acceptable to the British in a new 
government, two of the men they named, Hafez Ramadan and Aly Zaki el 
                                                 
165
 Boyd, “Sharq al-Adna…” ,  451. 
166
 Muhammed Hatem,  Information and the Arab Cause (London: Longman, 1974). 
167
 Boyd, “Sharq al-Adna…” ,  451. 
168





Oraby, were already dead. The broadcasts served only to increase Nasser’s 
popularity.169 
 
The Voice of Britain broadcasts often directly conflicted with the BBC’s Arabic Service, 
and the former was eventually scrapped entirely and its transmitter reassigned to the 
BBC.  Despite its disastrous ending, according to Boyd: 
The programming of Sharq al-Ādnā, the first Middle East-based station 
that was not Arab government operated, did ultimately have a positive 
impact on Arab world radio. Its commercials for products such as pain 
relievers and washing detergent, along with popular music and credible 
news, provided a format later copied for the most part by France’s Radio 
Monte Carlo Middle East, and several Arab government commercial radio 
services, including Egypt’s The Middle East Program, a station that started 
in 1964 during Nasser’s presidency. 
 
Moving back to the American broadcasters, the VOA Arabic service was in a 
difficult spot during the Suez War.  This was due in part to the awkward position of not 
wanting to oppose either side too vociferously, but American propaganda goals were also 
complicated by developments on other fronts of the Cold War.  As Salim Yaqub states: 
The attack on Egypt was doubly objectionable to U.S. officials because it 
diverted international attention from dramatic events in Eastern Europe.  
Earlier that October, encouraged by Nikita Khruschev’s de-Stalinization 
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campaign and by recent reforms in Poland, Hungarian students had risen 
up in revolt against the Soviet military presence in Hungary.170 
 
Radio Free Europe 
Those who wanted to see the U.S. take a hard line against the USSR and Soviet 
ideology had their moment when Radio Free Europe (RFE) was founded in 1950, with 
the explicit purpose of broadcasting anti-communist messages and regional news in local 
languages to Eastern bloc counties.  RFE was the brain-child of John Foster Dulles and a 
group called the National Committee for a Free Europe, and operated publicly as an 
independent corporation until it was brought under the wing of the International 
Broadcasting Bureau in 1972. Publicly, it was an independent corporation similar to the 
front that Britain used for the Sharq al-Ādnā.  Though RFE was in fact funded almost 
entirely by the CIA, this did not become public knowledge until 1968. 171   
Prior to this, RFE and its counterpart Radio Liberty were operated as private 
corporations, ostensibly funded by the largesse of the people of the United States.172  The 
National Committee for a Free Europe did in fact hold large “Crusades for Freedom”, 
fundraising campaigns which toured around the US with a replica of the Liberty Bell, 
encouraging citizens to sign “Freedom Scrolls” and donate “Truth Dollars” to the cause 
of Radio Free Europe.  While the Crusades for Freedom never became a significant 
source of funding for RFE, they did allow the CIA to easily launder money and send it to 
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the group without suspicion.  The slogan for the campaign was: “Help Truth Fight 
Communism.”  
Fighting was central in the minds of early RFE broadcasters.  Frank Atschul, the 
first head of Radio Free Europe, describes its goals in strong words: 
We must gain the confidence of our friends – and we must constantly 
remind them that they are not forgotten and that while the ultimate date of 
their liberation is unpredictable, its coming is inevitable.  At the same time 
we must undermine the Communist regime by exposing it for the vicious 
fraud that it is.  As we are unhampered by the amenities of diplomatic 
intercourse, we enter this fight with bare fists… We identify Communist 
collaborators by name.  We give their address and give and account of 
their misdeeds.  And sometimes, using a formula for which I claim no 
personal credit, “This is the sort of man to whom an accident might 
happen on a dark night.173 
While the primary focus of the VOA was international news and reporting about the 
workings of U.S. government and public life, the purpose of Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty was entirely different.  Staffed primarily by émigrés from Eastern Europe 
and Russia, Radio Free Europe stations attempted to become replacement services for 
domestic markets, with the explicit goals of overturning communist governments.  In the 
modern parlance of the Broadcast Board of Governors, the group that oversees all U.S. 
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international broadcasting, RFE and RL are “surrogate” services, designed to replace 
non-existent or deficient local media structures.174 
In contrast to the carefully news- and U.S. focused Voice of America, the 
RFE/RL was described by Altschul as a “citizen’s adventure in the field of psychological 
warfare” that sought to “sow distrust and dissension among our enemies.”175  Within the 
CIA, RFE was directed by a special Psychological Warfare Committee, which defined its 
goals in the following declassified internal document from Novermber 22, 1950:176 
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Figure 1.6: Memorandum to the Deputy Director of the CIA regarding Radio Free 
Europe (cont.) 
 
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are important precedents for Radio Sawa 
for a number of reasons.  Organizationally, RFE/RL serve as the models for the Middle 
East Broadcasting Network (home of Radio Sawa), as well as Radio Marti (Cuba) and 
Radio Free Asia (East Asia).  Though the Voice of America had its Arabic-language 
broadcasts cut in 2002 when Radio Sawa began broadcasting, RFE/RL Inc. continues to 
operate Radio Free Iraq, Radio Free Afghanistan, and Radio Farda (to Iran), with the 





Europe was the home of the first pop music broadcasts on U.S. international 
broadcasting, and the ideological forefather of Radio Sawa. 
 While not usually directly linked to the events in the Middle East, the events in 
Hungary are very important to the use of music in US broadcasting. Above and beyond 
the relationship between Eastern Europe and the Middle East that Yaqub points out, the 
events of the 1950s in Hungary are vitally important to the development of American 
broadcasting.   
One of the biggest debates in the history of U.S. international broadcasting 
concerns the conduct of Radio Free Hungary during the lead-up to the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956, a nationwide revolt that began as a student occupation of the 
Budapest radio building, and spread across the country before it was brutally put down by 
Soviet forces.  In the weeks during and immediately before the student revolt of October 
1956, a radio war took place between the Hungarian State radio station and the 
American-backed Radio Free Hungary.  Party-run stations increased the number of talks 
and programs devoted to youth themes,177 and, during the revolt itself, Hungarian state 
radio was flooded with “pleas for peace”, supposedly drawn from all segments of 
Hungarian society.178  On the other side, some Hungarians and Soviets on both sides of 
the fighting have suggested that Radio Free Hungary helped initiate the revolt by 
implying that U.S. aid would be lent to the students and fighters if they were able to hold 
out long enough.  Soviets commentators thus accused Radio Free Hungary of trying to 
entice impressionable youngsters into rebellion.  While defenders of the RFH deny this 
charge, they acknowledge at the very least that RFH broadcasters read editorials from a 
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London newspaper hypothesizing that Western powers would come to the aid of the 
revolt.179   The trouble is, what the Soviets and angry Hungarians accused Radio Free 
Hungary of doing parallels the CIA’s goals (as stated in the document in Figure 1.5-6) of 
“keeping alive the hope of liberation in the satellite states and telling various peoples that 
they are not forgotten by the free world.” and “developing an atmosphere favorable to the 
growth of resistances movements, for ultimate exploitation in war.”   
 Given the accusations leveled at RFH after 1956, it is somewhat ironic that Radio 
Free Hungary began to seriously target the teenage demographic two years later in 1958 
with the inauguration of its first disc jockey program, Teenager Party.  The brainchild of 
Hungarian service editor Charles Andras and reporter Géza Ekecs, Teenager Party 
initially aired the same thirty-five minute program three times a week.180   
According to RFE scholar Arch Puddington: 
Ekecs borrowed the top-forty format popularized by American rock 
stations…his core audience wanted rock, and that is what he gave it.  He 
kept his listeners informed about the shifts in the Billboard magazine 
ratings, explaining which songs were moving up and which were heading 
down.  
 
As the sole Hungarian language rock program of the time, Ekecs’ Teenager Party became 
extremely popular, expanding to more programs on RFH for Ekecs, and copycat 
programs on the other RFE stations.  The Hungarian Communist authorities were very 
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disturbed by the popularity of Teenager Party, and what they called the “sandwich 
strategy” of surrounding news broadcasts with popular music, in order to entice young 
listeners.181  The lesson learned by the RFH during the student revolt was apparently the 
desirability of broadcasting to students with a combination of music and news.  It was 
precisely this “sandwich strategy” which was expanded for Radio Sawa, where small 
news segments are surrounded by large blocks of music. 
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the basic defining characteristics of Radio Sawa 
have significant precedents in the history of international broadcasting in Arabic and of 
American broadcasting around the world: the commercial format and long broadcast day 
(Sharq al-Ādnā), the use of Arab and Western music and the emphasis on advertising the 
American brand (VOA), the employment of foreign nationals as announcers, the use of 
pop and rock music, and targeting the youth (Radio Monte Carlo, Radio Free Hungary.)  
One of the aspects of this broadcasting history that will be most important for this 
dissertation, and to which I will return in the analysis of Radio Sawa in Chapter 4, is the 
use of music as an ideological tool against Communism. 
The uses of music in conjunction with the anti-Communist broadcasts of Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and the accompanying notions of American music vs. 
communism, have been popularly lionized by American critics from Ronald Reagan to 
Tom Stoppard.182  Part of this has to do with the visibility of some former listeners and 
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their stories within the American press, as illustrated by Arch Puddington, describing the 
reaction received by Radio Free Europe following the fall of the Soviet Union: 
Tributes poured in from the radios’ loyal listeners.  Some recalled the 
dangers of listening to foreign broadcasts during the Cold War’s early 
days.  Grigory Yavlinsky, a reformed and presidential candidate in Russia, 
recalled that his father and grandfather had been regular listeners to RL.  
“Because it was forbidden to listen to Radio Liberty, they used to tell me 
to warn them if someone was coming up the stairs of our apartment 
building.  When I was a little older, they asked me not to say anything to 
my friends in school about what they did every evening.”  Andrei 
Codrescu, a Romanian émigré who attained some notoriety as a humorist 
on National Public Radio, recalled listening to RGE in his youth, “with the 
shades drawn, the lights off.”  H added, “If I walked down any darkened 
street at that hour, I would have seen the lowered shades and the furtive 
dark in which glowed the soft dial of the radio.”183  
 
Without dismissing the importance of these experiences and stories to individuals who 
listened to American broadcasts and American music while living under Soviet control, I 
would argue that the story of music, blue jeans and popular culture bringing down the 
Iron Curtain is not resonant within the US primarily because of anything to do with the 
actual experiences of listeners under communism. 184  Rather this story persists because it 
fits in with two widespread American narratives.   
The first is the narrative of jazz and rock music as forms of countercultural 
expression. These conceptions of rock music (as the sound of anti-authoritarian youth 
self-expression), and jazz music (as the sound of social justice and triumphant democratic 
ideals) remain relevant even long after the era when most listeners would make direct 
links between social movements and aesthetic movements in jazz or rock.  It is probably 
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unsurprising that hip-hop, a musical genre with a more recent anti-authoritarian pedigree, 
has taken a central place on today’s public diplomacy programs like Rhythm Road, which 
embrace specifically American forms.  This is the theory of music as expressing an 
emancipatory and fundamentally American set of ideals.   
The second narrative, which has increased in currency in the years since the end 
of the Cold War as neoliberal and market-based approaches have come to dominate all 
aspects of American policy-making, holds that music, blue jeans and popular culture 
brought down the Berlin Wall because they were consumer products.  The demand for 
free markets and the goods and lifestyles it allows would inevitably lure consumers away 
Communism.185   
Although the Cold War has ended, the significance of this narrative, and the view 
of culture as an ideological tool for integrating consumers into the practices of Western, 
capitalist, and American life, remains in place.  The major conflict of the post-Cold War 
era, the “Global War on Terror”, has few commonalities with America’s twentieth 
century competition with the USSR, yet the old cultural weapon in the battle of 
Capitalism vs. Communism has been redeployed in what has been described as by 
Benjamin Barber as the battle of “Jihad vs. McWorld”, a very problematic formulation 
which assumes the comparison to past ideological conflict.186  
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Chapter 2 – Damascus Radioscape 
 
Damascus, Before Dawn  
Early in the morning, a few hours after midnight and well before the first call to prayer, 
Damascus is mostly quiet.  From a vantage point on the road running up to the top of Mount 
Qassioun, one can look out over the whole city.  Back to the mountain, Saḥat al-Umawiyīn sits 
squarely in the right side of the tableau, surrounded by the opera house, the library, and a few 
government buildings.  A trickle of nighttime traffic leaving the square crosses the scene to the left, 
past al-Merjeh and the gates of the old city.  It weaves through the yellow and white streetlamps 
and fluorescent green lights of the mosques, up to the east, where the argon blue crosses of Bāb 
Tūmā and Abbāssiyyīn blend in to the green and white galaxy of the city. 
At this point in the morning, few people are listening.  Truck drivers with loads of 
vegetables enter the city on the road down from Aleppo, passing the big apartment buildings in 
Tijāra where the Russian families live.  The voices of a few groups of revelers finishing late-night 
chats on apartment balconies mix with the ballads wafting out into the air from home, and the 
occasional thumping bass from a passing car.  The big wholesale market where the trucks are 
unloaded, up northeast of Bab Sharqi, is still quiet. 
Introduction 
This chapter describes a 24-hour period in the radio life of Damascus, Syria.  Employing 
Arjun Appadurai’s terminology of interlocking and overlapping “scapes,” this chapter examines the 





conjuncture between the radioscapes and the soundscapes of Damascus.1  As a modern metropolis 
of two and a half million people, the greater Damascene soundscape is heard and voiced in 
innumerable contrasting and contradictory ways by the city’s inhabitants. Given the specific focus 
of this dissertation on mass-distributed music radio broadcasts, this chapter takes a broad view of 
Damascus, lingering on a few points of intersection between the radioscape and the sonic practices 
of daily life, rather than describing the soundscape of a specific group of people, physical locus or 
daily practice. This chapter, based on my research in Syria, is partially ethnographic in nature, and 
my understanding of soundscape as a social concept has been greatly influenced the work of 
anthropologists of sound including Steven Feld.2  
The music and other radio content described below was all recorded during May 2010 at the 
times and frequencies stated, but in the interest of a more coherent narrative, I have compressed 
radio events which took place across a longer time frame into a single day.   
Despite the economic and cultural dominance of satellite television for popular music, the 
primary experience of music is still a sonic one.  Radios, car stereos, mp3 players, cell-phone 
ringtones, storefront speakers, and human voices, even as they often give voice to the same sounds 
heard on music television, compose a soundscape to the shifting and unpredictable visuals of daily 
life, rather than the carefully directed and managed ones of Rotana and Melody Music.  According 
to the US Broadcasting Board of Governor’s operating data, 71% of Syrians surveyed report using 
radio in a given week, compared to a 95% usage rate for televisions.3  Even when the proximate 
source of music in a given setting is a television, the sheer ubiquity of satellite music means that it 
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is often consumed in social contexts where listening is somewhat divorced from the visual element 
of the broadcasts. 
Interested in the practices of collective audition to mediated music, I spent much of my time 
in Damascus in public or public-private spaces where music was played, especially in a variety of 
cafes in different neighborhoods around the city.  In these cafes, televisions playing music videos 
were nearly ubiquitous fixtures.  One of the few cafes which did not have a television when I first 
patronized it in 2009 (and played music either from the radio or from a computer-less CD-R player) 
purchased a television in order to draw in an audience for the 2010 World Cup matches.  On days 
without special events, these televisions did not tend to command a great deal of visual attention 
from patrons, who made little effort to sit in better viewing positions, and by and large preferred to 
socialize, play backgammon, smoke, or read the paper over watching the videos on the screen.  One 
relatively working-class café I frequented had a large projection screen that was used for football 
matches or special events, but at most times would have only a smaller television playing, used as a 
sound source for a pair of speakers.   
In homes that I visited in Damascus, television was often an accompaniment to any activity, 
but similarly it was not always focus of visual attention.  Coming from the cultural assumptions of 
the sometimes ostentatiously anti-television island of Manhattan academics (“Oh no, I didn’t see 
that, I don’t even own a TV”) I was sometimes surprised when invited to friends’ homes in 
Damascus to find the television playing throughout my entire visit.  It usually took a few moments 
of adjustment to realize that no one was expecting me to pay any concentrated attention to the TV, 
and thus to allow it to serve instead as both background music and background visual. 
Part of the practice of distracted consumption of the visual element of music video clips is 





for the advertising spots that occurs between sets of videos, in most free-to-air Arab music video 
channels, the advertising takes place during the course of the video clips.  According to Walter 
Armbrust: 
...the ubiquity of video clips may overstate their popularity.  Video clips are free 
content in an economically troubled business, paid for substantially not by the 
networks that broadcast them, but by mobile phone service providers and music 
producers.  Mobile phone service companies underwrite the production of video 
clips because the text messages flowing constantly on the margins of the screen 
during songs advertise their business, and because they can sell ring tones.  The 
same goes for music producers – video clips advertise cassettes and CDS, and 
they create stars who can command high fees for live performance.  Because 
video clips are quasi-advertising for a limited set of businesses rather than a 
simple response to demand, their conspicuous presence among the free-to-air 
satellite channels is an unreliable gauge of how many people watch them.4 
 
According to journalist Habib Battah, “SMS-related revenues make up to 70% or more of revenues 
for a number of music and/or gaming channels” and most of the SMS messages that populate the 
ribbons crawling along the bottom of video clips, and ringtone purchases that fund their creation, 
originate in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.5  These countries also finance the majority of pan-Arab 
music production, although the actual production tends to take place in Cairo and Lebanon. 
 Sitting in a café in Damascus as video clips play on a wall-mounted television and patrons 
largely disregard the screen, looking up only occasionally as a new song comes on, can feel like 
sitting the banks of a media stream rather than swimming in it.  Up on the wall one observes a 
station owned by Saudis, with content created by the Lebanese and Egyptians, filled with SMS 
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messages from Khaleeji (“Gulfie”) teenagers, a back-and-forth flow in which Syrian consumers 
participate, but do not have enough economic clout to direct the current. 
Egyptian composer Mounir Al Wassimi complained in a 2010 article that “The visual aspect 
has therefore become increasingly prominent in Arab song, to the extent that if you close your eyes 
while hearing a televised song today, you may not feel anything at all.”6  However, the prevalence 
of video clip music in situations where the visual element is not the primary focus of attention calls 
that belief into question.  Similarly, the lingering popularity of radio, and especially that radio 
which plays a repertoire of video stars, indicates that the sonic element of this kind of cultural 
product retains a great deal of significance. 
92.3 – Sham FM
7
  
 As a live recording of Umm Kulthum’s “Min Ajli ‘Eynayka” approaches the hour mark and 
begins to fade out, we change the channel, switching from one of the two staples of Syrian radio, 
Umm Kulthum, to the other, Fairuz.  In the stillest section of the night, Fairuz is singing “Khalīk bil 
bayt” backed by a big jazz band.  This is late Fairuz, the period when she was working with her son 
Ziad al-Rahbani whose arrangements famously integrated jazz, French pop, and Arabic vocal 
styles in a texture that numerous critics have compared to the cultural mixture of cosmopolitan 
Beirut.  A piano and guitar lead the performance, followed by a large orchestra of strings and 
brass, as she nearly whispers into the microphone, “God bless you, and keep you at home.”8 
 The station is Sham FM, referring to the traditional name for greater Damascus, and its 
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playlist relies heavily on Fairuz at all hours of the day, but especially in the morning.  While Fairuz 
can be heard on almost every Syrian station if you wait long enough, Sham FM specifically 
emphasizes “Fairuziyyāt” (songs by Fairuz) and the work of Ziad al-Rahbani in its mission 
statement.9   
Fairuz and Umm Kulthum  
In his book Among the Jasmine Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria 
Jonathan Shannon describes the continuing popularity and prestige in Syria accorded to the “Big 
Three” of Arabic music: Umm Kulthūm,  Abd al-Ḥalim Ḥāfiẓ, and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, 
three Egyptian musicians who are beloved across the Arabic-speaking world.  As far as radio in 
Damascus is concerned, however, we can concentrate even further on the two most significant 
singers who command dramatically more broadcast time than any others, Umm Kulthum and 
Fairuz.  
 The preeminence of these two vocalists is so self-evident to most Syrians that listing them 
among one’s favorite singers is often considered redundant or unnecessary.  Indeed, Shannon 
describes the extent to which one must at the very least specify artistic periods in the career of 
Umm Kulthum in order to be taken seriously by musicians and aficionados, for whom merely 
listening to Umm Kulthum as a general practice is as fundamental as breathing. 
Among the discriminating, however, to answer “Umm Kulthum” is not sufficient.  
At a listening session organized by a dramatist friend at the home of a well-known 
woman music teacher, my discrimination as a listener was put to the test early.  “To 
whom do you enjoy listening?” asked the teacher.  I replied, “Umm Kulthum,” and, 
with a look of resignation that suggested to me, “Is that all there is?” she asked, 
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“From which era [of her career]?”” I had just listened to a harangue by a local 
cassette vendor about how beautiful and pure the early Umm Kulthum was in 
comparison to her later work, so I replied, “Her early work, before she became well-
known.” This elicited a nod of approval and the remark, “Her best recordings are 
from the period of about 1928 to 1930.  Afterwards she became too repetitive and 
emotionally less sincere (mufta’ala),” she remarked.10 
  
The extent to which these two singers form an essential part of the audio landscape is displayed by 
the common response that I received when asking Damascenes about what music they listen to:  
“Fairuz bis-ṣabāḥ wa Umm Kulthum bil-masā’’” (Fairuz in the morning and Umm Kulthum in the 
evening).  The association of Umm Kulthum with the evening dates to her monthly performances 
on Egyptian radio and Ṣawt al-  Arab , detailed by Virginia Danielson in “The Voice of Egypt”.11  
Fairuz, on the other hand, is nearly universally associated with the morning. With the two singers 
thus bookending the day, any radio station in Syria that gears its programming towards either high 
art or older popular sensibilities has both Fairuz and Umm Kulthum in heavy rotation.   In 
Damascus, Fairuz is clearly the dominant of the two, and Sham FM plays on the common figuration 
with an ad spot for “Fairuz in the morning, and Fairuziāt in the evening, brought to you by 
Syriatel”, entreating listeners to “[e]lectrify your evening with Fairuz.”12 
 Fairuz (née Nuhād al-Haddād), the most revered singer from Lebanon, holds almost 
mythical status in her home country but is perhaps even more ubiquitous in Syria.13  In 2007 al-
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Hayat printed a story about a regulation in the Syrian city of Tartous, where a city ordinance was 
supposedly put in place requiring that street vendors cease to call out to sell their wares, and instead 
replace this constant yelling with boomboxes and Fairuz cassettes, a musical sign that would alert 
potential customers while replacing the usual din with something more pleasant.14  In Damascus I 
heard this story from both ardent fans and non-fans, like one Tishreen columnist who wrote an 
article titled “Ana Akrah Fairuz” [I Hate Fairuz], would happily never listen to her again.15   The 
ubiquity of her voice on in the morning in Syria, even more than in Lebanon, has become socialized 
into a functional necessity, on par with the delivery of a public utility.16  This is echoed by the 
description of the morning playlist on the Version FM’s website: “Can we image a radio station in 
the whole world able to capture the interest of listeners, and to command their respect and interest, 
without the existence of Lady Fairuz?”17  
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In honor of Fairuz’s 70th birthday, Syrian columnist and poet Luqman Derky wrote a short story entitled 
“Ummat Fairuz” (Fairuz Nation).17  The story takes place at a Fairuz concert in 1985, during the Lebanese civil war, a 
period when Fairuz avoided performing in Lebanon, to my knowledge her last performance in Syria until 2008.
17
  In the 
story, he describes a group of his friends, students of drama and literature from Aleppo, who traveled down to Tadmor 
(Palmyra) in 1985 to hear Fairuz perform.  The students have received tickets in exchange for participating as extras in 
a film, but when they arrive they find the stadium and its surroundings flooded by thousands of ticketless fans trying to 
find their way in.   
 
The doors closed, and more than thirty thousand entered the stadium, which could not even hold 
fifteen.   Outside, eighty thousand members of the infinitely vast Fairuz Nation satisfied themselves 
with hearing her voice through the external speakers.
17
 
The actual performance only takes a few paragraphs of the story, but Derky’s beautiful description of the moment when 
Fairuz walks onstage crystallizes the Syrian reverence for the singer. 
 Fairuz was late. Then she appeared.  White…White…White. She lacked nothing from perfection, but 





.Spinning the dial around through the stations, the air filled with the same voice.  On Radio 
Damascus, Sham FM, Radio Fann, Fairuz rules the airwaves in the early morning. 
Two young men sit on the curb with a blanket laid out in front of them on the street, covered 
in shoes for sale. The street was lively late into the night, but at this point all of the food carts and 
customers have headed home.  The teenagers sit chatting behind their shoes, hoping to entice the 
last few stragglers with a deal.   
A car speeds around the corner, and three cops jump out, two in blue uniforms, and one 
outfitted in equally recognizable attire: a leather jacket and a big pair of sunglasses pushed up onto 
his head.  As soon as they see the car, one of the guys sitting on the curb bolts immediately; his 
friend makes a grab for one of the blankets, wrapping up a few pairs of shoes before the cops chase 
after him.  Everyone runs for a few moments, the police not really trying too hard to catch the kids 
after that first burst of energy.  They walk back to the abandoned blanket to look over the remaining 
shoes, and each of the uniformed officers snatches a pair of high-tops, before hopping back in the 
car and moving off into the night. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
frightening… affectionate… infinite beauty in front of me, but so far away. . . .   A child was 
crawling, looking at the ground, then raised his head suddenly as the crowd froze.  We all froze 
together, fell silent together, even the beating of our hearts, and Fairuz sang.  No one believed that he 
saw and heard, no one believed that he was present in this place, in this time.  I felt my body…I put 
my hand on my faces so Lubaba wouldn’t see my tears, then I stole a look, and saw every hand 
covering every face. 
Later in the story one of the narrator’s friends, who decided to sell his ticket and try to sneak into the concert 
along with the crowd, is arrested when the crowd rushes  the gates.  In her guise as benevolent leader of her 
nation, Fairuz appears in the story to intervene with the police and manages have him released. 
 
Luqman Derky “Umma Fairuz” Syria News  http://www.syria-news.com/readnews.php?sy_seq=17606 





87.6- Radio Damascus 
Switching over to Radio Damascus, the final words of  Sabah Fakhri’s “ya Naḥīf al-
Qawām” fade out, moving into a boisterous, and slightly out of tune, brass band rendition of the 
Syrian national anthem, “Ḥomat ad-Diyār” (Guardians of the Homeland).  Like most of the 
national anthems in this part of the world, it is a musical remnant of colonialism. The arrangement 
sounds like a French march from the turn of the twentieth century.18 
State and Private Syrian Radio 
Government-run radio makes up a significant portion of the dial in Syria, where privately 
owned media were outlawed for most of the country’s modern history, and private radio was 
generally synonymous with Lebanese stations transmitting across the border.  In 2001, Legislative 
decree No. 50 allowed for the creation of privately owned print publications, and in 2002 this was 
expanded to radio stations, though exclusively for the purpose of broadcasting music, with no 
provision for political news content on private radio.19  The government slowly began to grant 
broadcasting licenses in 2002, and the first private radio station to appear, in 2005, was Al-Madina 
FM, a Damascus-based station which continues to advertise itself as Syria’s first private station.20   
According to an August 2009 Syria Post interview with Nabil Shinar, the head of Syrian 
Broadcasting, there were by that time 14 private radio stations in Syria, a number that has increased 
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in the past few years with new entries such as Radio Fann in April 2010.21   A 2012 statement from 
the Ministry of Information stated that there were 11 more applications under consideration.22 
Despite the entrance of these private stations, Syrian state radio still controls a significant 
portion of the airwaves. Having existed for decades as the only domestic broadcasters (with a few 
exceptions that I will mention later), Syrian government radio presents a wide range of content, if 
not a wide range of political viewpoints. They broadcast world and domestic news, music, talk 
shows, soap operas, radio-plays, educational programming, and a variety of cultural programs and 
special events, especially during the month of Ramadan.  Radio Damascus is organized into three 
divisions - The General Program (al-Barnāmaj al-‘ām), Voice of the People (Ṣawt ash-Sha‘b), and 
Voice of the Youth (Ṣawt ash-Shabāb) - each broadcast across the country from twelve broadcast 
towers.23  In 2011, in response to the Syrian Uprisings, the General Organization of Radio and 
Television launched a fourth branch, the religious station Noor ash-Sham.24  The Syrian Ministry of 
Information also recently announced plans for a college radio station run through the University of 
Damascus.25 
The content of the three main divisions overlaps significantly.  Each broadcasts news 
segments, music, and cultural programming.  Musical programming is based around the expected 
Fairuz in the morning and Umm Kulthum in the late evening, with a different additional focus 
depending on the division. Besides the regional and international news coming from the general 
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program, and the youth-oriented news from Ṣawt ash-Shabāb, the stations include entertainment 
programs like “The World of Sport” mixed with cultural programming like “Sound of Zejel” (Zejel 
is a form of colloquial poetry), “From the Cultures of the World”, and historical soap operas such as 
“Ḥikayāt al-Ḥubb wa al-Alam” (Stories of Love and Pain).   
The explicitly socialist/populist focus of Ṣawt ash-Shaʿb is exhibited both in news segments 
like “With the Workers in the Fields”, and the choice of music, which adds an emphasis on Syrian 
singers and more shaʿbī (folk/popular) genres to the usual Fairuz, Umm Kulthum and al-muṭribīn 
al-‘aẓīmīn (the great singers of ṭarab).  
 Ṣawt ash-Shabāb includes more popular, youth-oriented music and adheres more closely to 
the playlists of the satellite television stations.  It was founded in 2002 to compete with Lebanese 
pop stations like Strike and Voice of Tomorrow, streaming from over the border, and after the 
advent of private stations in Syria, competes directly with these stations as well.26  As an example of 
the self-conscious attempts to position Ṣawt ash-Shabāb as an alternative to the private stations, the 
station advertises itself as the victor in a 2007 listener poll conducted by the private, youth-oriented 
Sham FM.27  This isn’t to say the poll was necessarily reliable, rather that the government-run 
station competes directly with private radio.28 
The various branches of Syrian state radio, in addition to serving as the only legally 
authorized purveyors of political news on domestic radio, position themselves as the defenders of 
Syrian traditions and morals in the face of corrupting outside influence.  Cécile Boëx, in her article 
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“The End of the State Monopoly over Culture: Toward the Commodification of Cultural and 
Artistic Production”, describes this stance: 
 
The system of cultural production, derived from the Soviet model, has embedded 
artistic practices and outputs into a national and collective perspective.  In addition, 
as it relied on a utilitarian vision of culture, it generated two different kinds of 
cultural goods: from specific ideology but still controlled by the state, and cultural 
products produced by the official sector, intended to have an educational function, 
and dealing with ‘serious’ (jaddīyya) issues within the nationalist ideological 
framework.29 
 
This applies both to the news and talk segments, which focus explicitly on Syrian culture and 
education, and to musical styles, where the state broadcasts tend towards a more curatorial 
relationship with music, emphasizing the maintenance of traditional and conservative musical 
values.   
Existing at the will of the state, private stations tend to demonstrate at least lip service 
towards the social goals of state radio.  Most contain in their mission statements something similar 
to the quote from the beginning of the state call for songs. For example, Sham FM states on its 
“about the station” page that:  
 
We wanted for our radio to form a link between the various segments of society, 
horizontally and vertically, to facilitate the diversity of material and segments for 
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the younger generation to interact with the parent’s generation, and allow 
communication geographically, through coverage extending to all areas of Syria, 
as well as tying expatriates to the home country, through broadcasting on the 
internet.30 
 
The program director of Radio Arabesque stated in an interview that she has tried in her job to 
“balance the commercial aspect [of radio] with community service.”31  Version FM goes even 
further, with a “Who are we?” webpage that reads more like the announcement of an ambitious new 
public service than a private radio station. 
 
The programs that will be broadcast on Radio Version are realistic ideas taken 









-Programs that address women's issues and affairs 
-Children's programs 
-Programs for people with special needs 
-Programs dealing with health 
 
In our programs the goal undertaken by Version Radio is to give a large forum for 
the youth of Syria to represent their issues, aspirations, concerns, the problems 
they face and the ways to address these problems, and likewise we will have a 
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major role in education and cultural instruction, and an ability to produce 
dramatic programs and radio serials.32 
 
Rhetorically, the emphasis on community service by private radio stations in Syria positions them 
as examples of the “social market economy” implemented by Bashar al-Assad during the first 
decade of his presidency.33  Despite the high-mindedness of these mission statements, the profit 
motive is very present in these new stations, and the private stations differ significantly from state-
run stations, not least because of the general prohibition against entertainment stations broadcasting 
political news.34  One former employee for a Damascus-based station told me that “When they were 
putting the station together and trying to get the government license, the fundamental idea was to 
broadcast classical (classīqī) and heritage (turāth) music and refined culture.  But now that they 
have the license, they just play the same [pop] music like the other stations.”35 
 
Arrabiyya FM 99.9 is playing a countdown of the day’s Top 3 “Oldies but Goldies.”  The choices 
seem to be completely arbitrary, but no one is likely to complain.  Today it is Melhem Barakat, then 
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Airplay and Corporate Structure 
The standard techniques by which one would judge airplay and record sales in the US are 
difficult in Syria because of several factors, including the lack of enforcement of music copyright, 
the relative weakness of the Syrian economy in comparison to many of its neighbors, and the 
structural incentives of media companies to distort or obscure the relative popularity of their artists.   
 The integrated structure of radio and television stations and record companies in the Middle 
East discourages the existence of any reliable charts which might settle the matter of which artists 
are most popular.  The largest media companies like Rotana, Alam al Fan, and Melody sign artists, 
produce records and videos (often with third party corporate sponsorship), distribute and market 
music, and own or have agreements with the radio and television stations which promote artists.  In 
addition to the several extremely popular satellite television stations owned by these companies, 
two have radio station affiliates in Syria (Rotana FM and Melody FM).  Despite Resolution 4981, a 
statute governing private broadcasting which requires that stations be owned by Syrian companies, 
in several cases, local stations are allowed to have affiliations with international companies.36 
 As with most media in the Arab world, the political affiliation of the people who own these 
companies is widely known by their audiences, who assume at least some level of editorial control 
on the part of the ownership.  Rotana is owned by the Saudi Prince Al-Waheed bin Talal As-Saud, 
and Melody Entertainment Holding is owned by the Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawaris, who 
purchased the company from Gamal Marwan, the son of billionaire Ashraf Marwan and grandson 
of Gamal Abdel Nassar.37 
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With this level of vertical integration, companies often promote their own artists at the 
expense of those affiliated with other groups, and have no incentive to participate in sales and 
popularity measurements which might not favor their stable of artists.  Melody FM Syria advertises 
the station’s exclusive right to broadcast the entire of roster Melody Music artists on its 
homepage.38  For an example of the type of self-promotion that obscures objective charts, on the 
week of May 3rd, 2010, during the period in which I was recording radio broadcasts in Syria, 
Rotana’s Style FM website listed the following songs on its Top Five hits. 
 
1. Wael Kfoury: Ḥalat Ḥub 
2. Assi Al Hellani: Nadran ‘Alay  
3. Elissa: ‘A Bāli Ḥabībī  
4. Nawal Al Zoghbi: Amāneh  
5. Hussein Al Jasmi: sittat aṣ-Ṣubhi  
Table 2.1: Top Five Songs on Rotana Style FM Syria for the week of May 3, 201039 
 
My own listening confirms that these five songs were all receiving a great deal of airplay at 
the time on other stations as well as Rotana, but it is not coincidental that all five of the artists listed 
here, Wael Kfoury, Assi Al Hellani, Elissa, Nawa Al Zoghbi, and Hussein Al Jasmi, are signed to 
Rotana Records, the recording arm of the station’s parent company.  Although the stations 
associated with pan-Arab media companies Rotana and Melody ostensibly hold exclusive rights to 
broadcast the artists signed to their labels, local unaffiliated stations play freely from the rosters of 
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the major media groups, and the vertical integration of these media does not usually extend to artist 
exclusivity, except with new releases.40   
When stations do have exclusive rights (or at least early access) to songs, they are advertised 
heavily, and the phrase “Haṣriyyan ‘alā (exclusively on...)…[name of the station]” is used to 
promote stations and new songs, often with the station’s name overdubbed on a song periodically to 
prevent recording and rebroadcast.41  Despite this practice, I have on occasion in Syria, Lebanon, or 
Jordan heard an entire DJ set recorded from one station and broadcast on another, unnoticed station 
ID overdubs and all, though my impression is that this practice has lessened in the last few years as 
more and more stations have moved to completely automated systems, and are less desperate for 
large chunks of content.42  Of course, quite often when a new song comes out, one can sometimes 
hear multiple stations each claiming an “exclusive.”  Syrian stations are so unconcerned about 
copyright that several of the non-affiliated stations offer links to mp3 downloads on their websites, 
including songs by artists under contract with Rotana, Alam El Fan and the Melody Entertainment.  
Although some stations undoubtedly procure their music over the internet or less often by recording 
other stations, one station manager I met with made sure to point out that her station used entirely 
authorized music from hard media, not downloaded mp3s of lesser quality.   
 A few organizations separate from the major media corporations attempt to chart popular 
music sales, but problems with their methodologies make it difficult to generalize from those charts 
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that do exist.43 Hitmarker.com for example, begun in 2009, bills itself as “the first independent body 
that tracks album sales in the Arab World”, and advertises that it tracks recording sales at 50 large 
music stores in the region.  However, in addition to the small sample size represented by 50 stores, 
based on my experience in Syrian music shops, I would hazard that the group of people who 
purchase official (non-pirated) copies of CDs or cassettes is a small subset of total music 
consumers, and a subset which would tend towards the upper class.44  The International Federation 
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) also tracks some sales in the region in order to award gold and 
platinum records and name a winner of the Best-Selling Artist in the Middle East category at the 
annual World Music Awards, but the IFPI only tracks self-reported sales statistics, and even those 
only within the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi, the 
UAE) and Lebanon.45 
The estimates for the market share controlled by the large music conglomerates vary, but 
they are invariably extremely high.  Nagwa Rizk estimated that Rotana and Alam Al Fan control 
95% of the market in Egypt.46  The extent to which international media conglomerates determine 
radio playlists is perhaps lessened by the high degree of state control in Syria, both because the state 
still directly controls such a significant percentage of the radio spectrum, and because the market 
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was closed to most international corporations until fairly recently.  Those corporations which are 
able to operate within Syria do so under the authority of a corrupt bureaucracy and a history of 
nationalizing companies.47   
The wide (and probably correct) assumption that even enormous and powerful corporations 
have to accede to the demands of the government without question is evinced by a common joke 
about the two cellphone companies which are allowed to operate in Syria.  The first company, 
Syriatel, was until recently owned by Rami Makhlouf, the wealthy cousin of President Asad, “who 
is said to own or partly own one-quarter of the non-oil Syrian economy.”48According to a common 
Syrian joke, while it was the only mobile telephone company in Syria, the unofficial slogan of the 
company was “Syriatel: Lasna al-afḍal, walakinnana al-waḥīd” (Syriatel: We aren’t the best, but 
we are the only.)  After MTN was allowed to set up its operation in Syria, with prices still set by the 
government, the slogan was slightly changed, “Syriatel wa MTN: Lasna al-afḍal, walakinnana al-
waḥīdūn” (Syriatel and MTN: We aren’t the best, but we are the only ones.) 
The common assumption that a small number of highly influential people and families 
control much of the Syrian economy is illustrated by an editorial cartoon, widely distributed on the 
internet, attributed to Al Domari, the short-lived independent paper published by ‘Ali Farzat: 
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Figure 2.1: The cartoon shows a person thumbing through the Syrian yellow pages. “Hotel 
Makhlouf, Makhlouf Airlines, Makhlouf Pizza, Makhlouf Groceries, Makhlouf Cleaning Supplies: 
previously Al-Saffouri [a common brand of toilet paper]” 
 
The degree of competition is greater in the private radio market than in the telecom market, 
but there too listeners presume that all owners must not only be rich, but also have wasiṭa (literally 
“mediation”), meaning clout or connections to powerful people, usually in the regime.49  Resolution 
4981 states that individuals or legal entities are not allowed ownership shares of more than one 
broadcast organization.50  Despite this, two of the private stations in Damascus were founded by the 
same person, a wealthy businessman who has been accused of illegal business dealings with 
members of the Asad family.  While some international corporations have been able to enter the 
local radio market through affiliation with local companies, a number of the new stations opening 
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up since 2005 such as Al-Madeena FM, Syria al-Ghad, Sham FM, and Radio Fann, operate without 
the backing of an international media operation.  Even in Syria however, the degree of integration 
between music and video production and distribution is so great that stations which don’t have the 
backing of international corporations sometimes attempt to appear as if they do. 
 
Arabesque FM – 102.3 
A dozen people climb into the ‘servīs’ minibus heading out through ar-Rabwe to Qudsiyya. Despite 
the ever increasing number of cars in and around Damascus, this is the way that most people get 
around the city. 10 lira (~20 cents US in 2010 prices) can get you across town, but you are at the 
mercy of the driver’s listening choices.  Sometimes you get religious lectures or inshād (religious 
songs or chants), sometimes you get Nancy ‘Ajram.  Many drivers say that they prefer nashīṭ 
(lively) songs to keep their energy and attention up, so a glove compartment full of dabkat (dabke 
songs) on cassette is also standard fare.   
Blasting from the window of a car one lane over as it slowly weaves through traffic is “Barshaluna 
fāris kul al-malāʿib” (Barcelona, the Knights of Every Field) over a dance beat with synth horns 
and piercing winds, apparently on his way to watch a favorite soccer match.51 At the moment, the 
servīs driver has Arabesque FM playing, and the song is slower, but nonetheless appropriate for 
driving. Maya Nasri – Rouh (Go) “Go, if you want, don’t stay making it worse.  I want you to leave 
me alone...”52 
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In the absence of any reliable survey data on radio listeners, it is difficult to construct a 
model of the radio listening population in Syria.  Certainly every radio station, including the state-
run stations, angles its broadcast towards specific demographics and types of listeners, and to some 
extent it is possible to construct a kind of negative image of these radio audiences based on the 
ways in which they are addressed and marketed.  For example, Al Arabiyya FM, broadcast from the 
UAE and available in Damascus at 99.9 FM, features a mixed Western and Arab playlist, and 
frequent English words and phrases in its bumpers and advertisements.  The advertisements 
themselves are heavily weighted towards cars and other high-end items, cellular and internet 
services, higher-end restaurants and cafes, sports clubs, and clothing stores.  One ad on Al Madina 
FM begins with the voice of a woman stating “I won’t agree to marry anyone who doesn’t have a 
nice apartment” following by a man telling her about the wonderful apartments at the exclusive new 
Garden City Resorts development.  The obvious target is what Amanda Terc calls Damascus’s 
“New Neoliberal Elite.”53  However, the imagined listener that the station wants to attract and the 
real people listening differ quite a bit. 
One of the primary audience demographics desired by advertisers and one which is catered 
to by radio stations is drivers, and especially young drivers.   Although Syria as a whole still has a 
very low number of cars per capita in comparison to its neighbors in Lebanon and Jordan, this 
number has increased rapidly in the past decade due to the reduction in import tariffs on cars. An 
article in Syria Today recently stated that: “Fewer than 400,000 cars drove on Syria's roads in 2001, 
according to the Ministry of Transport. Now, almost 2m vehicles clog the country's motorways.”54  
The numbers provided by the Syrian ministry of transport are almost certainly inflated (the World 
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Bank listed Syria at only 63 motor vehicles per thousand people for 2009), but the large growth in 
vehicle traffic and concomitant exhaust in and around the capital is undeniable, and a frequent topic 
of discussion in Damascus in cafes and newspaper editorials in 2009 and 2010.55   
In an article on private radio for the Damascus daily Baladna (Our Country), journalist Rena 
Zaid raised the fear that the entire audience for private radio is made up of “ash-shouferia” (drivers) 
and specifically “shouferia as-servīs” (mini-bus drivers).56  In interviews, program directors have 
admitted that their primary audiences are people who are otherwise occupied, and listening while 
engaging in some other activity, and this naturally includes drivers as a central audience.  Khalid 
Ismail, director of broadcasting for Syria al-Ghad, stated as much in a 2009 interview with 
Baladna: 
 
Radio in general has a wide audience, because radio is a companion who can wander 
with you. It depends on the sense of hearing, so it is for drivers and housewives 
(rabbat al minazel) and for lovers and for everyone who drives a car, and no doubt 
that the existence of mobile radio increases the broadcasting audience.57 
 
In an earlier interview, the marketing director for the same station described the problem and 
opportunity in advertising to this audience: 
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 Radio, as an advertising medium, is exposed to a number of complicating factors: 
due to the lack of the listener’s complete attention - as he is often carrying out 
another task while listening - as well as unintentional exposure in many cases 
(particularly on public transportation).58 
 
While the driving population is Damascus is skewed towards men, the population of riders is more 
evenly distributed along gender lines, and Ismail’s description points out the second primary 
audience, women in the home. 
The significance of the female audience is clear from both close attention to the radio 
broadcast, and from limited ethnographic observation in Damascus.  As a foreign academic, my 
interactions were naturally constrained by both gender and class; while I was able to interact with 
Syrian women in a variety of contexts, such as in larger groups at cafes or restaurants, or in and 
around Damascus University in Mezze, the vast majority of my interactions were with Syrian men.  
As such, I am certainly unqualified to say very much about the social life and media consumption 
of Syrian women, especially outside of a certain educated class.59  However, it is evident that 
women probably form the majority of radio listenership outside of the context of transportation.  
Many women are at home during the day, and radio is a form of entertainment which allows the 
listeners to engage even while working on household duties which require visual attention or 
movement. 
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 Satellite television is by far the dominant form of entertainment in Damascus homes, and as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, is often used as an aural medium.  On one visit to a friend’s home 
in a newer and less affluent suburb of Damascus, as I sat playing with my friend’s son, I asked 
about what channel was playing on the television, and was told that he didn’t actually know as his 
wife controlled the television, since “my wife likes to listen while she is cooking.”  In the homes of 
the upper and middle class, a similar type of media consumption goes on, but the women listening 
to the radio or the television during the day are often domestic servants, rather than the women of 
the family.  Walking around a middle-class neighborhood during the day, one often sees 
housecleaners hanging up the laundry to dry, and hears the radio or television coming softly 
through the windows out into the street from behind drying sheets.  Much of the extra-musical 
content on private radio is specifically geared towards women.  Nearly every station heard in Syria 
regularly broadcasts the abrāj (horoscope), and women also form the majority of callers to the 
popular relationship-focused radio talk shows, as well as the majority of the hosts for these shows.60 
One of the benefits of examining the radio medium as a locus for discourse about music and 
social life is that it allows us to engage with Arabic popular music outside of the crowded field of 
arguments over video clips and sexuality, and potentially engage with a different set of audiences 
than the ones usually addressed there.  These discussions tend to focus on the portrayal of women’s 
bodies, and the potential effects of that portrayal on young men watching the videos.61  While the 
depiction of women’s bodies on television is without a doubt fraught and contested in the Arab and 
Muslim worlds, the preponderance of analyses, commentaries, and condemnations in both the 
English- language and Arabic press give the impression that the combination of “woman on display/ 
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male viewer or listener” is the fundamental pattern for Arabic music.  If you simply read about 
Arabic mass-mediated pop music rather than listening and watching, you might think that 90% 
performers were women, and 90% of the audience was young men. 62  When the medium becomes 
radio rather than television, it becomes clear that this model does not accurately describe radio and 
radio listeners, leaving out as it does the probably (female) majority of the audience, and that it 
must not apply to television either. 
While women are certainly disproportionally represented in the Arab celebrity press, it is 
not actually the case that Arab mass-media is disproportionately focused on women as opposed to 
male performers.  On Syrian radio, leaving aside the several hours a day devoted to Fairuz and Um 
Kulthum (admittedly a lot to bracket out), one hears more men than women on Arabic-language 
playlists.  Casually flipping through the multitude of music channels on Arabsat or Nilesat one will 
usually find at least as many video clips by men as women.  Of the 111 artists listed on Rotana’s 
website, 47 (42%) are women.63  Obviously gender cannot be disassociated from regional culture 
here; as several scholars have remarked, it seems that the more conservative audiences (and 
censors) in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are much more tolerant of potentially provocative depictions 
of women when those women are Lebanese or Syrian rather than Khaleeji (from the Gulf).  It is not 
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surprising that Rotana’s roster of Lebanese artists is heavily female, while its roster from Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf is almost entirely male.64 
In may also be unsurprising to find that the majority of singers (in number if not in 
popularity) on Arab mass media are male, given the historical ambivalence towards women singers 
in Muslim societies.  In situating radio broadcasts however, it is important to address the fact that 
the most discursively prevalent and oft-discussed gender pairing for Arabic mass media - that of a 
male listener and a female singer - may not be the most likely combination.  Rather it may be that, 
in contrast to the imagined listener envisioned by American broadcasters, the average listener is a 
woman, and the average singer a man.65 
94.4 - Version FM 
On “Version FM”, Nawal Al-Zoghbi is singing “Dalʿouna”.  The title references one of the 
traditional dabke song and song genres, and the video for Al-Zoghbi’s song includes dancers in 
village dress performing the dabke in a circle around her.66  Her song is not a simple performance 
of the dabke, however; it is more of an allusion to it, done over in a slightly more TV-friendly pop 
style, a shabābī (youth/pop) version of a shaʿbī (folk/popular) tune.  While it contains elements of 
the dabke that one might hear at a wedding, the timbres are smoothed out a bit, and the distinctive 
dabke rhythm is rounded off at the edges.  The tag line of the song, “Ḥabībī Ᾱsmar al-Loun” (my 
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dark-colored darling), is sung on a descending melodic line that closes off the chorus in a way that 
satisfies the harmonic requirements of a western pop song as well as those of a traditional 
Levantine song. 
Shabābī and Shaʿbī 
In his chapter “What’s Not on Egyptian Television and Radio! Locating the ‘Popular’ in 
Egyptian Sha’bi” James Grippo makes the distinction in Egyptian popular music between shabābī 
(youth) music of the type that dominates mass media, and shaʿbī (popular, in a “folk” sense) music 
which is extremely popular among the working class while receiving a smaller fraction of 
television, satellite, and radio airplay.67  Given the influence of Cairo in the regional media 
landscape and the traditional links between Syria and Egypt, it is no surprise that this distinction is 
also present in Damascus. 
However, while the distinction between shaʿbī and shabābī is certainly useful in the Syrian 
context, the Egyptian bifurcation described by Grippo does not map cleanly on to Syrian listening 
habits.  One reason for this is the heterogeneity of the Syrian population, where a wide variety of 
ethnic, linguistic, and regional cultures precludes the existence of a single shaʿbī tradition that 
would be analogous to the relatively more homogenous Egypt.  The most obvious example of this 
divergence would be the sizeable Kurdish minority in Syria, whose music does not appear in any 
form on local broadcast media.68   Despite the lack of airplay on Syrian radio, a variety of Kurdish 
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music remains popular, both in Kurdish neighborhoods in Damascus and especially in the Kurdish 
areas of Northeastern Syria near Qamishli and the Turkey/Iraqi borders, aided in recent years by the 
Kurdish-language television and radio stations originating in Iraqi Kurdistan.   
More generally amongst Arabophone groups, although specific local shaʿbī identities are 
often articulated through performances at weddings and festivals, music and dance styles are 
usually discussed in regional or geographical terms like desert, mountainous, or coastal, rather than 
ethnic, sectarian or nationally labels.69  This rural association of shaʿbī music in Syria is also a point 
of divergence from the Egyptian shaʿbī music studied by James Grippo and Nicholas Puig, which 
they describe as primarily a phenomenon of urban Cairo.  
In Syria as in Egypt, the term shaʿbī can be confusing as a musical identifier, as it is used to 
apply to multiple types of music of differing social associations.  In the context of government 
sponsored radio and other media, the term shaʿbī is most often used in the folkloric sense, referring 
to music associated with rural fork performance traditions.  For example, in the 2009 Syrian State 
Radio Sponsored Song contest devoted to the theme “Golan in the Heart”, the prize for best shaʿbī 
song went to “al Jolan” by Ahmed al Haj ‘Ali, a member of the folk group Dar  a, which was 
founded in 1986 and is dedicated to preserving and performing the musical traditions of the Hawran 
region of southern Syria.70  At the award ceremony, which was broadcast on state television, Haj 
‘Ali sang and performed the rebāba (a bowed spike-fiddle) in front of an orchestra in formal black 
suits, while wearing traditional Bedouin robe (thaub), and accompanied by a group of similarly 
dressed men dancing dabke.  This type of intentional performance of musical turāth (heritage) is 
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one use of the term, but shaʿbī can also refer to the popular electronic drum-and synthesizer-
focused dance music which is a mainstay of working class life, and wedding celebrations.   
Dabke 
The broadest signifier of shaʿbīyya as it appears in Syria and on Syrian radio would be the 
musical types associated with the dabke, a broad term which refers to a variety of group line and 
circle dances.  The dabke is danced throughout the Levant, including Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Palestine, and as ‘Adnān ibn Dhurail details in his book Raqs al-samāḥ wa al-dabke, tārīkh wa 
tadwīn, is performed within Syria in innumerable variations depending on the region.71  Although 
there has been some scholarly attention paid to the Palestinian and Lebanese dabke, there has been 
almost no work in English on the Syrian dabke (and very little in Arabic aside from ibn Dhurail and 
an earlier work by ʻAdnān Manini).72  Shayna Silverstein’s recently completed dissertation is the 
first full- length study of the topic, and her ethnography will be the definitive work on the Syrian 
dabke for some time to come.73  
In their mass mediated incarnations, signifiers of dabke shaʿbīyya most often come in use 
of, or at least the allusion to, dabke-associated iqa‘āt (rhythmic modes), but the performance of 
these modes is modified to move along the shabābī-shaʿbī spectrum towards a more pop style.74 As 
it appears in mass-mediated music, dabke is generally associated with a broad rural authenticity, 
rather than any particular region. According to Christopher Stone, this pan-Levantine association 
with mass-mediated dabke can be traced to the work of the Rahbani Brothers:  
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While the Dabka that the Rahbani Brothers participated in developing was based on its 
north-Lebanese mountain versions, the result was something new. By trying to make the 
Dabka more “Lebanese,” the Rahbani Brothers had, in fact, made it less so.75 
 
Though considered a folk genre, dabke is often recorded with electronic instruments taking the 
place of the reed instruments mijwiz or arghul, and drum machines in the roles of the tabla, 
darboukka or riqq.  While the dabke is associated with shaʿbī (folk/popular) or baladi 
(country/rural) culture, the music and dance are produced and consumed widely in cities as well, 
and people from all social classes are expected to know at least the basic steps. The genre has also 
increased in popularity outside of the Arab world in recent years due to its inclusion in the World 
Music marketplace, thanks to artists like Omar Suleiman, who released a series of well-received 
records with Sublime Frequencies.76 
This music does not, however, get the majority of the airplay on radio and satellite stations, 
which are aiming upmarket at an affluent audience who are perceived as less interested in shaʿbī 
styles.   
In a 2011 episode of the Syrian sketch comedy television show Buq‘at Dau’ (Spotlight), a 
sketch entitled Dabke mockingly illustrates the universality of dabke dance music, and the power it 
holds over even the wealthy classes of Damascus. 77 
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The sketch begins in a finely appointed house, where an older man in a silk robe lies in bed.  
From outside the bedroom we can hear dabke music playing, and from his supine position the 
man’s hand slowly moves up into the air in the pose of a dancer, and he is rhythmically dragged up 
to his feet.  The song is “  Aloush” by dabke star ‘Ali Ad-Deek. 
 
Sleep-dancing out of bed, out of the room and across the house towards a large television and 
speaker system, he stops the music and his dancing by shutting off the TV. 
When his wife comes out into the living room to ask why he turned off the music, he complains to 
her: 
“Darling, how many times have I told you that I don’t want to listen to these songs in the house?”  
“God forgive you, what do you mean these songs? They are sweet, and most people really love 
them! 
“I didn’t say that I don’t like them, but I don’t want to listen to these songs in the house.” 
“They are commendable songs…” 
“Enough! I’m saying I don’t want to listen to these songs in the house!” 
… 
In the next two scenes he hears the music again and is forced against his will to dance: first in the 
bathroom while shaving, and then in his car, where he is compelled out into middle of the street, 
dancing until the music recedes. 
In the following scene, he is sitting with a friend at a chic hotel café, the two of them looking very 
respectable as they sit and talk next to the pool.  He confesses his affliction to this friend, who 
recommends that he see a doctor. 





Luckily, the friend spots a famous psychiatrist sitting at a table across the café, and after sending a 
waiter to ask permission to come sit down, he makes his confession: 
“I’ll get to the issue directly.  Doctor I have a problem… a dabke problem.” 
“I’m sorry, but I think there is a mistake.  I’m a psychiatrist, I don’t have anything to do with 
dance.” 
“I know, I know doctor, of course.  But my point it is, I mean Doctor, give me a moment…I 
just hear the sound of any shaʿbī song (ugniya shaʿbīyya), and I can’t possess myself at all, I can’t 
control myself… 
“Excuse me, I don’t understand, what is the nature of your job?” 
“I am a retired general manager…” 
“Yes, but what’s the relationship of dabke with work, did you dabke as a requisite of your 
job?” 
“No, the nature of my job isn’t related to the dabke, but as you know Doctor, I am a general 
manager, and it is necessary in my position to join in every national, popular, and humanitarian 
event…as you know, we have many events, Doctor, sometimes there is more than one in a day. I can 
say that… hmm, three plus six plus six plus eight…for something close to forty years I have been 
dabke-ing (arbaʿyīn sena ana am bedbok).” 
“So I understand sir, that for all of your life you have dabked as you work” 
They make an appointment, with the doctor’s instructions to make a list of all of the events at which 
he has dabked.  The next scene takes place in the doctor’s waiting room, as half a dozen men in 
suits sit waiting for their appointments.  Someone’s cellphone rings, and as the sound of the dabke 
comes out of the tinny speakers, all of the men begin tapping their feet enthusiastically.  The 





do.  After each response in turn with “general manager”, the phone rings again, and the entire 
group gets up and begins a dabke line around the coffee table in the waiting room. 
 
Despite the ubiquity of dabke dance and associated music in public life, its down-market 
and rural associations means that relative to its actual popularity, dabke appears on urban-focused 
Damascus radio stations with less frequency than other genres of lesser or equivalent popularity, 
which are generally pitched to a  more affluent or at least aspirational listenership.  This divide 
actually illustrates a disjuncture between the audience which listens to private radio and the 
audiences which the stations are attempting to attract or create.  During listener request segments on 
Al Madina FM, Arabesque, or Version FM, the playlist shifts noticeably along the shabābī-shaʿbī 
spectrum towards the more working-class, dabke and shaʿbī side, playing popular mass-mediated 
dabke stars like Faras Karam, Melhem Zein, and Wafiq Habib.  Although these call-in segments 
seem to illustrate a clear demand for more shaʿbī music, that demand does not necessarily drive 
programming, as broadcasters attempt to attract the particular demographics desired by advertisers, 
rather than aiming to satisfy the desires of their full audience.  
 
University of Damascus - Mezzeh 
In Mezzeh, groups of students step off the servīs and gather just outside the gates of the university 
as afternoon classes begin.  Pairs of women share headphones as they sit on the benches outside 
the dental school, listening to music and reading textbooks.  In larger groups, the tinny ring of pop 







Shabābī Voices  
The demographic group that I had the most contact with, outside of my time spent listening 
in cafes, was middle and upper class shabāb, young people of college age and upwards to around 
30.  These are the prime demographics which both Syrian private stations are directed towards and 
which comprise the bulk of the voices heard on private radio.  A review of 30 mudhīʿīn 
(broadcasters) using public biographies, social media pages, and personal knowledge, finds that 
although a few more established broadcasters (such as Hiam Hamoy on Sham FM) receive a great 
deal of airtime, the majority of voices heard on the private stations are from  recent college 
graduates, especially of the universities in Damascus and Aleppo.  Though most studied academic 
subjects unrelated to broadcasting (political science and English literature were common) some 
have been trained specifically for broadcasting and production, either through the state-funded 
institutes, or through programs like the Diploma in Media, sponsored by the French international 
station Radio Monte Carlo and Radio France International, in cooperation with the Syrian 
International Academy.78   
These young broadcasters are generally multilingual, and in the style of Lebanese television 
and radio hosts, slip English and French words into broadcasts to varying degrees according to the 
station and the type of music programming. The majority of non-musical airtime on the current 
airwaves is taken up by women broadcasters, in a move that reverses the historical position of 
women on Syrian radio (a 2000 article from the journal of the Arab States Broadcasting Union 
counted 8 women to 13 men in Syrian radio’s Broadcaster Division, although 16 of 28 members in 
the Foreign Radio Division were women.)79   
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Many of the initial conversations about music I had in Damascus took place in and around 
the University of Damascus while I was taking Arabic classes early on in my time there, or later 
when visiting the libraries and bookstores around the University.  In these conversations, after being 
asked what I study and the accompanying questions (“What instrument do you play?” etc…) I 
would often respond with “What kind of music do you listen to?” a question which most often 
elicited protestations of ignorance: “I don’t know anything about music.”  As a musicologist, I am 
used to receiving this answer in the US from people who are nervous about the (lack of) social 
capital associated of their music tastes, and that was certainly at work to some extent in Damascus, 
but another significant factor is that “mūsīqā” is primarily associated with instrumental music. 
The question “What type of songs do you like?” was thus more successful, though people 
still expressed some reticence and were likely to default to “Fairuz in the morning, Umm Kulthum 
in the evening” if they knew I was a music specialist.  The question I hit upon which elicited the 
most voluble responses was “Who is your favorite singer on Star Academy?”80  Even young people 
who ostensibly don’t watch televised song contests were often very willing to discuss exactly why 
they don’t watch, in great detail.  This is a clear contrast between the type of knowledge about 
music and singing that is valued in public discourse, and the type of knowledge which is actually 
cultivated by casual or ’uneducated’ listeners.   
  
Spinning the dial, we hear a series of advertisements, each followed by a song. 
89.1 - Radio Fann (Art Radio), advertises a group of cafes with new TV sets and satellite 
connections for watching soccer matches, then features a spot for the Damascus Honda dealership.  
      Song: Tamer Hosni – Come Back to Me (rapping in English and singing in Arabic) 
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94.5 - Version FM advertises “Top Style” Italian clothes at the fancy Sham City Center Mall, and a 
new automotive club.   
 Song: Wael Kfoury – “Al-Hub Fanūn”  
99.9 - Al-Arabbiya pitches Subaru and a new sports club. 
 Song: a dance mix of Jocelyn Brown’s “Believe” 
105.3 - Radio al-Quds endlessly repeats ads for Bawabat Dimeshq, the “Guinness World Record 
Holder for Largest Restaurant” just outside the city, offering Levantine, Indian, Chinese, and 
Allepine cuisine, and seating for six thousand people. 




The Syrian advertising market is very small as compared to the rest of the pan-Arab market. 
According to a 2010 report by the Dubai Press Club, Syria accounts for just one percent of total 
pan-Arab spending on advertisements.81  From my observation, the pan-Arab television media does 
not direct a great deal of attention towards the Syrian market. 
In the period between the beginning of Ba’th rule in 1963 and the (now ironically named) 
“Damascus Spring” of 2001, when private media was generally outlawed, all advertising was 
controlled by the Arab Advertising Organization (al-mu’assisa alʿarabiyya lil- iʿlān) a 
governmental bureau under the Ministry of Information.  The organization still handles the 
advertising sales for state radio and television stations, newspapers, and outdoor billboards and 
posters. Prices for private radio advertising are set in conjunction with the bureau.  In an interview, 
                                                 





one radio employee complained that private stations are still required to pay large monthly fees to 
this organization, although it provides no services.  All media organizations are also required to 
reserve no less than five percent of their advertising space for use as a “free public benefit,” as 
determined by national media council.82  
Radio advertisements are produced either in-house, or by one of a number of independent 
studios that work as ad production agencies.  A few musicians I met in Damascus supplement their 
income through this kind of work.  In addition to music for paid advertisements, the stations also 
need music for internal promotions, bumpers, and ad spots.  For example, the state-run Ṣawt Ash-
Shabāb has several mini-songs that run about a minute long, and literally sing the praises of the 
station.  My favorite such promotional tune begins with a bed of piano chords reminiscent of Lionel 
Ritchie’s “Hello”, a staple of Syrian radio. 
ya ahla idhā’a 
shu bḥibek ana 
kul youm wa kul sāʿa, bghany lek ana 
O Sweetest Radio, 
How I love you, 
Every day, every hour, I sing for you 
 
Then the drums and bass kick in, and the voice is joined by a whistling synth countermelody. 
ya ṣawt ash-shabāb 
ya ṣawt ash-shabāb 
ya ṣawt al-maḥubbi 
wa layal al-ḥanā 
O voice of the youth 
O voice of the youth 
O voice of the beloved 
And the nights of longing 
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The density of advertisements on Syrian radio varies widely from station to station, with prices 
highest during rush hour and afternoons.  The marketing director for Arabiyya FM pointed out that 
this station did not play any advertisements after nine at night, while Syria al-Ghad at one point 
advertised ad-free Fridays. 83 
The period with the highest rates of radio listenership, as well as television viewership, is 
the holy month of Ramadan, when advertising rates on Syrian state and television rise 
significantly.84  Like satellite music channels however, ad revenue is not the only means of making 
money for radio stations in Syria and Lebanon, as is nicely illustrated by the following experience. 
One afternoon while I was staying in Beirut in June of 2011, I was listening to Strike FM, a 
Lebanese station which also covers some areas of Syria.  The DJ, speaking in Arabic, posed the 
question, “What is the city in Southern Lebanon, whose name, when two of the letters are reversed, 
becomes the name of a person’s occupation?”   
Having made a trip down south of Beirut the previous day, I quickly came up with an 
answer that fit the profile: the southern city of Sayda (Sidon in English).  Spelled saad –ya-dal-alif 
(اديص,  ص–  ي–  د–  ا ) with the middle letters reversed, it becomes saad-ya-alif-dal  )دايص ,  ص(–  ي–  ا
–  د  Siyad (hunter/fisherman).  Inordinately pleased with myself at the success of my meager 
Lebanese geography skills, I stayed tuned to the station, waiting for confirmation. 
In between each song, the DJ would receive a call from a listener, remind them of the prize, 
and take their guess. 
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Listener: “Tarablus” (Tripoli) 
DJ: “Āsif, ult ilek an al-madina fi’l janūb.  Madīna….. fil janūb.”  (I’m sorry, I said that the city is 
the south…  A city …..in the south.”) 
 
After a few songs, and a few more terrible guesses (“Beirut?”, “Byblos?”) cities that were neither in 
the south nor fit the criteria, I became annoyed.  How could all of these people fail to figure out the 
answer?  Surely if an American, with basic knowledge of Arabic, much less of Lebanese 
geography, can come up with the answer to the trivia question, then somebody else in range of the 
radio station must be able to do so. 
 I picked up my phone and dialed the number for the station, memorized at this point through 
endless repetition by the DJ before and after each song.  After a moment a recorded woman’s voice 
sounded from the other end of the line, thanking me for calling and listing off my options, and 
letting me know kindly that I would be charged for the call.    
Oh. Maybe I am not so clever after all. 
 
The point of the contest, and the point of the many of the radio surveys that one is invited to 
participate in via SMS or call, is to get people on their mobile phones, at which point the telecoms, 
and the stations, are making money.  The trivia segment between songs on Strike FM was designed 
less for the purpose of entertaining the audience than to drive the maximum number of listeners to 
call in.   This type of audience interaction is a recurring feature on Syrian radio.  For example, 
throughout the duration of “Kān Zamān”, a program which profiles one golden age singer each 







94.4 Version FM – On the tail of the plaintive voice and Spanish guitar of Melham Zain’s “Inti 
Mshiti” (You left), a chorus of children sings the station’s theme, a series of nonsense syllables 
before the title: 
 “Da-da-da-da-da, Da-da-da-da-da, Feerjin Ef Em” 
 
Version FM  
 “Version” FM provides a remarkable example of the disconnect that still exists between 
Syria and the regional and global media markets.  Transliterated into Arabic as “نجريف", the same 
way that one would also transliterate “Virgin”, the name is pronounced “Feerjin” over the radio.  
The station thus capitalizes on the brand presence of the British “Virgin” companies in the Middle 
East, and is presented to Syrian Arabic-speaking audiences in a way that would naturally lead 
listeners to presume an affiliation with the global brand, as is actually the case in Virgin Radio 
Jordan and Virgin Radio Dubai.  “Version FM” also uses a close copy of Virgin’s recognizable 
checkmark “V” in its advertisements, further enhancing the brand association. 
 
Figure 2.2: Version FM Logo and Website Banner85 
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Figure 2.3: Virgin FM Jordan Logo86 
 
Copyright laws are enforced loosely throughout the region, and piracy of media content is the norm 
rather than the exception.  On a small scale, this kind of unofficial franchising is common for 
restaurants or clothing stores, where proprietors rightly assume that they are so small and difficult 
to reach legally that they will fly below the radar of the companies with whose brand they are 
associating.  However, the transparent attempt of Version FM to associate with the larger global 
brand is specific to the Syrian radioscape, where relative isolation from the global market makes 
this kind of brand piggybacking possible. 
The close affiliation of Syria’s business class with government officials and official news 
outlets means that reported surveys of radio popularity are often conflicting and unreliable.  In 2011 
for example the Damascus newspaper Tishreen reported that Arabesque FM was the number one 
private station, while DamasPost.com conducted its own survey naming Sham FM number one later 
the same year.87  In one incident in 2007, the IPSOS statistical research company’s Syrian branch 
was shut down by order of the Governor of Damascus for operating without proper authorization.  
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Precise reasons for the shutdown remain opaque in new reports, but the head of IPSOS’s Syrian 
operations accused the head of Al Madina FM of playing a role in the decision, following an IPSOS 
survey which ranked Al Madina FM in third place behind Ṣawt ash-Shabāb and Al Arabiyya.88 
 
The afternoon call to prayer rings out from a dozen mosques and a hundred speakers.  The Iranian 
tourists visiting the Sayyida Ruqayyah Mosque in the Old City say their prayers before heading out 
to the busses taking them to the Shrine of Sayyida Zaineb down south of the city.  The bus drivers, 
listening to dabke as they wait for their load of tourists, switch over to recitations of the Quran as 
the faithful climb on board. 
Religious Song 
 Religious songs, readings, and sermons form a significant segment of the soundscape, 
especially in everyday life as one walks the streets of Damascus and passes by shop owners and 
street vendors.89  Popular religious music appears most often as songs distributed by cassette tape 
and burned CD, or on one of the various satellite music channels which feature it.  In its most 
anodyne form, religious song appears on Syrian pop music stations, a manifestation constrained 
only by the state’s preference for secular media, reinforced by both the socialist ideology of the 
Ba’th party and the fear of the ruling Allawi minority of any deviation from national unity that 
might arouse resentment from the Sunni majority.   
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 Even on the relatively secular Syrian radio however one hears Quranic readings and 
religious lectures, most famously by Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan Al-Buti on state radio.90  
While the regimes of Hafiz and Bashar al-Assad had until recently been opposed to wholly 
religious stations, in response to the protests of Spring 2011 Asad offered concessions geared 
toward religious protesters, including the promise to found an Islamic satellite television station as 
well as a religious radio station.91  The brand-new radio station is entitled Nūr Ash-Shām, and 
broadcasts a program of Quran readings and lectures, inshād (religious chant, often accompanied by 
percussion), calls to prayer, religiously focused stories from history, etc. Appendix 1 shows the 
schedule of a programming day for the station.92 
 This station is in addition and contrast to Radio Nūr (Nūr meaning “God’s Light”) 
broadcast from Lebanon, a station associated with Hizbullah, which “[c]alls for virtue and morality 
and a respect for religions” and broadcasts religious services.93   
 In his article “Sultans of Spin: Sacred Music on the World Stage”, Jonathan Shannon 
argues that in many Syrian musical traditions, the distinction between sacred and non-sacred music 
is extremely fluid in actual practice. 
      … Syrian musicians generally do not distinguish between sacred and nonsacred 
categories in this fashion. In practice, the sacred-profane distinction tends to refer 
more to different venues than to different repertoires. Of course there are well-
known forms of Islamic chant (inshād) performed in Syria that are distinct from 
songs performed in nonritual contexts by their association with prayer, other forms 
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of ritual, and by their lyrics, which refer to Allah, Muhammad, and the prophets. Yet 
the lyrics of the "sacred" songs often have both spiritual and profane connotations, as 
is well known in Sufi poetry and song texts in praise of wine and the beloved, for 
example.  
Shannon goes on to describe the ways in which “sacred” and non-sacred repertoires coexist, 
sharing both aspects such as melodies and texts, and performance practices and venues. 
 
  The ambiguity of the distinction between sacred and nonsacred song texts is 
mirrored in the coperformance conventions in modern Syria, where audiences and 
performers are expected to interact in similar ways-via shouts, sighs, and bodily 
movements- in the context of a sahra (evening musical soirée) and during dhikr.94 
 
 While Shannon is referring to live music performance genres which are not the most 
commonly represented on popular radio, his point about the fluidity for religious and non-religious 
songs applies to the radio as well as the concert stage.  This isn’t to deny religious listening 
practices which are self-consciously constructed as alternatives to the type of listening associated 
with popular music, and the type of “ethical listening” and “reverence for the sacred word” 
described by Charles Hirschkind in his book The Ethical Soundscape is indeed a powerful and 
relevant mode of audition in Islamic Syria as well as Hirschkind’s focus of Egypt.  However, the 
distinction between sacred and nonsacred music and music audition can be difficult to make.  Or 
rather, listeners and programmers are not always interested in a practice which makes that 
distinction.  Thus Syrian state radio will play a religious nasheed by a vocalist like Omar Sarmini, 
followed soon after by the same singer performing the secular lyrics of a muwashaḥ.  
 The inshād repertory in rotation on Syrian radio should also be distinguished from the most 
common inshād on satellite television.  Due to the financial backing of the conservative Gulf 
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countries, the Saudi and Khaleeji inshād are the most commonly heard varieties on satellite 
television.  Religious music also enters the soundscape in the form of an overpowered car stereo 
blasting a refrain of “Ya Hussein, Ya Hussein, Ya Hussein” over a thumping drum beat, an explicit 
kind of advocacy, and a sonic advertisement from the driver that says “I’m young, rich, and Shia.” 
 
 “The Awtar group and Qasr Ar-Rehab of Sayidnaya present for one concert only - the star Mu’en 
Sharif.  The star Mu’en Sharif - Thursday evening, the 8th of Tamouz, 2010.  For reservations and 
information call 0991-23-33-32.  Presented by Majelet Rotana, Majelet Sabaya, and Version FM.” 
Concerts 
Any concert taking place in Syria requires government approval, based on Article IV of the 
famous “Emergency Law” instituted in 1962, which among other restrictive injunctions designed to 
curtail political   instability, prevents the gathering of large groups of people without permits.  
Section A of Article IV allows the government to “place restrictions on the freedom of people in 
meeting, accommodation, travel and traffic in places or at certain times…” while section B allows 
the government to “control messages and intelligence of any kind, and control of newspapers, 




As I learned in the course of conversation with Syrian musicians, if one is able to secure the 
permits for a concert in Damascus (potentially a long and often expensive process even with the 
privilege of government connections), performers or venues can still be required to pay for 
government security for the gathering, either formally through the bureaucratic process or 
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informally through bribes to the mukhabarat (secret police) who will show up in any case.  Thus 
not only do several different segments of the government bureaucracy have effective veto power 
over all performances, but artists and venue owners are often forced to finance their own 
censorship, or at least their own monitors. 
The primary venues for live music are weddings, which in both rural and urban areas 
represent a rare opportunity for public gathering allowed by the state, and the dabke performances 
at weddings are the most public performances in Syria.
96
   Live performances of other types of 
music do of course take place in a variety of settings, including formal concerts at the opera house 
or the conservatoire, and less formal concerts in nightclubs or restaurants, but these are more 
restricted.  The process of financing large concerts often involves several companies jointly hosting 
an event, as with the Mu’en Sharif concert mentioned above, which was co-sponsored by Rotana, 
Sabaya, and Version FM.  The difficulty of organizing large concerts, however, means that many 
Syrian musicians make more money and perform as often outside of Syria as they do inside its 
borders.  For the highest level of performers, who are most able to navigate the bureaucratic issues 
involved in performing in Syria, and who command large fees to play at a restaurant or wedding, 
the promise of even larger appearance fees in Lebanon or the Gulf makes Syria an occasional stop 
rather than a regular option.  Musicians in the Middle East typically earn almost none of their 
income from the royalties on records, and when dealing with the major music companies are 
generally paid a lump sum up front for a recording.
97
 Performing is viewed as a direct source of 
income, rather than a method of increasing record sales. 
 
                                                 
96
 Silverstein, “Mobilizing Bodies in Syria: Dabke, Popular Culture, and the Politics of Belonging.” 
97
 Frishkopf, “Introduction: Music and Media in the Arab World and ‘Mus ic and Media in the Arab World’ as Music 





99.1 NRJ Radio 
 We turn the receiver to NRJ Radio from Lebanon and hear the largest uninterrupted block of 
English language all day. 
Pet Shop Boys – I’m With Stupid 
Tina Turner – I Don’t Wanna Lose You 
Alphaville – Forever Young 
Toto – I Will Remember 
This Lebanese station has a wider-ranging English language playlist than most, and isn’t subject to 
the Syrian caps on foreign song plays.  The close connection with NRJ’s French counterpart results 
in frequent programming of American and British music that was popular in France in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  In recent years, foreign language stations from Lebanon have been joined by MIX FM 
Syria, the only Syrian English-language station, which broadcasts Western music and English 
speaking DJs from Beirut and the Gulf, and uses the tagline “Proud to Be Syrian.” 
Lebanese Sound of Syria 
 As I detail in Chapter 1, from the earliest years of broadcasting in the Arabic-speaking 
world cross-border broadcasting has been the norm rather than the exception.  Arabic is, according 
to Douglas Boyd, the most internationally broadcast language in the world, after English.  The 
presence of foreign stations in Syria is an unavoidable fact, whether they are Arabic-language 
stations coming from international powers like the US, Britain, France, and Russia, clandestine 
Kurdish stations broadcasting from Northern Iraq, or private for-profit stations from Lebanon and 
Jordan.  Broadcasters in Lebanon especially direct some of their efforts towards the Syrian audience 





Compared to the domestic Syrian stations, Lebanese radio has offered a bewildering variety 
of radio options.  According to Marwan Kraidy: “In 1995, more than fifty terrestrial television 
stations and more than a hundred radio stations catered to Lebanon’s estimated three million 
inhabitants, who lived in a country of 10,452 square kilometers, or 4,105 square miles, only twice 
the size of the U.S. state of Delaware!”
98
   
Of course, some of these stations were serving more than just Lebanon, and the Syrian sonic 
memory of radio is tuned to these stations as well.  The existence of Lebanese stations was at least 
tacitly accepted by the Syrian government.  For example in the 1990s the Rafiq Hariri-owned Radio 
Orient “enjoyed a privileged relationship with Syria’s sole advertising agency, the Arab Advertising 
Organization, whereby the AAO sold airtime on its behalf.  This arrangement indicated to 
advertisers that Radio Orient was an officially approved medium in Syria.”
99
 
Stations are linguistically differentiated as well, with Arabic, English, and French-language 
programs each holding a segment of the market.  Among these, the English and French stations are 
typically more local in focus, and are thought to broadcast to a wealthier listenership, while the 
Arabophone stations broadcast to the largest population, which often include Syrian listeners. 
The relationship between foreign, Lebanese, and local stations extends down to the 
personnel level as well.  Hiam Hamoy, a well-known broadcaster at Sham FM, worked previously 
for the French Radio Monte Carlo in the seventies, then at Paris-based Radio Orient (idhaʿat al-
sharq) during the 1990s, when it was owned by Rafiq Hariri.
 100
  As the senior broadcaster on the 
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private stations, well known in the industry from her previous work, Hamoy is able to book 
interviews with some of biggest stars who visit Damascus.   
Many of the broadcasters on Syrian private stations studied or spent considerable time 
outside of Syria, in Lebanon, Europe, or the US.  As mentioned earlier, the young Syrian 
broadcasters tend also to be bilingual, and criticism directed at Syrian private radio often takes the 
form of complaints that the broadcasters sound too Lebanese, and that they use foreign words and 





105.1 Rotana Style – Turning the dial, we hear, once again, one of the most popular songs in 
Damascus in the spring of 2010, Elissa’s “ ‘A Balī Habībī” (On my mind, darling).  In constant 
rotation on radio, satellite music video stations, and personal stereos, the song is ubiquitous in the 
way that is exclusive to a hit song in the warm part of the year.  A long walk across the city 
invariably exposes a listener to snippets of the song multiple times, wafting out of car windows and 
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Elissa Khoury (b. 1972), known simply as “Elissa” professionally, is a Lebanese pop star with a 
series of hit albums recorded for Rotana over the past ten years.
103
  A staple of video clip channels, 
television shows, and the pan-Arab celebrity press, she has been named the best-sellinīg artist in the 
Middle East by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry three times. ‘A Bālī” (On 
my Mind) was the biggest hit off of her 2009 record Tsadaq Bmein (Who do you believe?). 
 Where many Lebanese stars are best known for shabābī dance songs, Elissa is synonymous 
with al-ughniyya al-rūmānsiyya (romantic song).  While a common criticism of popular mass-
mediated Arabic music states complains that all songs are variations on the same topic of love, 
unrequited love, or losing love, within the work of Arab pop there are many varieties of love song.  
“Romantic” refers not just to lyrical content, but to a particular styles of singing and musical 
arrangement. 
“A Bali” begins quietly, the first two phrases are each repeated over “‘A bali habibi”…….. 
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On my mind baby 
Tonight, I'll wear the white for you 
And I'll become yours 
And all the world will witness 
And I'll give birth to your baby 
That looks just like you 
On my mind baby 
I'll live a lifetime or more, next to you 
With a love that grows  
While we grow  
And I'll age with you,  
My life disappears when you're absent 
On my mind baby 












Figure 2.4: Transcription – Melody of  Elissa, “ ‘A Bali Ḥabībī” 
 
The video clip for the song begins in the interior of a church, to the sound of an organ 
playing “Here Comes the Bride”, and the rest of the video alternates between flashbacks of Elissa 
fighting and smiling with a handsome actor, and shots of her in a wedding dress, preparing for the 
ceremony and singing to the camera.  The video and the narrative described in it by the lyrics 
exemplifiy the ideal of the Lebanese female star, the sex object who simultaneously performs the 
duties of wife and mother to perfection.  This ideal is a standard trope of Lebanon music stardom, 
where even the “Ambassador to the Stars” (Fairuz) took care to mention her duties as wife and 
mother in most of her rare interviews.
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  Even the video for Haife Wahbe’s scandalous “Bous al 
Wawa” (Kiss the Boo-Boo) takes places within the confines of the protagonist’s home as she takes 
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Voice of the Evening  
2:00am  - 87.6 FM “You are listening to Voice of the Evening on Radio Damascus.” 
A smooth-voiced, comforting DJ, Simʿan Ferzli, takes calls dealing with the topic of the night.  He 
speaks in breezy newscaster when announcing the station and song titles, but slips into a 
comforting Damascene accent with each of the callers. 
Call-In and Talk Shows 
Call-in and talk shows are a significant part of the Damascus radio landscape.  These 
include advice shows which take calls on topics like romance, family, school, etc., horoscope 
programs and general discussion programs where callers will chime in on news topics of the day or 
broad societal issues.  While the shows often address everyday difficulties and problems in Syria, 
domestic politics is largely avoided.  Private radio stations are not licensed to discuss political 
news, and until the 2011-2012 uprisings were prohibited from doing so (see Chapter Six).  
However, the line between content geared towards general interests like “Family and Child-
Rearing”, the title of one radio talk show, and broadly political topics, is often blurry. Thus an 
interview program might have a professor of law on the air in order to discuss the rights of women 
to work in Syria, but all discussion regarding existing laws will be generally favorable.  DJs also 
take call-in requests for music, but following the popularity of SMS-based satellite music channels, 








2:00 am Ṣawt as-Sahara on Radio Damascus 
“Tonight’s topic: split personalities”     (al-izdiwaj ash-shakhṣiyya). 
   A series of women call in to give their opinions. Callers and host are warmly polite, the callers 
excited to be speaking with their nightly companion, and the host greeting them like a series of 
missed relatives. 
 
DJ: “What is your name, dear? 
Caller: “Leena” 
DJ: “Faḍalli ya Leena” (Go ahead, Leena!) 
Caller:  “I heard one opinion, perhaps it is incorrect, and you will disagree with it, but ….” 
 
Leena points out that a split personality is a clinical diagnosis and needs to be treated by 
professionals.  The next caller argues that there are situations in which dual personalities are 
understandable or even necessary.  A husband shouldn’t be the same at work as at home.  
Despite the excitement in the voice of each caller at expressing an opinion on the radio, the 
pace of the show is very relaxed.  Between each, the DJ weaves in 15 or 20 seconds of a song, 
slowing down the pace of the show, and often using the song to comment wryly on the topic of 
conversation. 
 
DJ: “Again, the topic for tonight is dual personalities…” 






“Waḥdi Ana, rah ibqa waḥdi…sākin Ana sākini waḥdi….” 




Tonight’s callers are thanked by Ferzli profusely in warm Shami (Syrian dialect), who signs off at 
2:15 before sending the station off into a 54-minute live recording of Umm Kulthum’s classic "Min 
Ajli ʿEynayka" (Because of Your Eyes). 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have described a few of the factors that shape the way that radio is 
programmed and listened to within the soundscape of Damascus Syria.   Within that soundscape, 
the variety of English- and Arabic-language popular music that has become the norm in recent years 
on Syrian radio often appears to American ears to represent split personalities, multiple unrelated 
listening aesthetics juxtaposed against each other, adopted and discarded at will. In the following 
chapters, I will examine mass-media discourses about music in Syria, and the way that radio genres 
and listening categories are described and understood within the larger Syrian mediascape.  In 
doing so I hope to illuminate the ways in which these sonic juxtapositions not only make sense, but 
are central to the local experience of public and state-sponsored culture. 
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Chapter 3 – Popular Music in Syrian Mass Media Discourse 
 
Introduction 
Depending on who is speaking, and where one is listening, the music which 
dominates radio, music stores, and satellite television in the Arab world goes by a variety 
of names: “bub” (pop), “Arabpop”, “shabābī” (youthful), or “Āghānī hadītha”(modern 
song) to fans, “jeel” to some scholars, “hābiṭ” (vulgar), or “fideo clip” songs to its 
critics.  In Syria, several musicians I spoke with referred to the music played on the radio 
and on satellite music channels as simply “Rotana Music,” implying through a reference 
to the largest media company a critique of both the quality and style of the music and the 
economic relationship of large corporations with local musical scenes.  The varieties 
which fall under this umbrella of popular mass-mediated music include a wide range of 
performance and production practices.  Some of these stylistic differences are extremely 
subtle, barely audible except to the most devoted and discerning listeners, while 
differences between some songs are so great that an unfamiliar listener would have a hard 
time imagining how this range could fit into even a term as widely defined as “pop.”  The 
fact that these stylistic difference don’t always engender separate genres, either in the 
sense of fully fleshed out “genre worlds” (using Simon Frith’s terms), or even as 
marketing categories, doesn’t mean that they aren’t significant for listeners.1  Rather 
these are the distinctions which fans argue over endlessly, and are used to read shades of 
meaning into lyrics and video performance, the distinctions which separate an hour of 
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happy listening to a favorite DJ from a grimace and a quick change of channel.  An 
attempt to evaluate the use of popular music in the context of politically motivated 
broadcasting must be sensitive to these kinds of differences. 
This chapter outlines some of the categories which are used to market and define 
mass-mediated music in Syria.  As I argue elsewhere in this dissertation, the use of 
popular music in politically directed broadcasts constitutes audible instantiations of 
institutional theories of music and music’s utility in political communication, a model of 
the imagined listener envisioned by broadcasting power, and a model for the kinds of 
listening practices which these broadcasters want to inculcate.  When studying a targeted 
broadcast like Radio Sawa, to be discussed in Chapter 4, these attempts at musical 
influence also need to be placed in the context of the local discourses of popular music 
and radio.  What are the counterpropositions, and alternate theories of music and music 
listening that exist within the local media discourse in the target markets for Radio Sawa?  
In the specifically Syrian radioscape, what are the differences between the discourses of 
state-controlled, state-sanctioned, and cross-border regional media, and how might these 
differ from the musical discourses employed by international political broadcasters?  Are 
there alternative theories of music and radio in play in addition to the alternative political 
viewpoints, and alternative versions of reality espoused by politically directed 
broadcasts?  
 Towards answering these questions, in this chapter I will describe elements of 
musical mass media discourses both within Syria and in the pan-Arab mediascape of 







- Hundreds of hours of radio broadcasts, and language used by radio DJs and station 
administrators and programmers to describe their playlists, both on the air and on 
station websites, and via published and personal interviews 
- Journalistic and scholarly literary descriptions of popular music, in the Syrian, 
Lebanese and pan-Arab press 
- Televised commentary on music, including comedic references to music in the 
Syrian sketch comedy Spotlight (Buqa’ Daw’) 
- Ethnographic encounters around popular music listening in Syria, especially public 
listening practices in Damascus cafes 
- Syria state radio discourse about music, focusing especially on state-sponsored song 
contests 
 
More generally, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a context against which to 
position the music and institutional theories of musical communication broadcast by 
Radio Sawa, and in particular to allow the possibility of pitting Radio Sawa’s use of 
music against the institutional theories of music espoused by Syrian private and public 
state-controlled media outlets. 
In the title to his essay in Music and Mass Media in the Arab World, James 
Grippo asks the question “What’s Not on Egyptian Television and Radio?” in order to 
address the disjuncture between the polished, commercial shabābī (youth) music of the 
satellite television channels and pan-Arab media companies, and the locally popular 





and burned cds.2  Moving out of Egypt, by far the most studied country in Anglophone 
music scholarship on the Arab World, the questions changes: when it comes to Syria do 
we even know what is on the radio?  Little scholarship outside of Egypt has examined 
Arabic popular music with the same level of attention to the way that musical differences 
within mass mediated categories are marketed and distributed – much less to the actual 
sonic distinctions which exist within the category of mass marketed music.3  There are a 
number of reasons for this, and Syria in general has been severely understudied, partially 
for reasons having to do with difficulties (some perceived and some very real) involved 
for Americans working in Syria.4 
While I am most directly interested in terrestrial radio broadcasts in Syria, this 
chapter will engage with a mass-media discourse that includes a variety of media.  To 
return to Appadurai’s “scapes” terminology, the imagined world of the mediascape, 
which includes radio, television, newspapers, books, and all mass media, becomes the 
discursive and music theoretical terrain in which listeners experience and create meaning 
out of the music in their daily lives.  Moving to another set of anthropological metaphors, 
in an article about the experimental music scene in Beirut, Thomas Burkholter invokes 
Marc Slobin’s conception of “superculture”, “interculture” and “subculture” to situate the 
various aspects of Lebanese music. 
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 Grippo, “What’s Not on Egyptian Television and Radio! Locating the ‘Popular’ in Egyptian Sha’bi.”  
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 There are of course a few excellent studies of popular musical culture in the Mashriq, see literature review 
in the introduction. 
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Following this logic, the Arab pop scene can be categorized as 
“superculture”; imported Western classical and popular music (such as 
Mozart and Madonna), and Lebanese music that is heard throughout the 
world (such as Fayrouz and Marcel Khalifeh) could be defined as 
“interculture”. Finally, the music played in small circles in Beirut can be 
regarded as “subculture”.  As in Appadurai’s conception of “-scapes”, the 
borders between the different “-cultures” are not fixed and always in flux.5 
 
Described using this model, this chapter examines the intersection between the 
“superculture” of pan-Arab music industry and the “interculture” of a particularly Syrian 
mediascape which has been characterized by a remarkably high degree of state control. 
As I write this chapter in the spring of 2012, Syria is in the grips of a political and 
humanitarian crisis of incredible proportions.  While this chapter will use some examples 
from the Syrian media which were broadcast or published since the beginning of the Arab 
Uprising and its incarnation in Syria, for the purpose of this dissertation, I am writing 
about the Syria of 2010, the last time I was in the country.  Chapter 6 addresses some of 
the ways impact of the Syrian uprising have changed the local radioscape and the role of 
foreign broadcasts in it. 
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 Thomas Burkhalter, “Mapping Out the Sound Memory of Beirut. A survey of the music of a war 
generation,” in Itinéraires Esthétiques et Scènes Culturelles Au Proche-Orient, ed. Frank Mermier (Beirut: 
Institut français du Proche-Orient, 2007), 103–125, http://ifpo.revues.org/550.; Mark Slobin, Subcultural 






Call for Songs 
There are a limited number of places in the world where the public discourse, the 
range of ideas it is possible to express, what Stuart Hall has called “horizon of the taken-
for-granted”, has been as tightly controlled as in modern Syria.6  In the age of satellite 
television and growing if still very limited internet access, the mediascape in Syria is a 
blend of local, regional, pan-Arab, and global international sources.  Nevertheless, Syria 
remains a totalitarian state which maintains tight control over all domestic media, and 
only allowed privately owned media outlets to operate at all within the last ten years. 
Although scholars such as Geros, Salamandra, Pinto, and Silverstein have described a 
variety of methods for resisting and asserting personhood in the face of a “culture of 
fear”, and despite a dramatic explosion on media options available to Syrians today, the 
Syrian state still controled the boundaries of acceptable public discourse in 2010.7 
 It is obvious to anyone who spends a day listening to the various branches of 
Syrian state radio, Voice of the People, Voice of the Youth, the General Program, and 
new religious station Nūr al-Shām, that nearly everything broadcast by the state has an 
ideological, nationalist, or political aspect to it, including the music.  In addition to 
serving as the only authorized purveyors of political news on domestic radio news, the 
branches of state radio position themselves as the defenders of Syrian traditions and 
morals in the face of corrupting outside influence.  This applies both to the news and talk 
segments, which focus explicitly on Syrian culture and education, and to musical styles, 
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 Stuart Hall, “The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists,” in Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 44. 
7Geros, “Doing Fieldwork Within Fear and Silences”; Weyman, “Empowering Youth Or Reshaping 
Compliance? Star Magazine, Symbolic Production, and Competing Visions of Shabab in Syria”; 
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where the state broadcasts tend towards a more curatorial relationship with music, 
emphasizing the maintenance of traditional and conservative musical values.   
In order to tie this political and aesthetic position to actual music and musical 
genres, I discuss a 2011 “call for songs” in the Syrian Radio-sponsored song contest, 
which I have reproduced and translated below. The description of song types which 
follows in the advertisement is worth reproducing at length because it details explicitly 
the curatorial, preservational, and didactic function that fills Syrian state rhetoric in 
regards to music and cultural production.  The significance of the document below is not 
that it accurately presents the full spectrum of Syrian song; it certainly does not.  Rather, 
as Hall has stated: 
 
Ruling ideas may dominate other conceptions of the social world by 
setting the limit to what will appear as rational, reasonable, credible, 
indeed sayable or thinkable, within the given vocabularies of motive and 
action available to us.  Their dominance lies precisely in the power they 
have to contain within their limits, to frame within their circumference of 
thought, the reasoning and calculation of other social groups…. 
   
In the process of detailing the various categories for musical submissions, the call for 
songs serves as a remarkably concise statement of aesthetic principles for Syrian radio 
music, and one of the more remarkable musicological documents I have seen produced 






  2211 لعام السورية الاذاعية الأغنية مسابقة 
 
سعيا ًلاستعادة مكانة الأغنية السورية ورفع سوية الإنتاج الغنائي والذائقة الموسيقية في سوريا، تعلن الهيئة العامة 
للإذاعة والتلفزيون مديرية الإذاعة دائرة الموسيقا عن إجراء مسابقة شاملة للأغنية السورية بألوانها 
 . الشبابية والإنسانية لطربية، الرومانسية ـ العاطفيةـ الشعبية، ا :المختلفة
  
  :والأنواع القوالب أولا،ً
 :الشعبية الأغنية
 كلمة مشاعره فتصيغ للمواطن، الحياتية اليومية الأحداث تواكب تحديدا،ً السورية البيئة من المستمدة الأغنية وهي 
 .اللحن في المتميز السوري وبالأسلوب المحلية، الشرقية والآلات الكلام، في الصادقة والتلقائية البساطة معتمدة ولحنا
 .كليا ً  عليه تعتمد أن دون )الفولكلور( الشعبي الفني بالموروث الشعبية الأغنية تستأنس أن يمكن
 الطربية الأغنية 
 تكون أن يمكن حيث محدد قالب بدون الأداء في خاصة قدرة إلى تحتاج جزلة لحنية جمل على المعتمدة الأغنية وهي 
 .العصر روح يناسب بما التزامها جانب إلى .العامية باللهجة أغنية أو بسيطا ً  موشحا ً  أو قصيدة
 الرومانسية الأغنية
 الرقيقين، واللحن بالكلمة والمشاعر الأحاسيس تخاطب إليها، وتتجه المرء عواطف من تنطلق التي الأغنية وهي 
 الحسي الخيال من عالم في والنغم الموضوع مع ليسرح واقعه ينسيه بما الإنسان نفس في يؤثر حالم وبأسلوب
 .والغربية الشرقية الآلات بين بمزيج أو أوركسترالية، بآلات تكون أن يمكن .والفكري
 الشبابية الأغنية 
 لا .اليوم لشباب الغنائية الاهتمامات تناسب والتي وإيقاعا،ً نغما ً  حركي قالب على المعتمدة الحديثة الأغنية وهي 
 الأغاني في الدارج الإيقاعي والضغط الحديث التوزيع على أساسي بشكل وتعتمد محدد، موضوع يحصرها
 .سبقه عما تميزه لمسة توزيعها يتضمن وأن حداثيا،ً جديداً  موضوعها يكون أن يستحسن .العصرية
 الإنسانية الأغنية 
 موسيقية وجمل لحني أسلوب من الموضوع هذا يناسب ما مع النص، في إنسانيا ً  موضوعا ً  تلتزم التي الأغنية وهي 
 دون وبساطة بتلقائية إنسانية فكرة نحو المرء عواطف تظهر .الأغنية هذه من المرجوة والغاية تتوافق وتوزيعات
 .الفكرة هذه مع والتعاطف المشاعر تبيان أو الحالة وصف في مبالغة أو تكلف
  
 :المسابقة تحكيم لجنة ثانيا  





 الذواقة من واحد
  
 : التحكيم برنامج ثالثا  
 :النص-  آ
  
 .الموضوع، جدة          •
 .الأسلوب، حداثة          •
 .الغنائي، السبك          •
 .الشعرية، والبلاغة الصور          •
 .النص، أفكار وتسلسل ترابط          •





 :اللحن-  ب
  
 . مبتكرة لحنية جملاً  يتضمن أن بمعنى اللحن، جدة          •
 .الأسلوب، حداثة          •
 .الموسيقية، الجمل وترابط اللحني التطور          •
 .واللحن، الموضوع بين التوافق          •
 .الموسيقية، والقفزات التنويع          •
 .التلحين، وأسلوب القالب بين التوافق          •
 .الموسيقي، التأليف قواعد مع التوافق          •
 .المطرب صوت وبين اللحن بين التوافق          •
  
 :والصوت الأداء- ج
  
 الصوت، خامة          •
 .بالصوت، والتحكم الأداء على القدرة       •
 .الموضوع، مع الغنائي الأسلوب وتوافق التعبير•
 .الحروف، ومخارج السليم النطق          •
 . مميزة صوتية هوية ذو المطرب أن يعني الذي التميز،          •
   
 :الموسيقي التوزيع- د
  
 .الحية، الآلات استعمال كفاية          •
 .الموضوع، مع التناسب          •
 .والقالب، اللحن مع التناسب          •
 .التوزيعية، الجمل جمال          •
 .الموسيقي، التوزيع قواعد مع التوافق          •
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The Syrian Radio Song Contest for 2011 
  
In order to restore the status of the Syrian song and elevate both song production and 
musical taste in Syria, the Public Association for Radio and Television, and the 
Directorate of Broadcasting, Department of Music, announce the sponsorship of a 
comprehensive contest for Syrian song in all its many colors: folk, ṭarabiya, 
romantic/emotional, youthful, and humanitarian. 
 
First, the forms and genres: 
Shaʿbī (popular in the folk sense) Song: 
A song specifically derived from the Syrian environment, keeping pace with the daily life 
events of the citizen, formulating his feelings in word and melody, supporting simplicity, 
spontaneity, and sincerity in speech, local eastern instruments, and with the best Syrian 
style in melody.  It is possible to draw on a folk song of from popular artistic heritage, 
without relying on it entirely. 
 
Ṭarab Song: 9 
A song based on eloquent melodic phrases, needing a special ability in performance, 
without a specific form.  It can be a poem or simple muwashah, or a song in colloquial 
language.  It must suit the spirit of the age.10 
 
Romantic Song: 
A song which begins from the person’s emotions and explores them, it addresses feelings 
and emotions with refined words and melodies.  With a dreamy style that penetrates a 
person’s very soul it makes him forget his own reality to wander along with the theme 
and melody a world of emotional and intellectual fantasy.  It can use orchestral 
instruments, or a mix of eastern and western instruments. 
 
Shabābī (Youth or pop) Song 
A modern song relying on a kinetic form, melodically and rhythmically, and which fits the 
musical interests of today’s youth.  It is not limited to a specific theme, and depends 
basically on modern production and the fashionable rhythmic stress of modern songs.  It 
is desirable that it have a new and modern theme, and that its production distinguish it 
from previous eras. 
 
Humanitarian Song: 
A song requiring a humanitarian theme in the text, and that represents this theme with 
styles of melody, musical phrases, and production compatible with the desired goal of the 
song.  It shows a person’s emotions towards a humanitarian idea spontaneously and 
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 The word “ṭarab” is specific enough that it is better left untranslated, referring both to the ecstatic 
response of music listeners, and the particular style of singing associate with the golden age of Arabic 
music in the mid twentieth century.  For a discussion of ṭarab in English, see A.J. Racy’s Making Music in 
the Arab World: The Culture and Artistry of Tarab  (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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 According to Jonathan Shannon’s definition: “Of probable Andalusian origin, the muwashshah consists 
of classical Arabic poetry set to music and forms the stape of the Aleppine waslah.” Shannon, Among the 





simply, without affectation or exaggeration in the description of the situation or the 
expression of emotions and sympathy with this idea. 
 
Second, the jury of the competition: 
The committee will include seven members, with two members as observers without a 
vote, to be distributed as follows: 
Chairman of the Committee 
Three musicians 
Two Poets 
One of the dhawāqa (people with good taste) 
 
Third, the program of judging. 
 
A – The text. 
- Theme quality 
- Modernity of the style. 
- Musical construction 
- Images and poetic eloquence. 
- Coherence and sequence of ideas of the text. 
- Compatibility of the subject and the literary treatment. 
 
B - The melody 
- Quality of the music – it must include innovative melodic phrases. 
- Modernity of the style. 
- Development and coherence of melodic musical phrases. 
- Compatibility of the subject and the composition. 
- Diversity and musical leaps. 
- Compatibility of the genre and the style of composing. 
- Compatibility with the rules of musical composition.  
- Compatibility of the melody and the singer’s voice. 
 
C – Performance and Sound 
- Pureness of the voice. 
- Ability to perform and control the sound. 
- Expression and compatibility of singing style with the theme. 
- Pronunciation and output of letters. 
- Excellence, meaning that the singer possesses a distinctive vocal identity. 
 
D – Arrangement 
- Sufficient use of live instruments. 
- Suitability for the subject 
- Suitability with the melody and form. 
- Beauty of the distribution of phrases. 
- Compatibility with the rules of musical production. 
- Construction of effects and use of loops. 






This statement of aesthetic principles comes from the the General Organization of 
Radio and Television in Syria, and therefore carries with it ideological baggage 
concerning the production of Syrian national identity, the relationship between young 
people and tradition, and the relationship between Syrian culture and technology.  
However, despite the document’s source and the tricky nature of the relationship between 
Syrian state and public culture, the breakdown of various song genres described here does 
fit for a significant percentage of the music played on Syrian radio.   The categories 
defined here, Shaʿbī (folk/popular), Ṭarab, “Romantic”, Shabābī (Youth/Pop), and 
“Humanitarian”, are by no means mutually exclusive; artists frequently cross over 
between these genres, such that both an artist’s catalogue and a single song often contain 
elements from more than one of the categories.  Nor is this taxonomy exhaustive in terms 
of Syrian playlists, as I will expand on below, but it does serve as an excellent starting 
point for discussing the musical content of both government-run and private radio. 
 Two of these categories, shaʿbī and shabābī music, were discussed in Chapter 2, 
where I described them in terms of a continuum where the “modern production and 
fashionable rhythmic stress” of shabābī music often coexists with the “simplicity, 
spontaneity, sincerity in speech, and local eastern instruments” of shaʿbī.  I similarly 
discussed the “romantic” category in Chapter 2 using the example of Elissa, the current 
queen of the romantic song (ughniyya rūmānsiyya).   The addition of Ṭarab and 
“Humanitarian” songs to the shaʿbī and shabābī spectrum of popular music expands the 
taxonomy to include very significant distinctions within the playlists of Damascus 





discussion of the other categories, and to extend our focus to the broader discourse on 
music and Syrian radio, we need to enter private stations into the discussion.  
 
Version FM 
The following chart details the broadcast week of Version FM, as advertised on 
the station’s website, and confirmed by extensive recording and review of the station’s 
broadcasts.11  Version FM is probably not the most popular of the private Syrian stations, 
but its scheduling breakdown and the variety of music it broadcasts are illustrative of 
many tendencies which are common throughout the radioscape.  I will use this program 
as a starting point to explore various aspects of the musical discourse, and associated 
listening practices.  
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As the above chart illustrates, the station divides its broadcast between segments 
devoted to specific singers, programs devoted to broad musical genres, categories or 
historical periods, song requests and hits, and talk-shows.  Most significant among the 
specific singers named, Version FM devotes three hours each morning, from 5:00 am to 
8:00 am, to the work of Fairuz.  Two hours are given over to her song catalogue and one 
hour to the dramatic audio-plays of the Rahbani Brothers, which are also interspersed 
with songs.12  This level of airtime for the “Neighbor to the Moon” and the Rahbani 
brothers is hardly unique in Damascus, where I once spent one long morning listening to 
the Syria Radio’s Ṣawt Ash-Shabāb play thirty seven songs in a row by Fairuz.  At the 
other end of the day, the hour between midnight and 1 am on Version FM is devoted to 
Umm Kulthum, completing the formula “Fairuz bis-ṣabāḥ wa Umm Kulthum bil-masā’” 
mentioned in Chapter 1. 
 Version devotes a half hour each morning to the “Giants of Lebanese and Arab 
ṭarab, the great voices who stood alongside Lady Fairuz and sung with her and composed 
for her, and joined her in working with the Rahbani Brothers” and titles the programming 
block by listing some of these singers by first name: “Wadi’ (as-Safi), Nasri (Shams ad-
Dīn), and Zaki (Nasīf).”13  The weekly program “Kān Zamān” focuses on the music and 
biography of one of these singers, along with the earlier generation of largely Egyptian 
stars (featured singers on the programs have included ʿAbd al-Ḥalim Ḥāfiẓ, Nāẓem al-
Ghazāli, Farīd al-Aṭrāsh, Leila Murād, and Asmahān.)  The station also focuses on one 
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“Star of the Week” for an hour on Friday evenings, as voted on through listener text 
messages.  The practice of programming around stars is hardly unique to Syria or the 
Arab world, and indicates an important aspect of the way that music is discussed in 
Syrian media, worth exploring further. 
Genealogy over Genre  
The process of introducing Arabic music to Western audiences has often led 
scholars to describe Arab stars using analogies to Western counterparts.  Thus ʿAbd al-
Ḥalim Ḥāfiẓ is the “Arab Elvis”, Fairuz the “Callas of Arabia”, and Sabah Fakri the 
“Frank Sinatra of Syria”.14  These comparisons reach their most elaborate when it comes 
to Umm Kulthum: 
 
Imagine a singer with the virtuosity of Joan Sutherland or Ella Fitzgerald, 
the public persona of Eleanor Roosevelt and the audience of Elvis, and 
you have Umm Kulthum, the most accomplished singer of her century in 
the Arab World.15 
 
There are problems with these types of formulations, both in the inevitable limitations of 
analogies across different histories and cultural contexts, and in their potential to create 
the impression of non-intersecting teleological trajectories of popular culture.  This type 
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of presentation of popular culture can be dangerous not just because the comparison 
usually assumes that the foreign popular culture will/should gradually come to resemble 
the Western one, but also because it neglects the circulation and intersections through 
which listeners and public figures do inhabit the same musical and media landscape (the 
Celine Dion of Lebanon for example …is Celine Dion.) 
Despite these potential drawbacks, the practice of situating musicians based on 
analogies and relationships to other singers is nearly unavoidable, and has some concrete 
benefits.  Primarily, it allows the speedy communication of a tremendous amount of 
information about both musical style and social role, provided that author and reader 
share a similar context.  We are familiar with the practice when employed by music 
writers as a tool for both communicating sonic information and for situating the writer 
and the reader within a set of shared references.  Within a shared set of references, we 
can make allusions which convey meaning about a specific musical attribute like timbre 
(“The record has a ‘Memphis Horns’ sound”) or about a broad set of musical and 
musical-social connotations (“The band sounds like the Dionne Warwick hired the 
Flaming Lips to play a party at Phil Spector’s house!”).  The case of cross-cultural 
analogy is somewhat different, in that the label “Arab Elvis” is meant to situate Abdel 
Halim Hafiz socially, in terms of audience, sex appeal, etc. but not necessarily to assert 
any direct sonic relationship between the two singers.  While it would be interesting to 
hear a traditionally musicological, style-focused comparison between the two stars, that is 
almost never the area being illustrated by these types of cross-cultural analogies. 
Perhaps the most convincing rationale for the use of this type of comparison is 





fundamental to the discourse on popular music in the Syrian and the pan-Arab media.  
The interviews, reviews, and discussions about music which take place in local 
newspapers, radio, and television inevitably situate singers in terms of their similarities 
and differences with peers and the stars of previous generations.   
This aspect of discourse about music is perhaps unremarkable, as the practice of 
comparing one performer to another is one of the basic exercises of music criticism all 
over the world.  However, the rhetorical practice takes on particular resonance in the 
context of Arabic music, where for example Walter Armbrust has written about 
Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s “authenticating geneology”, the musical lineage and 
isnād (chain of transmission) used by ‘Abd al-Wahhāb to claim authority in both the folk 
and classical Arabic music traditions.   The word isnād is primarily used in the context of 
the scholarly evaluation of the validity of hadīth, and refers to the chain of attributions by 
which details of the Prophet’s life have been passed down from scholar to scholar.  In 
Armbrust’s usage, the word also carries allusions to the millennia old tradition of 
biography and intellectual genealogy in Islamic literature, of which the most famous 
example is Abu Al-Faraj Al-Isbahani’s Kitāb al-āghānī from the 10th century (a.d.).16   In 
an aside to the discussion of ‘Abd al-Wahhad’s use of authenticating geneology, 
Armbrust contrasts the presentation of Elvis Presley with Arab artists: 
 
The process of authenticating Arab artists is starkly different from the way 
Western artists present themselves to the public.  Elvis Presley is an 
excellent example of how differently we present artistic authenticity…the 
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manner of presenting Presley to the public was invariably as a “unique 
event.”  The public presentation of Arab artists is always as ‘the next link 
in the chain.’17 
 
At the same time that a lineage of musical succession has particular historical resonance 
in the Arab and Islamic contexts, the contours of the modern Arabic radioscape also 
reinforce the primacy of individual singers as points of reference.  In a mediascape where 
even today a few stars demand an incredible level of bandwidth, the work of these voices 
(Umm Kulthum, ‘Abd al Wahhab, Abdel Halim Hafez, and Fairuz) can come to the 
status of single-artist song genres.  Thus Syrian stations don’t just program Fairuz: they 
program fairūziyyāt, a term used by Syrian and Lebanese radio stations to refer to the 
music of Fairuz and to newer recordings of songs she made famous.18   
Part of the difficulty then in writing about Arabic popular music for unfamiliar 
audiences is that where a great deal of Anglo-American music criticism is concerned with 
the policing and/or disruption of genre boundaries, the equivalent discourse in much of 
the Arabic-speaking world is proportionally more focused on individuals in connection 
with one another.  It is relatively easy to broadly describe a musical genre in terms of 
defining characteristics, and indeed the Syrian daily paper Baladna has run a series of 
articles defining Western popular genres (rock ‘n’ roll, rap, jazz) which tend not to even 
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reference individual performers or composers.19  Conversely, discussions of Arabic 
musical genre and style in the Arabic-language press tend to reference specific singers. 
In contrast to the cross-cultural analogies, within a shared Arabic musical context, 
the invocation of another singer is assumed to describe not just social relevance and 
fame, but aspects of musical performance.  Thus when a singer is described as “like 
George Wassouf”, this usually implies both a certain level of vocal mastery, and a 
commentary on the timbre of their voice.    The younger singer in question probably has 
the trademark scratchy timbre and weary delivery of the “Sultan of ṭarab”, or some other 
particularity of vocal timbre or delivery which renders their voice an acquired taste, 
rather than an immediately accessible sound.   
The other information conveyed by the invocation of one singer in relation to 
another, having to do with the biographical details, popularity and social position, is 
similarly important in these comparisons.  Here the usefulness of the comparison relies 
not just on familiarity with a singer’s music, but on a shared knowledge based on the 
discourse on singing stars that occurs in publicity bios, newspaper, television and radio 
interviews, internet message boards and book length biographies, the popular discourse 
around popular singers.  The celebrity industry is big business in the pan-Arab media, and 
the demand for gossip on actors and singing stars is high in Syria, although the local 
Syrian press typically exhibits a more subdued attitude towards the personal lives of 
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celebrities than the Lebanese based or pan-Arab media.20  In interviews, singers are often 
asked their opinions about other singers, and any especially juicy tidbits are repeated ad 
nauseum on popular websites like Elaph, and Al-Bawaba. A rather extreme version of 
this kind of positioning appears in a reporter’s exchange with Fula al-Jazairiyya from an 
interview in Baladna: 
 
Baladna: When we talk about the modern youth song (al-ughniyya ash-
shabābīyya al-ḥadītha) we come to mention Nancy Ajram, Haifa Wehbe, 
Elissa, and Nawal al-Zoghbi and others.  Do you accept the inclusion of 
your name on that list? 
 
Fula:  My small observation is that Nancy sings sweet songs, but I like to see 
her sing for children.  Nawal al-Zoghbi, my testimony is compromised 
[shahadetī majruḥa, implying that they are too close to accurately 
critique one another], Haifa presents a picture of the beauty of Arab 
women, but as for the rest, I have no comment on them.  However, I am 
the Sultana of Ṭarab, and no one competes with me. 
Baladna: Who named you the Sultana of Ṭarab? 
Fula:  The audience named me.  I love many of the singers and their examples, 
but I am the Sultana of Ṭarab and no one competes with me.  Not even 
Warda al-Jazairiyya, no one disagrees with me that this is true.  The 
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Sultan of Ṭarab, George Wassouf, how many copies have been made of 
him, and remain the Sultan, and authentic.21 
 
Many of Fula al-Jazairiyya’s songs fit quite well alongside the shabābī music video stars 
mentioned in the reporter’s question, and her most popular music certainly would appear 
out of place next to the performers described by AJ Racy in his seminal book on ṭarab.  
Nevertheless, she prefers to associate herself with singers from older generations (Warda 
and younger George Wassouf), and refer to herself with an honorific professing 
excellence in the ṭarab tradition. 
As the dialogue above also illustrates, the use of an honorific title or kunya assists 
in placing the singer within a musical genealogy.  The young Syrian singer Mohammed 
Daqdouq, a contestant on Star Academy 8, recently released a song entitled Nimr al-
Ghāba (Tiger of the Jungle) and in publicity documents, his website, and Facebook 
pages, is referred to by the name nimr al-ughniyya al-arabiyya “The Tiger of Arabic 
Song”.  This tactic follows the model of George Wassouf, who gained the title “Sultan of 
Ṭarab” after the release of his first album “al-Hawa Sultan.”  In a further link back in 
the chain, Wassouf himself is often referred to by fans as Abu Wadiʿ (an honorific 
meaning father of Wadiʿ ), having named his son in what will resonate with many fans as 
a tribute to Wadi’ al-Safi, the legendary Lebanese singer of the previous generation. 
This practice of referring to singers by a kunya or epithet even extends to the 
western artists most integrated into the regional media-scape. Thus Michael Jackson, 
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possibly the most popular American singer in the Arab world, is nearly always referred 
by the honorific “The King of Pop” in addition to his name, in both the press and in 
conversation.  Although there are definitely American artists for whom an honorofic has 
is in common usage (Elvis as “The King” for example), for all but the most ardent 
American fans of Michael Jackson, it would seem slightly silly to use this title rather than 
his name when discussing the singer in casual conversation, but in the Arab world, I have 
had numerous conversations in which listeners express their admiration for the songs of 
“The King of Pop” rather than “Michael Jackson.”22 
In regards to the Arab artists, the honorific is doing more work than Jackson’s 
title.  As we shall see, the sometimes tenuous relationship between discursive reference to 
ṭarab authenticity and the actual songs and performance styles that we would more often 
associate with the ṭarab tradition is an important aspect of the way that music is 
organized in the Syrian radioscape. 
Mass-Mediated Ṭarab 
As Shannon writes: 
Today…the sahra has diminished in importance and many Aleppine 
music lovers (perhaps the majority) experience ṭarab in the context of 
listening to mass-mediated music, chiefly through cassettes and radio 
broadcasts.  Thus, rather than speaking of a single ṭarab culture, we must 
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attempt to understand how diverse ṭarab cultures are formed through 
musical performance and mass mediation.23 
 
Despite the oft-heard criticism that private stations play only shabābī pop, or hābiṭ 
(vulgar) music, early afternoons on Version FM, as on several other stations, are devoted 
to ṭarab.  Indeed, most Syrian stations devote some part of their broadcast day to Umm 
Kulthum, Sabah Fakhri, Warda al Jazairiyya, Muhammed  Abd al-Wahhāb, Asmahān, and 
other singers from the ‘Golden Age’ of ṭarab song (roughly 1925-1975, though the latter 
date continues to shift forward for younger audiences).  These songs, in contrast to the 
majority of pop programming (though like the shaʿbī recordings which circulate via 
cassette and cd) are often recorded in live concert, or simulations of live concerts, with 
audible audience noise.  They are also much longer on average than a shabābī pop song, 
ranging from seven or eight minutes up an hour for a single recording.24   Both the length 
of these songs, and the possibility for long elaboration and repetition of phrases which it 
allows, and presence of audience sound in recordings are signifiers for the type of 
experience expected of listeners. 
The concept of ṭarab describes a listener’s experience of ecstasy, the heightened 
emotional state that can accompany concentrated, active listening to a masterful 
performance.   
According to Racy: 
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In the ṭarab culture, ecstatic experience develops significantly through 
active listening, through the creative musician-audience feedback that 
energizes the performance.  Therefore, the idea of passivity, which James 
and others have associated with the mystical state, applies only loosely.  
Indeed, passive listening in the strict sense is neither appreciated nor 
considered conducive to ecstatic transformation.25 
 
The audition of ṭarab music over the radio naturally presents a different set of 
possibilities for the listener than the direct “musician-audience feedback” loop described 
by Racy in live performances.  However, the practice of listening to ṭarab over the radio 
has its own set of historical associations built on the same set of understandings described 
by Racy, as experienced in a different medium.  While the possibility of a listener 
influencing the performers does not exist for recordings or music over the radio, the 
performance of listening inevitably shapes the experience of music.  This performance of 
listening to mediated music is described by Shannon: 
 
Many of the dynamics of the ṭarab culture in the context of live 
performance also hold true for listening to mediated music, especially 
when people listen to music in groups.  Listeners often will respond to a 
tape player as they do in live concerts…I have even seen some listeners 
curse at their stereos with such phrases as “May God wreck your home! 
(yikhrab baytak!) to express delight at a performance (approbation is 
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sometimes couched in negative evaluations); one man even slammed his 
fist down on the cassette player in consternation with a particular recorded 
performance, thereby enacting emotional presentations in the context of 
mediated music that might be more appropriate for “live” music.26 
 
As the music which looms largest in the cultural memory of radio in the region (see 
Danielson on Umm Kulthum), ṭarab is closely associated with the memory and practice 
of collective radio audition.27  While very different from the direct interaction between 
musicians and listeners in a live performance, collective audition of mediated music 
creates another a sort of feedback loop: between the radio performer, the audience present 
in the recording, the individual listener and the group.   
As I describe in the previous chapter, the role of radio in Damascus cafes has 
largely been usurped by satellite television music channels and mp3 players.  During my 
time in Damascus, I did however occasionally witness the type of listener interaction with 
recorded ṭarab music that is generally associated with live performance (in my 
experience intense, concentrated listening was more common in homes, shops, or other 
private-public spaces).  This type of performative listening included exclamations of 
pleasure at moments of heightened emotion or displays of skill, and commentary on a 
singer’s voice and pronunciation and on the quality of the poetry.  In public, the men who 
engaged in this ṭarab listening were invariably older, and in a few cases the performance 
of listening was obviously for my benefit. 
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In one instance in mid-February in Damascus, I was sitting in a café in Abu 
Roumanneh with a cup of coffee and a notebook, reading the paper and half-heartedly 
writing down unfamiliar words to practice later.  It was early enough in the day that no 
one had yet turned on the television, and a radio was playing an old live recording of a 
full-voiced woman singing with an orchestra.  I have a tendency to bob my head or rock 
in my chair a bit while listening to music, regardless of the style or meter, so I must have 
been visibly enjoying the recording, because an older man sitting two tables over leaned 
in my direction, smiling: 
 
“Ya ‘amo, bt’arif ha al-mutribeh?” (“Hey there [uncle], do you know this singer?”) 
 
Not being certain, I equivocated: “It is old.  I don’t think she is Umm Kulthum, but 
maybe I’m wrong? I don’t know.” 
 
Smile widening, he introduced himself as Abu Tariq, and corrected me: “Of course it 
isn’t Umm Kulthum.  This is Asmahān.  You know Asmahān? You know Farīd al-
Aṭrāsh?” (her brother and also a legendary musician). 
After I acknowledged knowing Farīd al-Aṭrāsh and Asmahān, though obviously 
not as well as I should, he began to explain enthusiastically.  Asmahān was born in Syria, 
and many people prefer her voice to Umm Kulthum, and there was a musalsal (television 
series) about her I should watch if I was interested, and I should be interested, and if I 





 For the rest of the song, about ten minutes in length, he would nod approvingly at 
moments, and give a periodic ya salām (O Peace!), or other expression of appreciation, 
while looking over at me to see if I was paying appropriate attention.  At one point he 
praised the strength of her voice, and pointed out her pronunciation (lafẓ).  When I 
confessed that my Arabic was not good enough to judge anyone’s pronunciation, he 
reassured me: “That’s not important, the basic thing is that you, as a young person (ka 
shāb), listen to the great singers.”    
 
This small scene is close to the archetypical example of an encounter instigated and 
shaped by the ethnographic “participant observer”.  Abu Tariq was not engaging with the 
music vocally before talking to me, and without my presence he probably would have 
continued to drink his tea quietly while waiting for a friend.  His performance of this kind 
of listening was motivated by educating the foreigner about good music, and the pleasure 
in demonstrating competence.   
 
Quoting Shannon again: 
In mediated contexts, listeners enact ṭarab cultures through their 
presentations of conventional ṭarab responses and the establishment of 
virtual connections with the performers…By displaying ṭarab responses, 
listeners demonstrate to others, and to themselves that they are capable of 
being moved emotionally by music, which is a valued attribute of the self 
for many Aleppine artists and music lovers.28 
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What this anecdote illustrates is not simply the self-definition of ṭarab listening described 
by Shannon, but the distinct didactic valence of mediated ṭarab, both as it appears on the 
radio and as it is listened to in social situations.  Within the Syrian radioscape, the 
programming of ṭarab is often described as a sort of public service, elevating the 
standards of youthful listeners, or reminding them of the values of the past. 
Naturally, in personal interactions in Syria I was subject to more direct education 
than would have been directed towards an average Syrian sitting in a cafe.  As a youngish 
looking foreigner interested in music, I was often offered advice as to where to find real 
Syrian music, and told that I shouldn’t be listening to the radio or watching television.  
Part of this had to do with people’s very understandable confusion about my project.  Due 
to security concerns discussed in the introduction, my conversations focused on music 
rather than the political aspects of broadcasting.  As a musicologist and musician myself, 
who obviously liked the high-status, authenticity- laden music that serious musicians are 
supposed to like, the fact that I was interested in music that was at least publicly 
considered disposable pop was understandably confusing.  Even people my own age and 
younger, who themselves listened primarily to the Arabic and Western pop music played 
most often on radio and TV, would try and point me towards high-status, authenticity-
associated forms of music. 
Of course, the pedagogical thrust of mass-mediated ṭarab listening isn’t directed 
towards foreign musicologists.  Listening to Syrian radio and reading newspapers, one is 
constantly exposed to the notion of broadcasting ṭarab as a kind of public service for 





broadcast ṭarab is set against the common criticisms of shabābī and pop music described 
by Michael Frishkopf : 
 “Since the onset of media technologies, Arab scholars, intellectuals, music 
connoisseurs (sammiʿa), trained musicians, and social conservatives have 
frequently criticized newly emerging mediated music as aesthetically 
inferior and low-brow, overly commercial, excessively Westernized, even 
dissolute.  The social importance of this music thus tends to be 
downplayed (if not decried) by those eager to assert what is sometimes 
assumed to be ‘timeless’ Arab ‘art’ or ‘classical traditions (the turāth, or 
heritage) of al-mūsīqā al- arabiyya in its stead, though ethnographically 
turāth is a highly chronocentric term, a temporally moving target 
observed, nostalgically, as those genres or styles preceding – by a 
generation or two – music popular among those who are presently 
young.”29 
 
Singers, record companies, and broadcasters counter this criticism by providing the 
continuous recordings of the older songs, and oft-made references to earlier singers and 
styles.  Where, as Danielson, Racy and others have noted, the vocal qualifications of 
previous generations of singers were often proved through biographical references to 
Quranic recitation, working as a muezzin at a local mosque, the official biographies of 
today’s younger stars are incomplete without a mention of time spent working on the 
songs of the “Golden Age”, and a youthful appreciation for ṭarab heritage.  
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 While not every shabābī star has the vocal technique to convincingly sing Umm 
Kulthum, the ability to perform from the recorded ṭarab tradition is a requisite for 
success on shows like Star Academy and Arab Idol, and artists often perform the older 
songs in attempt to prove their identification with the Arab singing tradition.  On Version 
FM the newer versions of songs from the ṭarab cannon are referred to as ṭarab mujaddad 
(neo-ṭarab or renewed ṭarab), and are afforded one of the less valuable daily time slots, 
between 3 and 4 am.  The tagline for this music block attempts to leverage the nostalgic 
reverence for the ṭarab songs and the star power of shabābī singers: 
 
Helwa al-dhikriyyāt wa ajmal al-ughniyyāt. fadlu Sharīn, Asala wa 
Muʿen, Subhi wa Sultan, Nancy wa al-Jassār wa ghairun khitār. ajmal al 
ugniyyat at-ṭarabiyya al-mujaddida.” 
 
“The sweetest of memories and the most beautiful of songs.  The best of 
Shareen, Asala and Mu’en, Subhi and Sultan, Nancy and Jassar, and other 
selections.  The most beautiful renewed ṭarab songs.”30 
 
Singers in Lebanon and Syria especially also reference the “folkloric” music of Fairuz 
and the Rahbani Brothers as markers of authenticity.  For example, in one interview 
quoted in Syrian daily Al-Watan, Elissa stated that she “has a room in her house 
dedicated to vocal practice on the songs of Fairuz.”31  Asserting one’s presence in a 
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lineage descending from Fairuz has a different valence than one from the older ṭarab 
singers, as Fairuz’s style is generally considered more vocally accessible, though more 
authentically local.  Fairuz’s music does sometimes employ impressive vocal technique, 
but she also sings simple folk songs, largely devoid of the markers of ṭarab mastery.  
This is significant because despite the rhetorical significance of invocations of ṭarab, a 
great deal of the music heard on Syrian radio is far away from ṭarab in style and in 
listening practice.  
Hād     
 The other broad category that takes up large segments of the broadcast day on 
Version FM, and numerous other stations are blocks of hādi   songs.  Among Syrian radio 
stations, the term hādi   (literally “calm”) is roughly analogous to “light” or “lite” on 
American radio.  This is not a genre or style of music; rather it is a programming category 
which refers to a certain feeling and type of emotional engagement.  I am not aware of 
any musicians who describe their own music primarily as “hādi  ”, but among radio 
listeners it implies both a certain set of musical attributes, along with a certain type of 
engagement with the music.   The ṭarab designation, as well as the “long, sad songs” 
played on Version FM, or that appear on government radio’s Ṣawt as-Sahra’ 
(Voice/Sound of the Evening Party), implies a high level of emotional engagement and 
continuous interest.  In contrast, hadi  songs are assumed not to arouse the same type of 
intense emotion, although this certainly doesn’t imply a lack of emotional response.  
  In some ways this forms the musico-theoretical opposite to ṭarab. As a listening 
experience, the emotional journey of ṭarab is antithetical to the calm of the hādi   





public, collective audition as well, though as music imagined to calm the emotions rather 
than arouse an ecstatic state.  Radios in workplaces, upscale stores, and Syriatel offices 
are often tuned to stations playing hādi  songs.32 
The positioning of ṭarab and hādi  as opposing sides of a dialectical spectrum 
describing the musical and emotional encounter between listener and radio also creates 
some interesting implications for the position of Western songs in the Syrian radioscape.  
As the category of music with the highest level of discursive authenticity, in the sense of 
an association with Syrian nationalized authenticity and a general pan-Arab ‘asabiyya, 
the concept of Western ṭarab is oxymoronic.  No matter how familiar or beloved, a 
foreign song would seem out of place in a block of either ṭarab qadīma, or ṭarab 
mujaddada.  At the other end of the spectrum, the hādi   radio category does not carry the 
same aura.  Although the Arabic-language music in hādi   blocks may be very “Arab” in 
terms of the constituent musical elements (rhythm, melodic line and ornamentation, 
instrumentation, etc…) it does not have the same discursive association with authenticity.   
Without the burden of ṭarab authenticity, hādi   describes a feeling, type of listening, and 
programming category into which Western songs can be incorporated as well as Arabic.  
The determining factor for the hādi   category is not linguistic or even stylistic; rather it is 
the emotion reception state which the songs are thought to engender in listeners.   
Calm in this case, does not necessarily imply a lack of emotion; in fact, the 
adjective most often paired with hādi   in the vocabularies of radio DJs is rūmānsī 
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(romantic).  Thus the English language programming for Version FM’s daily block of 
hādi   songs overlaps greatly with the former Radio Samar’s “Music for Romantics”, or 
Ninar FM’s “Love Songs” programming blocks.33  Two of the artists whose music often 
appears in hādi   blocks are Kāẓim as-Sāhir, the Iraqi singer and composer, and Mājida 
al-Rūmi, both known among other things for singing arrangements of work by Syrian 
poet Nizar Qabbani, icon of modern Arabic love poetry, and according the Salma 
Jayyusi, “the most popular poet in the Arab World”.34  These artists remain part of the 
discursive genealogy which includes the most respected singers of previous generationsm 
while staying on the popular side of artistical respectability.  Sāhir’s songs, in particular 
his setting Qabbani’s early poetry, have often been seen as populist, relatively accessible 
breaks from earlier more classical styles. 
 
Any number of songs from the repertoire of Sāhir and Rūmi could be used to 
illustrate the general affect associated with the term hādi  .  On the page and absent a 
sonic example, the combination of romance, eroticism, and calm which characterizes the 
Arabic hādi   playlists might best be illustrated by one of Qabbani’s poems which has not, 
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On Entering the Sea – Nizar Qabbani 
Love happened at last, 
And we entered God's paradise, 
Sliding 
Under the skin of the water 
Like fish. 
We saw the precious pearls of the sea 
And were amazed. 
Love happened at last 
Without intimidation...with symmetry of wish. 
So I gave...and you gave 
And we were fair. 
It happened with marvelous ease 
Like writing with jasmine water, 
Like a spring flowing from the ground. 
     Translation – Lena Jayyusi and Jack Collom35 
 
The vision of love described in this poem, the effortless consummation of two 
complementary natures, is certainly not universally present in songs which might be 
described as hādi   and rūmānsī. However, the emotional tone of the poem recreates to 
me a mimesis of the listening experience that is the ideal of light-romantic music.  This is 
an unintentional poetic-musical ekphrasis analogous but completely opposite to the 
music-drunkenness that one might feel while listening to Sabah Fakhri sing “khamrat al-
ḥob” (“Wine of Love”) four hours into a late-night concert. 
  The Western music programmed in hādi   and rūmānsī blocks comprises by far 
the most popular body of Western songs in Syria, and these tend to conform to a broad 
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set of musical, lyrical and semiotic norms.  The songs tend towards big romantic ballads, 
often with a string orchestra or otherwise expansive-sounding instrumentation, and 
without aggresively syncopated rhythms.  The focus here is on the discourse around the 
music on radio, but later in Chapter 4 I will directly address musical, lyrical, and 
historical elements which typify Western songs on Syrian radio. 
“Humanitarian” (Advocacy) Song  
 The final song category described in the Syria Radio Call for Songs at the 
beginning of the chapter is “Humanitarian Song”, the category which on its face, would 
seem to be the least common.  Returning to the contest rules, state radio calls for a 
humble, unexaggerated advocacy of humanitarian themes: 
 
A song which requires a humanitarian theme in the text, and that which 
suits this theme in style of melody, musical phrases, and production 
compatible with the desired goal of the song.  It shows a person’s 
emotions towards a humanitarian idea spontaneously and simply, without 
affectation or exaggeration in the description of the situation or the 
expression of emotions and sympathy with this idea.36 
 
The Syrian General Organization for Radio and Television provided a number of ready 
models in this category, in the previous year’s song contest, entitled “Golan in the 
                                                 
36
 “Musābiqat al-Ughniyya al-Ithā’a as-Sūriyya l’ām 2011” General Organization of Radio and Television 





Heart”.37  That contest awarded prizes for best production, text, and melody, as well as 
best male and female vocalist, best duet, and best shaʿbī song (the winner of which was 
mentioned in Chapter 2).  However, in order to expand the definition of humanitarian 
song to more usefully describe the Syrian radioscape, it is necessary to expand beyond 
the boundaries of the humanitarian category as defined by the call for songs to include 
some of the areas of songs which are left out of the state taxonomy. 
 Specifically, the call for songs doesn’t mention religious songs (āghānī dīniyya), 
patriotic or nationalistic songs (āghānī waṭaniyya), political songs (āghānī siyāsiyya), or 
foreign or western songs (āghānī ajnabbiyya or āghānī gharbiyya).  Of these, I would 
group patriotic, political, and some religions songs into a broad category which I call 
“advocacy songs.”  An advocacy song could be anything from a song in praise of a 
political figure, to the soccer anthem Barshaluna fāris kul al-malāʿib” (Barcelona, the 
Knights of Every Field), mentioned in one of the ethnographic interludes from the 
previous chapter.  
Taking that example for a moment; most soccer fans in Damascus root for either 
Real Madrid or Barcelona in Champions League soccer, and on big match days the 
streets are filled with car stereos pumping out one of the dozens of Arabic language songs 
praising players and mocking the opposing teams.  With the global reach of big-time 
European club soccer, the songs come from all over the Arabic speaking world, in a 
variety of styles, including hard-rock and rap songs like the Saudi rap group Monsters of 
the West (the west here referring to Western Saudi Arabia), whose Barcelona tribute is 
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one of the most viewed Arabic soccer songs on YouTube.38  The idea of a song that 
advances a specific position, and does so while paying attention to the compatibility of 
the aesthetic components of the song with the cause being advocated, is a common one, 
for which there are numerous examples outside of the realm of strictly “Humanitarian” 
songs.  
Political Advocacy – Idhāʿat a -Quds and “Talfin ʿ Ayyāsh” 
 The most direct example of political advocacy and political music on Syrian radio 
before the arrival of the Arab Uprisings, and a unique outlier both in terms of playlist and 
politics, is Radio Al-Quds.  Named for the city of Jeruselem (al-Quds), the station was 
founded by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command and 
began broadcasting on January 1st, 1988, at the beginning of the first Palestinian 
Intifada.39  The station takes a hard line towards Israel, and tags its station identification 
breaks with slogans like “From the river to the sea, on the road to return, Palestine 
remains.”  As station run by exiled Palestinians, the station broadcasts, in its own words,  
“temporarily” from southern Syria.  The sonic mood of the station is a combination of 
lighthearted advertisement and the endlessly dramatic: some of the station’s ID bumpers 
feature men and women advertising “Idhāʿat al Quds” over the beginning of “O 
Fortuna” from Carl Orff’s Carmina Burana.  Syrian support for the PFLP-GC and its 
operations in Syria, including Radio al-Quds, is one of the factors that have caused the 
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US to designate the country a “state sponsor of terrorism” since 1979.40 The Syrian state 
injunction against political reporting on independent radio stations does not apply to 
Radio al-Quds, though of course complete support for the Syrian regime is a condition of 
the station’s and its organizers’ continued existence in the country.41 
 In addition to its unique position in relation to the Syrian government, Radio al-
Quds is notable for the varieties of music it broadcasts.  Taking the musical programming 
as part of the political project, the station heavily relies on traditional Palestinian songs, 
songs which express Palestinian solidarity, and religious inshād. Songs which explicitly 
advocate for or express solidarity with the plight of Palestinians are commonplace all 
over the Arab world, from Fairuz’s “Ana La Ansāk Filistīn” (I don’t forget you, 
Palestine) to the hip-hop of Ramallah Underground.  Al Quds radio draws from this 
enormous body of music.  In the context of the relentless propagandizing of Radio al-
Quds however, every song with the slightest reference to Palestine, or any kind of 
struggle, immediately becomes a song of direct political import. 
It is within this context, where a song can become politicized by context as much 
as by content, that we might understand some of the more subtle instances where Syrian 
radio might have multiple political valences.  Take for example “Talfan ‘Ayyāsh”, the 
great piece by Ziad al-Rahbani.42  This song, which I heard one night in Damascus on 
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Arabesque FM in a block following a ballad by American James Blunt and a love song 
by Abdel Halim Hafez, has a variety of political valences of differencing levels.  As a 
composition by Ziad al-Rahbani, the song comes from what Christopher Reed Stone calls 
the “Rahbani Nation” of Lebanon, but the song is from the sarcastic, cynical, and self-
aware Lebanon that emerged post-civil-war.43     
 
… 
ʿAyyāsh called, while we were standing around waiting for him 
ʿAyyāsh called, God heal him 
ʿAyyāsh called, ʿAyyāsh called 
 
ʿAyyāsh lied, while we were standing around waiting for him 
ʿAyyāsh lied, he never swears anything, except on his religion 
He called and he lied 
… 
ʿAyyāsh lies, he lies with sophistication and obfuscates 
ʿAyyāsh lied, and like usual we know who he is 
…44 
The song is a swirling mixture of repeating vocal lines on the refrain of “Talfan ʿAyyāsh” 
and ascending trumpet and saxophone countermelodies in an arrangement for choir and 
big band.  Fairuz’ recording of the song with a women’s choir on “Live at Beitaddine” 
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ends with a dizzying syncopated melody on the line “wa akhirran talfan ʿAyyāsh mitl ma 










            
 
Figure 3.3: Melody from Ziad Rahbani’s “Talfan ʿAyyāsh” 
 
The revolving melody of the chorus pauses for a moment for a four-bar flutre solo, then 
returns, the same figure split into two… 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Doubled Line from Ziad Rahbani’s “Talfan ʿAyyāsh” 
 








Figure 3.5: Tripled Line from Ziad Rahbani’s “Talfan ʿAyyāsh” 
 
The final time through the theme, as the chorus adds a fourth voice, the big band 
winkingly inserts the “James Bond” theme into the air of espionage and distrust.  45   
 
 
Figure 3.6: Full Chorus from Ziad Rahbani’s “Talfan ʿAyyāsh” 
The piece is a subtly political song, with ʿAyyāsh filling the role of self-serving and 
untrustworthy politician, and this kind of political valence can be applied to any variety 
of situations.  It was evoked by Lebanese writer Ghassan Teffha in 2005 to satirize the 
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sense of perpetual waiting for a corrupt leadership during the investigation in to the 
assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and by Massoud Mohammed in August of 2011 to criticize 
Prime Minister Najib Mikati.46  The song also has a more macabre political association 
for some, based on a coincidental invocation of the assassination of Yahya ʿAyyāsh, the 
well-known Palestinian bomb-maker who is thought to have been killed in 1996 by 
Israeli intelligence by means of an exploding cell-phone.47  While the song was written 
and recorded before the death of ʿAyyāsh, and for most listeners the only political 
associations will be Rahbani’s subtle cynicism, the words “Talfan ʿAyyāsh” inevitably 
evoke the well-known story strongly enough that some listeners at least assume that the 
song was written in response, and might therefore read it as a commentary on Palestinian-
Israeli violence.48   
 The majority of songs on Al-Quds Radio may have little political meaning 
attached to them, but as we have seen recently in the context of the Arab uprisings, the 
songs of mostly apolitical, extremely popular artists like Tamar Hosni can become 
strongly politicized with remarkable speed depending on events.49 
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Language and Westernization 
Much of the discussion of Arab mass mediated popular music, in both English 
and Arabic, has centered on the question of the Western influence over Arabic popular 
culture.  Numerous critics of Arab pop music and music video clips in particular have 
argued that this music exemplifies a Western encroachment on authentic Arab culture.50  
Reports in Anglophone press about these intellectual battles most often frames the debate 
in terms of Islamic critiques of secular music and visual culture, but in reality the 
“Westernization” critiques, as with critiques of popular music and sexuality, come from a 
wide variety of political and cultural viewpoints.  While conservative religious figures 
across the pan-Arab press create steady stream of criticism pointing to a corrupting 
influence described as Western and un-Islamic, critics who espouse a more secular 
worldview are similarly worried about the loss of authentic Arab culture and a the 
commercialization which seems so fundamental to the modern Arab music industry.  In 
Syria for example, the secular, state controlled daily newspapers often run critical essays 
calling for an investment in local song and performance styles as a means of combatting 
cultural hegemony without assuming a religious criticism.   
One of the central tenets of state discourse about Syrian media is the preservation 
of its Arabic nature and the elevation of artistic standards among broadcasters and 
listeners, or in the words of the call for songs: “to restore the status of the Syrian song 
and elevate both song production and musical taste in Syria.” According to Resolution 
4981 governing private radio, the language of broadcasting must be in formal or local 
Arabic, and no more than 20% of a station’s broadcast time can consist of foreign songs.  
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The reality of this injunction does not live up to the legal theory however, and the 
presence of MIX FM (the lone Syrian foreign- language station, broadcasting in English) 
in the Syrian radioscape illustrates that this rule is not universally applied.51  The 
requirement that stations record and archive one month of their broadcast to be delivered 
to the ministry of information on request means that in theory stations can be audited at 
any time, but here as with the more direct and restrictive forms of state news monitoring 
and censorship, the reliance is on self-censorship rather than daily control.52   
This 20% rule for radio does not come up in published interviews with radio 
station managers or articles about radio stations in the Syrian press, and there is little 
visible evidence that stations are constrained by the rule.  The radio station employees I 
spoke with in 2010 never expressed any complaint about being limited in the amount of 
Western music that stations could play, rather, they tended (at least outwardly) to be 
invested in the idea of building up a local Syrian music and media industry, and their 
criticisms of radio stations were largely focused on wanting to push for more high-culture 
associated music and music by local singers and groups. 
Even a strict enforcement of this rule would not create quite the limit on radio 
stations that one might assume.  The common practice of devoting several hours in the 
morning to Fairuz and an hour or more in the late evening to Umm Kulthum (see Chapter 
2) means that stations wanting to create a more Western mix during another portion of 
the broadcast day are able to do so.  Whether due to this aspect of scheduling or due to 
the laxness of enforcement of the relevant statutes, it is quite easy during the day to find a 
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local station with a playlist that is more Western-focused than, for example, Radio 
Sawa’s ~30-35% English- language mix.53  Another indication that stations are not 
substantially constrained by this rule is the way that Western music is scheduled 
throughout the day.  For example, Version FM typically devotes an hour between 2:00 
and 3:00 am to a Western block of various designations (80s, Rock and Country, Blues 
and Jazz, Slow English, French, Italian and Spanish).  If the station was really 
constrained by the 20% rule and felt there was more demand for Western songs, 
programmers would probably use the less listened-to early morning hour for Arabic-
language songs. 
Several listeners I met, especially those involved in the Damascus rock and 
alternative music scene, did express dismay at the inability to hear the music that they 
were interested in on local radio.54  One friend reminisced about a late-night heavy metal 
program on one of the Lebanese stations that he used to stay up and listen to in his teens, 
saying that the variety of [rock and western] music available was better before the advent 
of Syrian private radio.  In general though, my impression based on conversations with 
listeners and people involved with radio is that even in cosmopolitan Damascus, the bulk 
of radio listeners prefer an Arabic language playlist with the occasional English song.  
This is backed up by the criticisms of some stations by listeners in the radio survey 
conducted by Damaspost, where one of the main complaints of Al Madina FM was that 
the station’s broadcasters use too much foreign terminology and that announcers were 
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speaking in a multilingual emulation of Beiruti radio and television hosts, rather than 
speaking like Syrians.55 
 
Even if there are ways around linguistic restrictions for well-connected 
companies, the rhetoric of Syria as preserver of Arabic language and culture is 
maintained by the regime and the official outlets.  A 2011 sketch in the Syrian comedy 
program Spotlight illustrates this element of official discourse by mocking the practice of 
“Arabization” of English technical terms and neologisms.  In the sketch, entitled “taʿrīb” 
(Arabization, or translation to Arabic), a panel of muthaqqafīn (cultured) Arabic 
professors and officials sit around a conference table coming up with Arabic terms to 
replace the encroaching English language terms.56   
 
“Today, we want to arabize some world vocabulary and special terminology, to 
bring it into our language.” 
“Beautiful, like what?” 
“Like terms…which have something to do with computers, for example.” 
“Excuse me Doctor, its name is the ḥāsūb” 
“Pardon me, dear colleague, the word was late in coming to me.” 
 
The group begins with the term “CD.” The first few suggestions are actually in 
occasional use as Arabizations, but the attempts become increasingly ludicrous: 
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“What do you think about referring to it as al-qurṣ ad-dā’irī” (literally: round 
disk) 
“One moment if you please, I vote that we call it, better than ad-dā’irī… dā’irat 
al-m  alūmāt” (circle of information). 
“qurṣ al-m  alūmāt (disk of information) is appropriate.” 
“Do not forget, colleagues, that it is maḍghūṭ! (pressed!) 
“Its title is qurṣ al-m  alūmāt al-maḍghūṭ”! (the pressed disk of information). 
“I propose that its name be qurṣ al-maḍghūṭ wa al-mudajjaj min m’alūmāt.” (the 
disk [that is] pressed and bristling with information) 
 
“Wonderful Doctor, Wonderful! Agreed!” 
 
The computer mouse becomes the “device for moving and opening files,” the internet 
“the net for entering into information.”57  Later, at the home of the committee Chairman, 
his wife is speaking to a friend, and warns that when her husband comes home, she may 
need a translator: 
 
“Doesn’t he speak Arabic?” 
“Yes, he speaks Arabic, but not natural Arabic.  See that botogas (stove), he calls 
it a mūqid.  The microwave?  It is al mūqid dhu shohunat al-
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kaharabamagnetissiyya (the hearth characterized by the delivery of 
electromagnetism.)” 
 
At the same time that the sketch mocks this official discourse about the maintenance of 
the Arabic language, it also highlights the hypocrisy of the people setting the discourse.  
At home with his wife, the official speaks in comically elaborate fusḥa, but in a final 
scene we see him at a fancy Western café with his young mistress, where he nonchalantly 
orders in trilingual Lebanese fashion: “Garson!  Lo Samahet (if you please), two 
Nescafe”. 
While English has been steadily encroaching as the language of commerce, 
education, and the neoliberal elite in a Damascus, the dominance of the Arabic language 
remains a principal point of Syrian bureaucratic discourse at least, if not practice among 
the economic elite.58  Syrian universities are well known for teaching engineering, 
science, and medical courses in Arabic, while in many other Arab countries these 
subjects are taught in English or French, especially at the post-secondary level.  The sons 
of wealthy and connected families however, often including members of the Ba’ath Party 
and the state bureaucracy, are likely to study abroad in English, French, or (for a slightly 
older generation) Russian-speaking universities.  Bashar al-Asad himself famously 
studied ophthalmology in London.59  
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The differences between official rhetoric of the state and the actual practice of the 
elite and educated youth is illustrated by the contrast in linguistic practices between state 
television and the nominally private Syrian television station Addounia TV, owned by 
Rami Makhlouf, the President’s cousin. The latter features significantly more English 
than the Syrian governmental news station, though its news programming directly parrots 
the government.  For example, though the news crawl on Addounia periodically switches 
to English, the crawl on Syria tv (from what I have seen) remains in Arabic.  Youth 
focused programming especially features a more polylingual presentation style.  For 
example, Addounia broadcasts a program entitled “Shabāb-tube”, a youth-focused 
interview show which features segments on issues like Facebook’s new timeline, or the 
stress of studying for year-end exams.  The host and guests all speak Arabic, but the 
program’s introduction and segment titles are printed in English, and guests often drop as 
much of a sentence of English (less often French) into their answers to the hosts 
questions, mirroring both the style of popular Lebanese television hosts, and the linguistic 
patterns of Syria’s young elite. 
This style, adopted especially by the young university graduates who form much 
of the broadcasting talent in Syria, is frequently criticized by monolingual and working 
class listeners, as well as nationalists and older educated listeners who object to the drift 
away from the eloquent language of their favorite classic radio voices.  Some critics of 
Syrian radio speak of a “Lebanese broadcaster complex,” lamenting the tendency of radio 
hosts and DJs to mimic the multilingual speaking style of Syria’s neighbor.  In one 
article, the director of government youth station Ṣawt Ash-Shabāb acknowledged the 






The time of the tradition of Lebanese dialect has ended on Ṣawt ash-
Shabāb…but a word may slip through sometimes, and sadly some people 
judge on the basis of a single word in addition to the emphasis on the 
place of the Arabic language, so the use of foreign terms is practically 
nonexistent now.60 
 
In contrast, the director of Al Madina FM responded to critics of his station’s use of 
English words: “These people are sealed off by themselves, and they don’t understand the 
Syrian citizen, who has become an intellectual.”61 
Although state rhetoric about preserving the primacy of the Arabic language is a 
significant part of the mass media discourse about music in Syria, this by no means 
indicates a fundamental opposition to Western music as such.  On the contrary, the 
Ba’thist government has encouraged and funded institutions for the cultivation of 
Western art music, based on a Soviet model of national and collective development 
which encourages a both “commercial/lowbrow and national/highbrow” as well as 
expressions of folk or popular culture which fit unthreateningly within the “mosaic” of 
national culture.62 The Damascus High Institute for Music is primarily engaged with the 
promotion and education of Western art music, although there is also an Arab music 
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faculty and performing ensembles.  Due to the historical relationship between Syria and 
the Soviet Union, the Western art music scene in Damascus has close connections to 
Russian music pedagogy.  Many of the institute’s instructors have historically been of 
Russian origin, and Syrian artists have often spent time studying in Russia.   
In an essay from January 2011 in Al-Watan (The Nation) entitled “The Creative 
Inheritance of Arabic Music” (al-mīrāth al-ibdāʿī lil-mūsīqā al-ʿarabiyya), music critic 
‘Ali al-Ahmed expressed both the fear of Western domination and a hegemonic musical 
language (not necessarily the same thing), and rebutted those who see the use of Western 
instruments and techniques as antithetical to the creation of a particularly Arab musical 
style.  This article is worth quoting at length, as it expresses the two dueling attitudes 
towards music and the West described in official Syrian media: the desire for a music that 
is authentically Arab, and the certainty that this will require a mastery of “advanced 
Western musical knowledge.”  As the style is somewhat dense in my (fairly literal) 
translation, I have excerpted and annotated several passages. 
Al-Ahmed begins with a criticism of contemporary Arabic music, and what he 
sees as its abandonment of the long tradition of Arabic musical scholarship: 
 
That which makes contemporary Arabic music mortgage itself, in many 
of its products, to a single language, even if it grants some immediate 
benefits, abandons voluntarily an extended inheritance from the creations 
and brilliances of the Arab and Islamic spirit in music research and 
knowledge, and methods of performance and practice which have had a 






Arguing that it is possible to celebrate the values of this inheritance without “submission 
to the arguments of the past,” he then critiques a slavish devotion to old styles and 
practices. 
 
We find these arguments of the past always exemplified and presented in 
many of the musical folk styles, where they are presented as though they 
were without any change or modification, preserving their symbols, traits 
and purity… 
Meanwhile Arabic music has abandoned its legacy – its identity – under 
false and unconvincing pretenses, and is lacking in knowledge and 
objectivity.   
 
 
He then entertains the notion that the devotion to old styles and practices might be 
necessary as an alternative to a purely Western musical education. 
 
Perhaps some of these arguments are correct, especially if we know the 
type of academic method which one studies, and which does not allow 
education in this inheritance, except knowledge of, not in it.  These 
approaches to [the significance of the Arabic musical inheritence] make 
whoever is musical write inside the purview of western music alone, in its 





aid him in developing his musical work, while the science of Arabic music 
stands as an obstacle in the path of this project, as he thinks. 
 
He rejects both the fully Western path, and complete abnegation of it that would come in 
reproducing tradition, and cites the historical precedents for musical hybridity, 
referencing Munir Bashir as an example of a performer (oud) and composer who took the 
expertise gained studying Western music, at the Franz Liszt Academy in Hungary, and 
used it to blend “modernity and authenticity in one creative alloy.”  He continues citing 
Toufiq al-Basha, Nūri Iskandar, ‘Atea Sharara, and Marcel Khalife as exemplars of a 
class of modern composers and musicians who “write Arabic music that we call ‘Arabic’ 
and not western music written in an Arabic hand.”  He closes with a quote from 
musicologist Shareen Malouf: 
 
Researcher Shareen Malouf says in the book “Arabic Music, the Question 
of Authenticity and Renewal”: “We remain in one situation despite the 
multiplicity of situations of loss, and this case is summed up in that we 
discover and we create and we vitalize in patterns musically congruent 
with our heritage. We spread what we have in every village, and under 
every root, and in a few of the pages of history.  We open up to these 
patterns to globalization, and we open them up to become eligible to 
accept the tumbles of advancement in human civilization, and especially 
the musical ones among them.  (Our heritage drinks from these patterns, 
and gives to them, without losing its authenticity or melting into what it 
has taken, and thus we become part of the universal heritage.  We interact 
with it, rather than enter into a battle with no equivalence, or to conclude 
a race behind what others have provided for us.  It is necessary for us to 
have patterns of musical heritage formed of what remains of our history 





it viable, because the West benefits as the West tries to convert us to its 
music.63 
 
Many of the most celebrated composers of Arabic music such as Mohammed ‘Abd al-
Wahhab or Ziad Rahbani, are lauded for their integration of Western and Arabic musical 
elements, and the call for songs presented earlier also allows for the use of Western 
instruments and orchestration.   
 
Lena Chamamyan 
An excellent example of music that can be both authentically Syrian in its 
discursive positioning and hybrid in its mixture of Western and Arab musical style, is the 
work of Lena Chamamyan.  This extremely talented vocalist rose to prominence in the 
mid 2000s, and became the most successful representative of what some Syrian writers 
have referred to as Syria’s new wave (al-mawja al-jadīda) or alternative music (al-
mūsīqā al-badīla) scenes.64 Chamamyan’s music appears regularly on Syrian radio, and 
she has performed to sizeable crowds in Syrian and Lebanon, but her combination of jazz 
instruments and arrangements and traditional Arabic instruments puts her in something of 
an upmarket, educated niche in terms of audience.  Nevertheless, she is a fixture of 
Damascus media, appearing in dozens of articles in the Damascus papers, and interviews 
with the local radio stations.  Backed on her recordings largely by musicians from the 
Damascus music scene, she is among the most successful representatives of a network of 
young Damascene musicians whose other recorded efforts have included rock and jazz 
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bands with varying degrees of success.  Chamamyan has become one of the go-to 
examples for articles in the Syrian press about the talent of young graduates from the 
High Institute for Music, along with a few lesser-known groups like Jussour (Bridges) 
and Harāra ‘Ālia (High Heat).65  Her music is arranged by Aleppine saxophonist and 
composer Basel Rajoub, a graduate of the conservatory in Aleppo. 
Chamamyan’s biography makes her ideally suited to the dual narratives of 
international progress and Arab tradition, illustrating the possibilities of a pluralistic yet 
Arabophone-Syrian polity.  Born into Syria’s sizeable Armenian community, 
Chamamyan attended the Damascus University for economic management and the 
Higher Institute for Music in Damascus for voice. Her albums Hal Asmar Ellon (2006) 
and Shamat (2007) consist largely of jazz arrangements of traditional songs from Syria 
and bilād ash-Shām, the first album carries the title of a traditional song, and the second 
literally means “Shām songs.”66   
An excellent example of the mix of Western and Arabic vocal styles comes in her 
performance of “‘A-Rōsānā” on Hal Asmar Al-Loun.  The traditional song is arranged to 
a Latin jazz accompaniment, with the piano and bass comping through chord changes.  
Chamamyan sings the first few verses syllabically, with minimal embellishment. 
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Through the song Chamamyan steadily adds ornaments and turns to the original 
melody, reinforcing the impression this isn’t an American standard with lyrics translated 
into Arabic, but a melody native to the language and vocal tradition. 
After modulating down a whole-step halfway through the recording, the rate of 
improvisation increases.  By the end Chamamyan is singing in melismas lasting almost 
the duration of the first verse, building a rhythmic counterpoint to the instruments 
through stepwise bounce back and forth between D and E.  In my ears, her vocal 
command of Arabic and Western style is so idiomatically fluid that when she lands on the 
Bb s and C#s at the end of the tune, they are simultaneously the “out” notes of a jazz 













The influence of Western jazz and the “oriental jazz” of Ziad Rahbani is obvious 
in this music, and her song choices are certainly reminiscent of the shaʿbī Fairuz.  In the 
current Damascus Radioscape, Chamamyan’s mastery of vocal ornament means that her 
songs appear on Version FM’s ṭarab mujaddad blocks. 
This combination of the old with the new, the Western with the traditional, allows 
Chamamyan to be portrayed in Syrian media as an exemplar of modern Syria.  The party 
newspaper al-Baath described her titled profile “The Artist Lena Chamamyan…Music 
able to absorb our heritage.”67  When the Syrian Computer Society announced the 
beginning of a partnership to digitally document and preserve the music scene in modern 
Syria, the face of the partnership was Lena Chamamyan.   Articles about her usually 
mention that she won the best album prize from Radio Monte Carlo in 2007 for Hal 
Asmar Ellon.68  A 2009 profile in Baladna referred to her as “Voice of the Memories of 
an Entire Generation.”  The generation implied is the young one which comprises 
Damascus’s local music scene, but the memories are of an older shām.   
Despite all of this press, her music remains largely peripheral outside of the listening 
habits of the urban elites; her audience is relatively marginal compared to either the 
shabābī stars who appear on satellite television, or the dabke stars who play at weddings 
and festivals.   
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 In this way, Chamamyan’s music is is like much of the programming, in that it 
both plays to the cosmopolitian tastes of Syria’s economic elite (through the style of the 
arrangements), and maintains a reverence for Syrian song traditions.   
Juxtapositions of Style 
 At least in terms of the ways artists publicly present themselves and their musical 
influences in interviews and in the press, there is a great deal of overlap between the 
respectable, high status musical genres and the popular but oft-disparaged shabābī styles 
which dominate video clips.  The prime vehicle for star creation over the last decade, the 
televised song contests like Superstar, Arab Idol, and Star Academy, requires contestants 
to at least try their hands at the older and more high-status song, which are thought to 
bring in an older and broader audience as compared to newer songs which might be more 
geographically and demographically restricted.69  These contests, and the stars that they 
create, attempt to depict their new and old music as part of a continual tradition of Arabic 
singing which defies the criticisms described by Frischkopf above.  Nevertheless, the 
juxtaposition of styles and subject matter which these television stars engage in is not 
accepted without comment or criticism.   
An example of the way that many people hear these moves back and forth 
between genres as jarring or nonsensical comes again from Buq‘at Dau’.  In a popular 
recurring sketch, the show parodied Arab Idol style singing competitions with a series of 
audition scenes for a show called Star al-Arab.  In one of these clips, a very nervous 
Lebanese contestant comes out onto the stage, and after a series of jokes (one judge asks 
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the bald contestant what kind of hair gel he uses), explains tentatively what he is going to 
perform: 
 
“I’m going, I’m doing a little thing…I want to present to you something 
from the great master Wadiʿ  al-Ṣāfi …a mawwāl I mean, and then 
afterwards a song.” 
 
He begins singing with deadly serious affect, in a comically inadequate voice, 
straining at the bottom of its range to imitate the weighty sadness of Wadi’ Al-
Safi. 
 
The harvesters have passed by, the birds of winter have passed. 
The fig leaves dry, and clouds shadow the barrenness. 
And the keeper of the jasmine, has not yet returned 
mar  u al-ḥaṣidīn, mar  u ṭuyūr al-bard 
yebsu waraq at-tīn wa al-ghaim tel al-jard 
wa naṭurat al-yasmīn bʿada ma rajʿat bʿad 
 
After closing the last line solemnly at the bottom of his range he moves into the next 
song, rap-singing the first few lines of the hit Egyptian song “Shankuti” by the composer, 
singer and television host Essam Karika.  It is a comedic song in Egyptian slang over a 





incredibly catchy repetition of the word “shankuti” serving as the response to every line 
(roughly translated as “sleazy”).   
 
The one who's a big liar and hits on college girls 
What does that make him?” 
 
The contestant pauses, and the three judges in the panel join in automatically: 
“Shankuti!” 
 
The one who stays up late and claims the opposite on the phone 
Talks to his friend's girlfriend, sells him out and betrays him 




The auditioner in the sketch, visibly nervous, is obviously not attempting any kind of 
clever juxtaposition of vastly different songs.  Rather he seems to think this is completely 
normal, which makes the contrast between the heartbreaking but terribly rendered 
mawwāl and the flighty pop song even funnier.  The two songs are opposites not only in 
lyrical content, and high-culture esteem, but in terms of the reaction of listeners, in this 
case depicted by the panel of judges in the sketch.  The expectant looks on the faces of 
the judges during the slow melody of the (usually improvised) mawwāl is in direct 





like an autonomic response which surprises even the utterers.  Not only the singer, but the 
listeners as well are thrust from one styles of listening to another. 
 The sensitivity of listeners to this kind of contrast in performance (and listening) 
style is one of the things that condition the playlists of Syrian stations.  Although many 
stations now use computer programs to control songs lists, with a song’s frequency set 
ahead of time and a programming algorhythm assuring that it appears a given number of 
times a day, programming blocks on Syrian radio are still organized to create a 
consistence of song and listening styles. 
Western Music and the Significance of the (long) 80s 
 
 While a larger discussion of Western music in the Syrian radioscape will place in 
Chapter 4, it is necessary to establish the way that Western music is utilized on Syrian 
private radio.  In one interesting example, Version FM devotes several hours each week 
to music from specific decades.  One of these music blocks is an hour in the afternoon 
devoted to Arabic music from the 1990s, and is labeled “tis’eenat” (90s in Arabic).  The 
other, labeled “80s” (in English), occurs from 2:00-3:00 am in the morning and consists 
entirely of English- language songs from that decade.  Songs from the “80s” are the only 
Western music block drawn from a distinct chronological period, while other 
programming blocks include “Rock-Country”, “Blues & Jazz”, and “Slow English.”  The 
80s also represents a significant programming category on American radio, but the 
absence of any other decades as musical identifiers gives credence to the idea that timbres 
which Americans aurally understand as signifiers of the 1980s often fit more easily into 





of Western music from what I might describe as the “long 80s” (~1975-1995) to borrow a 
practice from historical musicology, has to do with the use of synthesizer timbres, and 
this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  Here however I will briefly describe a 
historical theory for the prevalence of Western music from the long 80s on the Syrian 
radioscape.  The roots of this theory lie in the differences between the histories of music 
radio in the US and in the Levant. 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the boom in FM radio in the United States 
occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.70  In combination with the baby boom after World War 
II and the accompanying demographic bulge, FM radio in the United States has been 
disproportionally devoted to music from the first two decades of its major cultural 
significance, and the period of this culturally dominant age group’s youth, the 1950s and 
1960s.  Naturally there are many other social and cultural factors which have contributed 
to the significance of music from this period in American culture generally and on radio 
in particular, and I want to avoid making a broadly deterministic argument about 
technology and demographics dictating the course of popular music.   
Since roughly the mid-1950s, pop music from that period has remained in 
constant air play, joined by music of the 1960s and slowly shifted to the “oldies” format, 
where it slowly aggregates songs from later decades.  Although there is a small 
percentage of radio programming devoted to music from before this period, by and large 
the collective memory of American pop radio, and the concept of “pop” itself, begin in 
the 1950s and 60s. 
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The following panel from Randall Monroe’s web-comic XKCD, entitled 
“Tradition”, illustrates the idea brilliantly by charting out “the 20 most-played Christmas 
Songs by decade of popular release”: 
Figure 3.9: : “Tradition,” Randall Monroe, XKCD.com 71 
 
As displayed on the XKCD webpage, text appears when a mouse hovers over the comic, 
with the tag line “An ‘American Tradition’ is anything that happened to a baby boomer 
twice.”   
 While Christmas is certainly a special case wherein there is a larger than usual 
market for nostalgia, I would argue that in general American FM radio displays a similar, 
though much less dramatic, tendency to emphasize pop music which was popular in the 
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early years of the FM and demographic (baby) booms, especially as opposed to music 
from earlier periods.  This argument is admittedly a gross simplification of the 
development of pop music in the US, but it is useful as a framework within which to 
contrast pop radio elsewhere in the world.  As I have argued in Chapter One, it can be 
misleading to examine radio elsewhere in the world from an American historical 
conception of the medium.  However, especially when discussing the role of American 
and Western music within other media systems, it can be useful to contrast local histories 
with the American one, which in some radio scholarship can problematically be taken as 
something of a default rather than a specific historical case. 
Moving over to Syria and Lebanon, it is possible to find a similar radio boom, and 
a similar continuation of musical popularity from that period, at least in terms of Western 
music.  Medium and short wave radio have been a significant force in the Levant since 
the 1930s, especially in regards to international state-sponsored broadcasts (see Chapter 
1).  The major FM radio boom in the region happened during the Lebanese Civil War, 
which saw the emergence of more than 100 local radio stations broadcasting a wide range 
of content in French, Arabic, English, and Armenian.72  
 
For many Syrians, the first major exposure to Western popular music was on 
these Lebanese stations.  The presence of the Syrian military in Lebanon during and after 
the Civil War, in combination with the policy of compulsory male military service, 
means that a huge number of Syrian men had experience stationed either in Lebanon or 
near the border during this period.  Thus even many Syrians who lived outside the 
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broadcast range of Lebanese stations would have had opportunities to be exposed to the 
full range of Lebanese radio (often for extended periods with very little to do, as the 
countless Syrian jokes about military service will attest).  Additionally, an enormous 
number of poor and working-class Syrians migrate back and forth to Lebanon for work.73 
The existence of the Syrian “youth bubble” which began in the 80s and 90s only further 
increases the number of listeners in Syria for whom the formative interactions with 
Western music took place during this period.74 
Thus for a large number of Syrians, the Western music with the most emotional 
resonance, and which sounds most familiar coming over the radio, comes from the period 
of the Lebanese Civil War and immediately after.  The Syrian private stations which have 
attempted to supplant Lebanese cross-border stations in recent years have banked on this 
affinity in their programming.  While the fully English stations like MIX FM (Syrian), 
and NRJ Radio (Lebanese, but widely audible in Syria) focus on newer Western music – 
the MIX FX playlist is usually indistinguishable from an American top-40 station – the 
Western music on primarily Arabic-language stations in Syria disproportionately consists 
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“The Syrian Song” in Mass-Media Music Discourse 
 
Within the cross-media public conversation about music, as well as in discussions 
I witnessed and participated in among musicians and people involved with radio, there is 
a tremendous amount of concern for the state of Syrian music, and especially for “the 
Syrian song.”  State radio call for songs is emblematic of this, but the anxiety extends 
throughout radio, television, news, and public performances.  It can be hard to find an 
interview with a Syrian singer on the radio, or read one in a newspaper, without hearing 
the artist or the interviewer lamenting the status of the Syrian music industry, and the 
country’s seeming inability to create and nurture local stars.  The weakness of local 
music production and “star production” is often contrasted with the television drama 
industry.76 Syrian musalsalat (serial dramas), often financed by money from Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf, have become extremely popular across the Arabic-speaking world, and are 
Syria’s most visible cultural export.77  The relative weakness of music production is 
blamed on an array of factors: a lack of production companies, copyright enforcement, 
governmental support, or private capital; disinterest on the part of listeners, 
Westernization, Rotana, television in general.  The list goes on and on.   
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Government media outlets are frequently the publishers of these laments: for 
example the Ministry of Culture sponsored arts journal Shorufat, has published a number 
of articles which criticize Syrian production facilities, copyright system, and the Syrian 
song in general.78   Criticism of the government’s role in fostering an environment for the 
music industry is frequent, but it is usually expressed in abstract terms, rather than the 
result of actions and decisions of specific individuals or groups.  Direct criticism of the 
government officials and policies, even in the context of musical production and 
performance, is one of the “red lines” which people know not to cross in public speech.79 
 
A satirical article entitled “I am a muṭrib, oh the arrows I bear” (Ana muṭrib, aya 
niyālī), written by Basil Hamwi for a Baladna column in 2009, describes an interview 
between a singer and a radio broadcaster.80 
 
The Syrian muṭrib sits with the broadcaster in his radio interview in one of 
the private radio stations, where initial talk revolves around the newly 
released single, and the surprising success it has achieved.  Then the bored 
broadcaster is compelled to ask some questions to the artist, converting his 
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radio interview to resemble an official investigation.  He directs some 
provocative questions to the artist, and some accusatory ones, and then 
questions reminding him of his contentious past. Before the end of the 
interview, that the broadcaster must direct to his guest the traditional 
question:  Are there difficulties in your Syrian existence?… What are their 
causes?  Is it a result of the lack of local production companies?… Or that 
the audience doesn’t react to Syrian song? AARRGHHG??? 
 
This is the moment that the Syrian muṭrib (and interviewee) is scared of.  
When put with this question, he is left with two options, both of them 
bitter.  Either expand the discussion by venting anger and speaking 
spontaneously without limitations, or simply shake his head and say: 
“Whatever you say, sir.” 
 
In the end, the writer concedes the lamentable status of the Syrian song, but blames this 
on the very people who he mocks for endlessly asking about it, the broadcasters. 
 
We find that the ignorance of our domestic stations to Syrian song is a 
principle obstacle to the fame of its muṭribīn, and not these possibilities 
which have become a certain traditional discussion between any 
broadcaster or journalist and a shaʿbī or less famous Syrian muṭrib.  For 





the Syrian muṭrib, who is lucky to that he can talk about his next album 
over the air on the broadcast of his beloved Syria!!!81 
 
 
With all of this concern about the “Syrian Song” it is worth asking what exactly people 
consider “Syrian” about the Syrian song.  To a large extent, when the issue is discussed 
on commercial radio, this is primarily an issue of artist origin and song dialect.  
As was discussed above, biography and “authenticating genealogy” are significant 
to the way that listeners talk about and categorize artists.  It is certainly true that music 
from outside the nation’s current borders, especially the music of Fairuz and the 
Rahbanis, can become associated with Syrian identity; the historical resonance of Bilad 
ash-Sham and interrelations between modern Syrian-Lebanese media and culture means 
that for many Syrian citizens, this music is fundamental to daily life and group identity.  
It would be extremely jarring (bordering on unthinkable) to hear a Syrian refer to the 
Fairuz as “foreign music.”82 Despite the fluidity of audience and association in the Arab 
mashriq, Syrian media does reflect at least a verbal desire to promote work by citizens. 
A larger issue than birthplace however is the use of language. As numerous 
scholars have noted, the language of pan-Arab popular music is comprised of a number 
of regional dialects of Arabic, not necessarily broken down according to a singer’s 
nationality. Michael Frishkopf notes: 
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Indeed, dialect manipulation is an important marketing strategy in 
contemporary mediated pop music.  Egyptian, Lebanese and Gulf singers 
frequently adopt each-others’ dialects (sometimes even mixing them on a 
single album) to enhance commercial viability across subregions…though 
ultimately most pan-Arab popular singers tend to be categorized by 
subregion, as North African, Egyptian, Levantine, or Gulf, injecting 
common feeling into regional identities that did not formerly exist as 
such.83  
 
The primary complaint about the place of Syrian song within the pan-Arab musical world 
is linguistic, and reflects the paucity of mass-mediated songs in local Syrian dialects. Not 
only do Syria’s stars go abroad to record in Lebanon and Egypt, but they go abroad and 
record in Lebanese and Egyptian.  This is true both for today’s video-clip stars and for 
many of the Golden Age vocalists.  Siblings Asmahān and Farid al-Atrash, two of the 
most famous “Syrian” singers of the mid-twentieth century, worked (and were largely 
raised) in Egypt and sang in Egyptian dialect.84 
 Rather than hoping for the expansion of a particularly Syrian musical style out 
into the pan-Arab mediascape, the goal  in regards to a Syrian presence in the pan-Arab 
music world would be simply for Syria (and Syrian Arabic) to become more audible both 
locally and internationally.  Thus one hears interviews on the radio with contestants from 
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the pan-Arab televised singing contests where their lack of success post-contest is 
compared negatively to that of singers from other countries with strong music 
industries.85 
Framed by these two primary qualifiers, the Syrian-ness of a mass-mediated pop 
song is primarily determined by biography and dialect, but there are also stylistic ways in 
which a particularly Syrian musical identity might be articulated. Very briefly, I would 
point out three potential sets of tropes used by musicians who appear on Syrian radio to 
create a specifically Syrian musical identity: 1) musical tropes of Syrian shaʿbī culture - 
primarily dabke rhythms and instrumentation, 2) tropes associationed with the urban 
high-art muwashah tradition of Aleppo and Syrian ṭarab, and 3) cosmopolitan mastery of 
Western techniques with specifically Syrian musical material.  A full exploration of these 
aspects of Syrian song is beyond the scope of this dissertation, for the purposes of this 
discussion it will suffice to point out the relevance of the “Syrian” song as a discursive 
category in the local radioscape.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter and the previous one I have outlined a number of the categories 
and programming genres which form the topography of the Syrian radioscape, based on 
both the direct rhetoric of the state media organs, and the general mass-media discourse 
in Syria.  These categories include shabābī, shaʿbī, ṭarab, hadi   and romantic, advocacy 
(or humanitarian), religious, and “Syrian” songs.  The purpose of outlining this taxonomy 
is not simply to describe a set of musical categories.   It allows us to describe, visualize, 
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and compare the music playlists between various stations.  For example, the following 




Figure 3.10: Graphic representation of Version FM’s playlist 
 
The illustration represents the approximate time devoted to various song categories, as 
well as the degree of overlap between categories (though a two dimensional 
representation does not allow a visualization of all points of connection between 








Figure 3.11: Graphic representation of Ṣawt Ash-Shabāb’s playlist 
 
Of course, these illustrations are quite subjective.  I have listened to over a thousand 
hours of radio in the course of research for this project, and documented over a hundred 
hours of broadcasts in a database which includes songs, advertisements, and talk shows 
and interstitial material.  However, the nature of continuous 24-hour radio broadcasts as 
an object of study, and the impossibility of listening to more than one at a time means 
that my impressions are inevitably based on small, statistically insignificant sample sizes.  
As such, the primary usefulness of these graphs is to illustrate the relative differences 





 It should also be mentioned that the nature of my listening practice and history 
has the potential to create vastly different impressions than would be received by another 
listener.  While in Syria I listened to the radio on the same timetable as everyone else; 
after returning to the States, my listening patterns became completely removed from 
those of Damascus life.  Listening to radio recordings I made in Syria, and streaming 
radio over the internet, my consumption of radio is extremely time shifted, condensed, 
and concentrated, facts that would change my experience even without the obvious 
factors which make me experience radio differently from Syrian listeners (as a non-native 
speaker, American, musicologist, etc.)  I am under no pretense that my level of 
familiarity with the pop music played on Syrian radio approaches that of, say, a 16 year 
old student in Damascus.  
While I am confident that I have done enough listening that my general 
characterization of radio playlists would be recognized as fairly accurate by most 
Damascene listeners, these charts would not necessarily line up with individuals 
experiences of the stations.  As was discussed in Chapter 2, most radio listener’s consume 
broadcasts according to a routine built around their daily schedules, at home and work.  
For example, I spoke to with one servīs (minibus) driver who works the evening and 
night shifts every day and listens to the radio as well as his own cassette collection while 
driving.  His experience of radio stations takes place during these times, and his 
perception of Version FM for example was as a station that played primarily hadi   and 
romantic music, and Umm Kulthum after midnight.  The person who drives the same 
servīs during the morning and day shift would have a completely different impression of 





 Although broad playlist analysis will fall short in describing the experiences of 
individual listeners, it is nevertheless essential for situating American broadcasts within 
the contours of the Syrian radioscape.  In the next chapter I will address Radio Sawa, and 












In 2002 the Bush administration shut down the Voice of America’s Arabic 
language service, replacing it with Radio Sawa, a 24 hour pop-music station which 
breaks up an Arabic and English language playlist with short news segments.  Fast-
tracked along with its sister satellite television station Al Hurra after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, Radio Sawa was billed by originators in the US Broadcasting Board 
of Governors (BBG) as a departure from the “ineffective” practices of the VOA Arabic 
service, and a way for the US to break through what then-BBG Chairman Kenneth 
Tomlinson called the “distorting filter of radio and television stations controlled by those 
hostile to the United States.”2 Though scholars of Arab media have rightly pointed out the 
faults in this monochromatic picture of the Arab news media landscape and tried to 
address American sponsored news in a more realistic historical and regional context 
commentary on the music half of Sawa’s music and news framework has tended to come 
mostly in the form of mocking headlines (“Britney vs. the Terrorists.”)3  
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The music-focused Sawa has been more successful than the all-news Al Hurra in 
creating a consistent audience, and despite the undisputed primacy of satellite television 
as the number one entertainment and news medium in the Arab world, radio remains a 
significant source of news and entertainment for large portions of the region’s population, 
and has a long history as a locus of political contestation.  This chapter undertakes an 
analysis of the musical content and programming style of Radio Sawa, placing the station 
and the theory of musical utility it employs within a history of US Arabic language 
broadcasting that goes back to World War II. 
Against the backdrop of the history of US international broadcasting, I propose 
two broad theories of music radio and its power as a tool for public diplomacy and 
propaganda, described in Chapter One.  The first theory views music as a communicative 
medium that includes semiotic content beyond its lyrics; music is thought to illus trate, 
advocate, and instantiate the values and culture of the broadcasters, creating an affinity 
between the listener and the broadcasting country.  The second theory conceives of music 
primarily as a medium of exchange, the currency with which listeners are induced to 
become audiences for non-musical content, whether that content is commercial in the 
case of corporations, or public diplomacy and propaganda in the case of states.  These 
theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and they are both employed in attempts to 
“move the needle” of public opinion towards the US, but they express profoundly 
different views about what music is and what it can do.  
Within this framework the analysis in this chapter identifies the music and 
formatting on Radio Sawa as defined by the second, transactional theory in international 





inculcate familiarity with and appreciation for American culture while demonstrating 
respect for local culture.  Instead it can be viewed as an effort to develop a pattern of 
radio listening based on a consumer capitalist relationship between listeners and radio, in 
which music is purely currency used to entice listeners to become members of audiences.  
Far from an ancillary effect of the programming, this type of listening practice and 
relationship to music becomes an end in itself.  The fundamental idea communicated by 
the music and formatting of Radio Sawa, apart from any news content, is exactly that 
transactional, consumerist nature of listening that the station’s format engenders. 
Although I argue here that Radio Sawa is organized around a theory of music 
typified by exchange value rather than musical meaning, I don’t believe listeners 
necessarily perceive the music and musical choices as bereft of meaning.  Rather, 
individuals use patterns of listening shaped by the practices of daily life, local discourses 
about popular music, and decisions about aesthetic preferences and personal 
identification, in order to make sense out of foreign music, and integrate it into existing 
categories of listening.  To explore this aspect of music reception, the second half of this 
chapter shifts away from the direct content analysis of Radio Sawa to describe some of 
the ways in which Western music is integrated into the Syrian radioscape, relying on the 
discursive categories established in Chapter 3. 
 
Theories of Music in American International Broadcasting 
The most common rationale for the use of music in US broadcasting holds that 
music, and especially music viewed by Americans as quintessentially American - jazz, 





communicate fundamental information about America, in a way that positively inclines 
audiences towards the country and its people.  This is the most common rationale for 
music described by the broadcasters across the history of American international 
broadcasting, and it is maintained today in programs such as the US State Department’s 
Rhythm Road Program, administered through Jazz at Lincoln Center in New York.  
 
The mission of The Rhythm Road is to share America’s unique 
contribution to the world of music and to promote cross-cultural 
understanding and exchange among nations worldwide… Building on the 
rich legacy of the legendary Jazz Ambassadors, the program has expanded 
in recent years to include music that is quintessentially American.  
Musicians are invited to apply in the genres of jazz, blues, bluegrass, 
Cajun, country, gospel, hip hop/urban, and zydeco.4 
   
Scholars like Von Eschen have rightly pointed out the extent to which the conception of 
music as conveying something fundamentally American can obscure the complicated 
political realities of audiences and musicians alike.  Nevertheless, the theory that, in the 
words of famed VOA broadcaster Willis Conover, “Jazz is its own propaganda”, remains 
embedded in both the popular and governmental discourse about music and its place in 
US governmental broadcasting.5  
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The rhetoric does not exclusively apply to American music; another version of the 
theory asserts simply that music, as the “universal language”, has inherent 
communicative potential. Thus, in 1945 VOA music director Elizabeth Lomax advised 
programmers to: 
 
. . . sample every kind of music which is truly part of the American 
scene… as well as music of your target area … We can create a bond of 
friendship by telling our audience in effect: ‘We in America know your 
music as well as our own’.6 
 
 During the Cold War, the focus of US communication abroad was on the 
ideological battle between capitalism vs. communism.  As early as 1964, however, the 
USIA had come to the conclusion that using the word “capitalism” directly to advocate 
reform was ineffective.7  Resorting to subtler methods of contrasting the fruits of 
capitalism with the downsides of communism, American programmers, many coming 
from private radio and bringing expertise in commercial advertising, attempted to drive 
up demand for American cultural and physical products of all kinds.  The identification 
of consumerism itself with Americanism created a logic in which the expansion of 
markets for US consumer products was seen as not just economically beneficial, but 
central to the expansion of US political influence.8 
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 A view of music as cultural commodity is not necessarily incompatible with the 
idea that it might also “project America”, and these two theories often go hand in hand, 
but bringing political economy into the discussion of musical meaning gives us access to 
other theories of how music might be operating.   
Scholars of the political economy of communication describe commercial radio as 
a series of transactions in which listeners are induced with content (often musical) into 
becoming part of an audience.  As the main commodity produced by the radio industry, 
audiences are then sold to advertisers, with the value of these audiences based on the 
relative desirability of various demographic attributes and listening practices.9  When the 
entity wishing to purchase a particular audience is a political actor rather than a 
corporation, other content (like news) may take the place of ads, but the principles of 
audience manufacture remain the same.  To quote Fernando Bermejo: 
 
How exactly does the audience become a commodity and how is its labor 
appropriated by media firms?  This occurs through audience measurement, 
which can be considered an attempt to ‘define the intangible’…ratings 
firms do not simply ‘check to determine’ the size and characteristics of the 
audience, they actually manufacture the audience through a set of 
measurement procedures that are shaped by both industry dynamics and 
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the technological and usage patterns of the media whose audience is 
manufactured.10 
 
In order to attempt to influence the political views and values of an imagined Arab 
listener, broadcasters must create an audience.  The goal is not just to attract listeners, but 
to shape them, through the act of listening, into a different form. 
 
The Beginnings of Radio Sawa 
The man who developed Radio Sawa is Norman J. Pattiz, a Clinton appointee 
who began work on the Sawa concept in January of 2001, and the founder of Westwood 
One.  That company, which merged with Dial Global in 2011, was the largest distributer 
of commercial radio programming in the United States, and a pioneer in the practice of 
distributing entire 24-hour streams via satellite to be broadcast locally.11  Within this 
model, programming decisions down to the level of individual song choices are set 
centrally, based on intense market and focus group research.  Using this model, Radio 
Sawa is recorded and distributed from the home office in Washington, DC, and the 
Middle East production office in Dubai, with regional news offices and correspondences 
located around the region in Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bagdad, Amman, and Beirut.12  
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Early in the process of beginning Radio Sawa, Pattiz gave statements that seem to 
support both of the theories of music broadcasting expressed above, sometimes calling 
music “a tool to deliver the audience”,  and sometimes describing it as something that can 
illustrate useful stories about America.13  Not an expert in the Arabic-speaking world, 
Pattiz brought experience in the areas of distribution, audience research, and audience 
manufacture.  From early on, spokespeople for the station emphasize the use of audience 
research methods in constructing the format and playlist of the station.  Initial research 
for Radio Sawa was conducted by Edison Media Research in Amman, Cairo, and 
Bahrain, where pollsters went door to door and “played 5- to 7-second hooks from 500 
American songs and 500 Arabic songs on cassette tapes in households…” then 
“calculated a score for the songs based on how the listeners rated the snippets.”14 The 
Broadcasting Board of Governors continually hires outside firms to conduct focus group 
and polling research, to assess the reaction to news content, and to garner informa tion 
about song preferences, and significantly, to register internal benchmarks necessary to 
demonstrate progress and growth.15   
The BBG describes Radio Sawa’s programming as “a carefully crafted blend of 
Western and Middle Eastern music programming that successfully attract[s] listeners to 
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stay tuned for substantive news and information programming.”16  Beyond this thin 
description, the musical and other non-news programming on the station is never 
addressed in any detail in the Board’s reports or funding requests.  Examining the 
station’s website (Radiosawa.com) one would assume that it is a 24-hour news broadcast, 
as the site contains no information about music at all, though 80% of airtime is devoted to 
music and non-news content.   
Radio Sawa is currently broadcast from more than 40 relay sites in 19 Arabic 
speaking countries in North Africa and the Middle East, over an area spanning Morocco 
to Oman.   
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FM   
Abu Dhabi – 98.7 Meknes - 91.9 
Agadir - 101.0 Mosul - 106.6 
Akkar, North Lebanon - 98.7 Najaf – 105.8 
Amman/West Bank – 98.1 Nasiriya – 103.6 
Amara - 91.6 
Northern Jordan - 
107.4 
Baghdad – 100.4 Rabat - 101.0 
Basra - 107.0 Ramadi – 97.6 
Beirut - 87.7 Samawa – 95.6 
Bekaa Valley /Western - 98.7 Sidon - 87.7 
Bethlehem/Ramallah - 94.2 Sulimaniyah - 88.0 
Casablanca – 101.5 Tangier – 101.8 
Djibouti - 100.8 Tikrit – 97.1 
Doha - 92.6 Tripoli, Lebanon - 87.7 
Dubai - 90.5 Zahle - 87.7  
Erbil - 106.6 
 
Fes – 97.9 Medium Wave (AM) 
Hebron/Gaza-100.2 Egypt-Levant – 990 
Hilla – 90.4 
Iraq and The Gulf – 
1548 
Jenin - 93.5 
Sudan & Yemen – 
1431 
Khartoum – 97.5   
Kirkuk - 98.8 Satellite 
Kuwait - 95.7  Arabsat 
Manama - 89.2 Eutelsat  
Marrakech – 101.7 Nilesat 
Table 4.1:  Radio Sawa broadcasting sites.17 
 
The station is divided into seven streams: Iraq (FM and AM); Jordan and the West Bank 
(FM); the Gulf (FM and AM); Egypt (AM); Morocco (FM); Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen 
(FM and AM); Lebanon and Syria (FM), all of which can also be heard online at 
radiosawa.com as well as on Arabsat, Eutelsat, and Nilesat. 
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Figure 4.1: Unduplicated Weekly Reach of Radio Sawa (BBG Report)18 
 
 According to US-commissioned market research on Radio Sawa, these regional streams 
have a combined weekly audience of over 17.6 million listeners.19 
The BBG considers Sawa and Al Hurra “surrogate” services, designed like 
precursors Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to replace local media outlets. 
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Figure 4.2: Map of Middle East Broadcasting Network of target audience region and 
degree of press freedom.20 
 
In addition to the $112.7 million yearly combined operating costs for the MBN, the State 
Department has invested a great deal of effort into convincing Arab governments to allow 
the US to broadcast from FM transmitters within their borders.21  Leaked reports from the 
US Embassy in Cairo detail a series of meetings held in 2005 between State Department 
officials and their Egyptian counterparts, in which Egypt was pressured to either make an 
exception or alter its broadcasting laws in order to allow Radio Sawa to broadcast in the 
                                                 
20







FM band from a local transmitter.  Though American officials threatened to withhold 
$227 million in scheduled aid to Egypt’s Economic Security Fund, the attempt to 
pressure Egypt into shifting its laws (along with an attempt to convince the state 
broadcasting agency to ban Hezbollah-run Al Manar TV from the state-owned NileSat 
network) were unsuccessful.22  
 
In, Syria, the US has not negotiated FM broadcasting rights, and the station is 
available on FM wavelengths streaming over the border from Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq 
depending on the region of the country, in addition to AM band and free-to-air satellite 
broadcasts.  A BBG-funded survey of young listeners conducted by Intermedia in 
February of 2008 claimed that 29% of young adults (15-29) had reported listening to 
Radio Sawa in the previous week.  The BBG has produced various estimates for the 
station’s weekly audience in Syria.  While the largest estimate I have seen from the 
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places the weekly Syrian audience at ~2.7 million, in other reports, the BBG claims an 
audience of 1.5 million listeners per week, or about 11% of the Syrian population.23 
Judging the accuracy of these claims ethnographically, even among a limited 
population, would be extremely difficult, and is not the goal of this study.  While in Syria 
I made no attempt to conduct even informal surveys to estimate Radio Sawa listenership, 
and doing so would have been extremely problematic.  As a researcher the prospect of 
becoming closely associated with an American propaganda station had the potential to 
introduce an unacceptable level of scrutiny from Syrian intelligence services, for both 
myself and my local interlocutors and friends.24  I certainly met people in Syria who had 
listened to the station, but based on my experience in Syria and Lebanon, and to a much 
lesser extent in Jordan and Palestine, the station plays a larger role in public 
consciousness in Amman and Ramallah than it does in Damascus and Beirut. 
 
Syrian and Arab Criticism of Radio Sawa
25
 
 Radio Sawa, and to an even greater extent its companion television station Al 
Hurra, has received a significant critical response in the Arabic language press, almost all 
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of it negative.26  However, despite the overwhelmingly negative tenor of the criticisms 
leveled against Radio Sawa and Al Hurra, the vast majority of specific mentions of Radio 
Sawa in the Arabic-language press are completely neutral, consisting only of a reference 
for a quote (“In an interview with the American Radio Sawa [some politician] stated…”)  
Thus the bulk of the mentions of Radio Sawa tend actually to bolster the reputation of the 
news coverage, in that they occur in the context of reporters restating quotations and 
information reported by Radio Sawa.  Whatever the impact on listener’s opinions of 
America, Radio Sawa has unquestionably succeeded in finding a place within the Arabic 
media ecology, as evinced by the frequent references to Sawa reported stories by other 
media outlets. 
When criticized directly in the Arabic press, Sawa and Al Hurra have been 
described as part of a “media invasion” or a “propaganda war”, considered an extension 
of the “neo-colonial” state of the Arab world, and described as “honey to attract cultural 
wasps.” 27  Addressed using the entire range of synonyms for propaganda discussed in the 
introduction (directed media, penetrating media, public diplomacy, etc.,) they are 
described as part of a larger, warmongering American media system: 
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Radio Sawa has emerged, like the Voice of America broadcast, as one of 
the tools of the media war against the Arab World after the American 
domestic media machine succeeded in forging the mentality of the 
American citizen, especially after the events of September 11th.28 
 
Although many commentators in the pan-Arab press have expressed concern that Sawa’s 
combination of music and news could be successful in attracting young listeners, in the 
Syrian national press, the American broadcasts are almost always discussed in terms 
which take their failure for granted.  The idea that the stations have had and will have no 
effect on the Syrian populace is assumed.29  Using the failure of the stations as a logical 
starting point, commentators in Syrian national media often explain this failure in terms 
of a Syrian reaction to Sawa and al Hurra’s perceived pro-Iraq war and pro-Israel bias, 
and of using what they describe as the failed techniques of Israeli propaganda: 
 
The funny thing is that some foreign channels which broadcast in Arabic 
didn’t learn from the Israeli experience.  [Israel] endlessly repeated the 
same methods of blatant propaganda, forgetting that Arab audiences have 
come to distinguish very easily between the wheat and the chaff, and 
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know who supports their welfare, and who wants to keep them at the vile 
nadir.30 
 
The resemblance of Radio Sawa to a commercial station, and the attempt to sell America 
as a brand, is also frequently noted: 
 
“….the underlying goal of the station [is] to win a young Arab audience 
through the use of programs resembling commercial advertisements, 
aimed at the promotion of a certain commodity. But in the case of Sawa 
[this commodity] becomes American news and values, the subject of the 
American broadcasts.”31 
 
Although addressed with less frequency than the news content, music comes in for a 
similarly strong condemnation in the Syrian press: 
 
The beaten-down humanity of this miserable Arab world does not want to 
dance and sway licentiously to the melodies of Michael Jackson and 
Britney Spears, and doesn’t want to laugh at a few quick news briefs 
woven together in the style of Goebbels.” 32 
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While some critics describe the musical side of Radio Sawa as simply a cover for 
political propaganda, others view the music itself as an attempt to encourage the 
Westernization of Arab youth. 
  
Sawa tries to inculcate cultural Westernization, Americanization even, in 
the fabric of young minds in a novel way, broadcasting an Arabic song 
then an American song in succession around the clock…[political 
orientation comes] in the form of light and quick doses or propaganda.33 
 
Despite the consistent default position in the Syrian (state-controlled) press that 
Radio Sawa and other politically directed broadcasts from outside the country are 
completely ineffective in the goals of swaying the population, the same press does not 
claim that no one listens to the broadcasts in Syria.34  Rather they argue that, according to 
the title of one editorial in Tishreen “Their voices do not enter my hearing” (aṣwatuhum 
la tadkhal samʿai): in other words, that the acts of listening, hearing, and believing are 
not the same thing.  In this essay, after describing a number of American efforts to 
influence Arab audiences, author Mousi As-Sayid closes by quoting a taxi driver, who 
states: "I listen to these frogs every day, and their words do not enter my ears."35 
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 The irony in this criticism of Radio Sawa goes beyond that implied by cries of 
“propaganda” coming from Syrian state-controlled “mobilization media”, to use William 
Rugh’s characterization.36  The bigger irony is that the assumption of citizens listening 
without hearing, participating in the broadcasts without being swayed or convinced by 
them, is a mirror image of the process described by Lisa Wedeen in her study of public 
performances of loyalty around the personality cult of Hafiz al-Asad.37  As Wedeen 
describes it, the goal of regime in propagating the Asad cult is not necessarily to inculcate 
belief or “legitimacy.”  Rather citizens are required to “act as if”, observing the public 
forms of loyal citizenship even in the face of state rhetoric which is patently 
unconvincing or ridiculous.  In this model, it is significant only that audiences perform 
the actions of listening, if not necessarily the mental functions of hearing.  
 
I detailed some of the anglophone criticism of Radio Sawa and Al Hurra in the 
introduction to this dissertation.  As previously stated, despite the fact that the large 
majority of the station’s broadcast day is devoted to music, there has been almost no 
discussion of the actual musical content of the station, beyond references to well-known 
pop stars in the Western press.  The following paragraph by Sam Hilmy, former director 
of the Near East, North Africa, and South Asia Division for the VOA, comprises one of 
most direct critiques of the musical content of the station: 
 
Pop is a major successful commercial enterprise that targets a wide 
youthful common denominator, but it alone cannot present the picture of 
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America which American public diplomacy is intended to present—that of 
a country with rich, multifaceted culture, revolutionary ideals, commercial 
vitality, history-making values of human rights and social justice, and 
standards of transparent government.  Nor is pop music what young Arab 
needs today to form a more enlightened view of their societies and the 
world, or to build a more participatory society firmly rooted in human 
values.  Pop does not attract potential future leaders or opinion makers.  It 
does not build credibility.38  
 
In contrast Radio Sawa’s supporters assert that listeners to the station, attracted by the 
music, stay to hear the news and are exposed to a more accurate view current events, and 
of the US and its policies in the region than is available anywhere else.  What none of 
Radio Sawa’s Arab or American critics have done is analyze the musical and non-news 
content of the station, the material which makes up the vast majority of the broadcast 
station.   
 
Content Analysis 
Since I first tuned in to Radio Sawa in Sana’a, Yemen, where I was studying 
Arabic in the summer of 2007, I have listened to hundreds of hours of broadcasts from 
the station, either over FM and AM broadcasts while in the Middle East, or via internet 
streams for each of the regional channels while in the US.  For the content analysis in this 
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chapter I catalogued a bit over 24 hours of Radio Sawa’s Levant broadcast, from January 
11-12, 2012.  While the contours of Sawa’s playlist have changed significantly over the 
period in which I have been listening, this sample is a representative selection of the 
current music and formatting of the station. 
During this period I logged 290 song plays and 246 nonmusical events, including 
station identification bumpers, newsbreaks, promos, and general interest segments.  In the 
sample, the station employed a playlist of 118 individual songs by 84 different artists or 
groups.  By means of extensive listening, cross-referencing with recordings of other 
stations, and scouring of the internet and my own collection of recordings, I was able to 
identify the vast majority of the songs in rotation on the station. 
The table below details the format of a typical hour of Radio Sawa.  Apart from a 
daily half-hour news show, the format is extremely consistent, with only occasional 







Arabic Song Hossam Jneid - "Rajaʿ Illy" 4m 
What's 
New?  
"What's New? (Shu fī Jadīd?) - Cinema" - Description of the 




Selena Gomez & The Scene -   "Love you like a love song" 3m15s 
Promo “For additonal information about Radio Sawa, visit 
RadioSawa.com” 
15s 
Arabic Song Iwan - "Adini Ganbak" 3m 
Arabic Song Darine Hadchiti  – “Ya Toqburni " 4m 
News “The World Now” - News Break 7m 
Arabic Song Fadel Shakir - "Allahu ‘Alam"  4m 
Station ID Radio Sawa Station ID 5s 
Western 
Song 
Rihanna - "We Found Love" 3m15s 
You and 
Your Health 
"Radio Sawa presents You and Your Heath"  - Information about 
Alzheimer's 
1m15s 
Arabic Song Joe Ashkar - "Sayerlo" 4m 
Wisdom of 
the Day 
"al-kalamu Sifet al-mutakalem" (Speech defines the speaker)   20s 
Arabic Song Wael Kfoury - Ma Tehky 5m 
Sawa Chat Q: "Do you think there will be peace in the Middle East in 10 
years?"  A1: "Maybe!" A2: Sadly no, violence increases 





Tinie Tempah Feat. Kelly Rowland - "Invincible" 3m10 
Station ID "Sawa Sawa Sawa!" 5s 
Arabic Song 30 second intro to a song, cut off by news break 30s 
News Headlines from the longer newsbreak earlier in the hour 1m30s 
Arabic Song Mohamed Hamaky Ft. Perry Mystique (rapping in English) - 
"Ahla Haga Fīki" 
3m 
Station ID "Sawa! Stay connected to everything new!" 10s 
Western 
Song 
Melanie C "Weak" 3m20 
Promo Al Hurra TV promo spot 30s 
Arabic Song Asmara - "Ash'ak" 4m40s 
Station ID "Hello, You are listening to Radio Sawa.  [I'm] Wael Jassar" 5s 
Arabic Song Wael Jassar  - "Mahma T'oulou" 3m30s 
 







To clarify this breakdown in terms of programming category for readers 
unfamiliar with current Lebanese pop, we can examine the following chart from the 
Office of the Inspector General’s 2010 review of the performance of the Middle East 
Broadcasting Networks. Aside from the fact that Table 4.2 describes the Levant stream of 
Radio Sawa and Table 4.3 the Iraq Stream, the main difference between the tables is that 
the OIG’s chart examines a somewhat unrepresentative period which includes a full ½ 
hour news broadcast. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Description of an hour of Radio Sawa Programming39 
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The station is extremely reliable in its timing and content, with two news breaks an hour 
plus a consistent mix each of the general interest segments Sawa Chat/What’s New?/You 
and Your Health/Wisdom of the Day.  Though dead air is the bane of all radio 
broadcasters, the station projects a rapid pace even compared to other stations, often 
cutting off the end of one song and using a station identification bumper to overlap with 
the next.   This large-scale rhythm, and the frequency and brevity of bumpers and 
promos, is probably what Norman Pattiz was referring to when he complained that most 
Arab radio sounded “pretty dull and pretty drab.”40  The underlying music bed rarely 
stops, though it does cut out one minute into the longer news breaks, a sonic signal that 
this news segment will last five minutes or more (inadvertently alerting listeners as to 
when to change the station if one prefers not to listen to the news).   
The overall tone of the station is greatly influenced by the non-musical 
programming elements, in addition to music and news, and I will thus begin with a 
description of these.   
 
Entertainment News/Promo Spots  
The most direct means by which Radio Sawa advances a consumerist ethos is 
through the inclusion of ad-like segments of entertainment and media news, entitled “Shu 
fī Jadīd?” (What’s New?) broadcast hourly in the categories of Cinema, DVD/Video, 
Music, and Computers and Video Games.  These segments consist of updates about 
newly released films, mentions of Oscar nominations and other entertainment news, and 
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alerts about new albums and games.  The segments are similar in length and style to paid 
ads on commercial radio, but they are presented as a service, helping listeners stay 
connected to what’s new.   
While many of the segments seem to line up with the imagined audience of the 
station, the products are not necessarily congruent with the musical style of the station or 
interests of the presumptive listeners.  Musically, the station occasionally often pushes 
albums by artists whose music would not be played on Radio Sawa’s top 40 format (I’ve 
heard spots describing albums from Neil Young, Black Sabbath, Joni Mitchell, and Paul 
Anka).  Depending on the products being advertised, some “Shu fī Jadīd” segments can 
seem downright absurd.  When listening with friends in Sana’a a few years ago I heard a 
spot advertising the release of MLB 2007, a new baseball video game - an odd thing to 
advertise in a country a where small minority do own personal computers, but no one 
plays baseball. 
 Returning to audience theory, it is not immediately clear how these spots should 
be characterized: are they the goods given to listeners to recruit them into becoming part 
of an audience-commodity, or the message conveyed by the customer (the US 
government) who purchases audience attention?  The companies who make the products 
are not paying for the advertising time.  These types of product spots do make sense 
however under the supposition that the purpose is not to sell the product, but to drive 









Among the defining programming features of Radio Sawa is a segment called 
“Sawa Chat”: “Sawa’s flagship interactive feature, broadcast hourly, providing the 
audience an opportunity to express opinions on political and social issues of interest to 
Arab youths in response to the question of the day.”41 Throughout the course of the 
broadcast day a question is repeated, and once or twice an hour a mix of people in “man 
on the street” style interviews give their opinions.  Questions for this segment vary from 
political and social (“Do you think there will be peace in the Middle East in ten 
years?”/“What do you think of women who work to support their families?”/”Do you 
think that some nationalities are smarter than others?”) to personal or consumer focused 
(“Do you feel scared when faced with a new matter?”/“Do you judge people based on the 
type of car they drive?”).  
 These questions and answers attempt to shape the ways in which listeners process 
both the news and daily lives.  Some, such as the question about the types of cars people 
drive, can seem quite patronizing.  However, the effect is not as simple as a reminder not 
to judge a book by its cover or blindly admire wealth.   Like many of the questions posed 
during “Sawa Chat” segments, the question is less about getting an answer than it is about 
putting the queried in a subject position amenable to American policies, or American 
style consumer capitalism.  “Do you judge people based on the type of car they drive?” 
places the listener in a consumer, and arguably American mental state through its very 
premise (everyone drives a car, and the kind of car you drive might say something about 
you).   
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 In addition to the question of the day, Sawa’s programmers control the responses 
broadcast on the station, and shape the discussion through these answers as well as the 
questions.  The most obvious editorial control evinced by the answers on “Sawa Chat” is 
the lack of religiosity relative to other call-in shows in Lebanon and Syria.  Whereas local 
shows are filled with religious justifications for and against any position one can think of, 
“Sawa Chat” is a largely secular feature.42  Whether this is because of some directive to 
minimize religious discourse, because of the large proportion of Lebanese Christian 
employees at Radio Sawa seeking and curating responses from a largely Muslim 
audience, or some other reason, is difficult to say.43 
The segments close with the tag-line “Sawa Chat – You talk, and we listen”, and 
although we know whom those pronouns are supposed to indicate, the real people being 
referred to are somewhat vague.  “You” are given no direction on how to participate in 
the “interactive feature,” only the direction to identify with a larger audience.  
Respondents in Sawa Chat segments reply in the local dialect of Arabic, depending on 
the various regional Sawa streams, so the audience knows very roughly where the 
answers are coming from, but is not directly instructed to call-in or participate.  In 
contrast to the chat and call-in features on private stations in the region, such as the call in 
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trivia program I described in chapter two, getting listeners to actively respond is not a 
priority.  
As for the “We” listening to the comments (all in Arabic of course) featured on 
the segment, the word certainly doesn’t refer to the people who fund Radio Sawa.  Given 
the fact that it is illegal under the Smith-Mundt Act for the US government to broadcast 
Radio Sawa inside its own borders, regular American citizens are not likely listening to 
these comments either.  The real audience for the comments is of course listening and 
talking to itself, with the form and content of that interaction mediated and controlled by 
the radio station. 
Music 
Sawa has a playlist consisting of approximately 65% Arabic language music (or 
Arabic with some English), and 30% English language, with the occasional lyric in 
Spanish, French, or Farsi.  In comparison to the local Syrian stations, this is higher than 
average, discounting the presence of the mostly English- language MIX FM.  The 
percentage is also higher than the 20% legal limit on foreign language songs for Syrian 
stations, though as we have discussed in previous chapters, this limit may be largely 
theoretical.  The uniformity of Radio Sawa’s playlist means that one can hear, almost 
without exception, the same number of Western songs spread out over any given hour, 
day or night.  This is a significant contrast to Syrian stations, which as I describe in 
Chapter 3, vary their playlist according to the time of day.  Those programming blocks on 
Syrian radio which do feature Western songs will usually play more per hour than Radio 
Sawa does, creating a higher density of foreign language songs during that period.  Thus, 





programming patterns, it plays both more Western music than most stations, and less 
Western music than many programs. 
As one would expect in the Levant stream, which is advertised as being broadcast 















Other Arab Countries 
3% 
 
Table 4.4: Playlist Breakdown by Artist Country of Origin (Based my analysis of the 
January 2012 sample.)44 
 
Though the other regional streams are not as heavily weighted towards Lebanese singers 
(Radio Sawa Egypt features a significantly higher percentage of Egyptian, for example),  
Lebanon is one of the two the largest exporters of pop stars in the Arab world, and music 
from Lebanon features prominently on all of Radio Sawa’s streams. 
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 As Table 4.4 shows, music made by Americans only accounts for 17% of Sawa’s 
total playtime.  To be sure, the global market for English-language pop music is so 
integrated today that identifying the American artists within an English-language playlist 
is a task that would be impossible for most native English speakers, much less native 
Arabic speakers.   As such, it is difficult to detail the extent to which a playlist sounds 
particularly American without examining one area and group of listeners in detail, and as 
I argue elsewhere, the extent to which individual songs register as foreign depends on the 
extent to which they are able to be interpolated into local programming categories (this 
process will be addressed later in this chapter.)  Certain musical features such as rap 
vocality might be associated with the US, but these types of musical signifiers can be 
misleading, and in fact the majority of the rapping played during the sample period was 
by non-Americans.  However, the 17% figure does illustrate the extent to which the goal 
of broadcasting identifiably American music and musical forms, central to earlier 
iterations of American musical diplomacy, has been largely abandoned by Radio Sawa.  
In fact, in almost no market that Radio Sawa operates is the station the largest purveyor 
of American music.  Listeners who are specifically drawn to American or Western music 
can choose from stations geared mostly towards Western music such as NRJ Radio in 
Lebanon, Mix FM in Syria, Nile Radio in Egypt, and Beat FM in Jordan, or stations that 
play a mix of Arabic and Western music, like Radio Fann in Syria.45 
In typical CHR/Top 40 pop radio format, the station is divided between a set of 
high-rotation songs, repeated about once every four hours around the clock, a tier of 
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middle-rotation songs, and a “tail” of less frequently played songs.  The dozen songs in 
highest rotation during the sample period are an equal mix or Western and Arabic, while 
the mid-tier and tail rotations are progressively more Arabic-focused. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Language Percentage by Song Frequency (Based my analysis of the January 
2012 sample.) 
 
All of the high-rotation English language songs were new releases currently 
charting in the US, Europe, or Australia, and out of the complete English playlist, almost 
two-thirds were new releases from the past year, with the other one-third were songs 
released between 2005 and 2012.   
This finding confirms the descriptions applied by the OIG report in Table 4.3 
(page 254), where the Arabic playlist includes “Gold”, “Current Hit”, and “Current 
Super-hit[s]”, the Western songs come exclusively from the “Current Super-hit” 
category.  This complete dedication to new songs, at least in the English- language 



















last few years.  When the station first began broadcasting in 2002, and even when I began 
listening to the station casually in first time in 2007, Sawa programmed a high number of 
Western songs from previous decades, especially the 1980s ballads which are popular on 
local stations.  In addition to moving its playlist to newer songs and a presumably 
younger audience, the shift towards an entirely new English-language playlist has 
reduced the number of instances when an average listener would be able to identify a 
song definitively as American.   
The Arabic-language playlist is similarly focused on the new if to a lesser extent, 
and when Sawa plays songs by long-popular artists such as Amr Diab or Najwa Karam, 
the focus is on their more recent recordings.  One does hear older songs in the Arabic 
playlist, however, usually in the form of new recordings of older songs, such as Dina 
Hayek’s recording of “Ṭal as-Sahir” with Tony Hanna, a dabke artist who first achieved 
fame in the 1970s. 






Western Performer Song 
Arabic 
Performer Song 
Lady Gaga Marry the Night Melhem Zein Kabad Bad 
Madonna ft. Nicki 
Minaj/MIA 
Gimme All Your 
Love 
Tamer Hosny ft. 
Shaggy Smile 
Loick Eissan  Me Without You Hani Shakir Ahlā a-Dhikriyyāt 
Selena Gomez & the 
Scene 
Love You like a Love 
Song Mohamed Kelany  ’Albī ala Eidī 
Rihanna ft. Calvin 
Harris We Found Love Marwan Khoury Bi 'Ashq Ruhak 
Shakira Je l'Aime a Mourir Pascal Mesh'alani  Am Tahaddadnī 
 
Table 4.5: Twelve songs in the high-rotation “Superhit” category on Radio Sawa 
 
Rather than attempt a song-level analysis of the station however, it is more useful to 
employ the taxonomy discussed in Chapter 3 to form a rough characterization of the 






Figure 4.4: Graphic Representation of Radio Sawa’s Levant playlist 
Certain musical features are solidly correlated with the language of the lyrics.  
Orchestration is the most obvious of these, with the Arabic songs relying heavily on the 
string orchestra as well as traditional Arabic instruments the ney, mizmar, arghul, ‘ud, 
and qanun, or as often, synthesized electronic versions of these instruments.  The use of a 
piano or Spanish style guitar is also extremely common, especially in introductions to 
pieces.  The Arabic songs on Sawa also commonly feature instrumental breaks and solos 
of 30-40 seconds, in contrast the Western songs which almost never let that much time 
pass without vocals present.   
The Arabic language songs on Sawa are generally longer than the English-
language songs.  Though often cut down from the full length found on albums or in full 
video clips, the Arabic songs still clock in at nearly four minutes on average, versus about 





averages of music broadcasts in the Middle East, this is on the short end.   A station like 
Arabesque FM in Syria might fill up a block of romantic music with songs clocking in at 
around eight minutes each, while stations that focus on older ṭarab styles and stars like 
Umm Kulthum, Muḥammad   Abd al-Wahāb, or ʿ Abd al-Ḥalim Ḥāfiẓ, frequently play 
single records lasting upwards of half an hour.  Even the songs on other purely pop 
stations tend on average a bit longer than Radio Sawa.   
 As mentioned above, although I argue that Radio Sawa is organized around a 
theory of music as a medium of exchange as opposed to one in which its value is 
primarily communicative, that doesn’t mean that listeners necessarily perceive these 
musical selections as bereft of meaning.  With that in mind, I want to provide a brief 
interpretation of Sawa’s playlist and show how that might in fact reinforce rather than 
detract from the overall impression of music as commodity.  
 
Gender 
 One noticeable difference between the English and Arabic language playlists 
which becomes clear through a statistical breakdown is the difference in gender 
composition between the two sets of songs.  For the Arabic playlist, 63% of songs were 
performed by men, 30% of songs were performed by women, and approximately 7% 
were duets.  Many songs with a single featured singer also included a backup chorus, 
which can be of either gender.  This includes women singers backed up by a chorus of 
men, a combination which is extremely rare in Anglophone pop music.  The basic gender 





58% female to 28% male singers, and the rest made up of combinations of men and 
women.  
With this divergence in the gender composition of its musical broadcast, Radio 
Sawa conveys a version of Western pop music that is mostly woman-focused, in direct 
contrast to a Middle Eastern pop world which is more heavily male-centered (an outcome 
that might be surprising to anyone familiar with the focus on female pop stars and their 
videos in the Arabic and Anglophone press).  The breakdown by performer’s gender is 
not the extent of the differentiation in gender information presented by the selection of 
songs; the stylistic content of the music also points to a differentiation in gender norms in 
the Arabic and Anglophone samples. 
The English- language playlist is typified by performance techniques with specific 
gendered associations.  Specifically, the majority of male performers in the sample 
employed either rapping or falsetto, both vocal technique with specific kinds of gendered 
associations.  Despite the presence of women MCs in hip hop from the first days of the 
culture’s inception, “rapping” as a form of vocal production in the mass media is 
typically gendered as a masculine practice.  On Radio Sawa, and in Anglophone pop 
music in general, on often hears the combination of a female singer, employing an R’n’B 
vocal style, paired with a male rapper.46   
The second technique employed by a large number of male singers in the 
Anglophone playlist is falsetto.   This is a technique which is explicitly male, in that the 
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difference between head voice and chest voice is typically much more pronounced for 
men than for women (at least in Western vocal culture), for whom the term falsetto isn’t 
normally applied.  Despite its maleness, it is also a technique that allows access to a range 
of performance associated with femininity.  Thus Western singers who ascend into their 
head voice do not simply continue in the same vocal style of their chest voice in a higher 
register, rather they often mark the shift by increasing the level of ornamentation or 
melisma, or by dropping into a softer, less aggressive style. 
An example of this comes in the song “Me Without You” by Loick Essien, one of 
the “Current Superhits” on Sawa during the sample period.  For most of the song, when 
Essien moves into the high register, such as the bombastic “Tryin’a be the me without 
you, It’s like driving in a car with no wheels…” he remains in chest voice belting out a 
mostly syllabic chorus.  The few moments in the song when he moves to a falsetto are 
points of increased melisma and moderated dynamic.  This isn’t a direct invocation of 
femininity, but it does separate head from chest voice in terms of vocal performance 
practice.  The bifurcation of Anglophone vocality into gender-associated performance 
styles extends to the relatively infrequent ‘rock’ songs which appear on Radio Sawa.  47   
When Radio Sawa plays a song by a band playing rock instruments, as opposed to a solo 
singer with anonymous backing musicians, the lead vocalist of that band is 
disproportionally likely to be male.48 
In a contrast to the gender associated vocal practices in the English- language 
sample, in the Arabic sample, the singing styles performed by men and women are 
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largely similar.  That is, the general singing style is melismatic, frequently includes 
melodic sequences, and utilizes cry-breaks, vocal turns and ornaments, and timbral 
signifiers to convey intense emotion.  The difference in tessitura between male and 
female singers, so strongly naturalized in the West, is less significant in this sample.  
While men tend to sing in a lower range than women, there are few extreme highs or 
lows, and little “falsetto” is employed as such.  That is, while male singers certainly move 
into their upper registers frequently, this isn’t marked by the same shift in sound and 
melodic style which so often accompanies the falsetto in Anglophone pop.  This 
particular European history of falsetto as a performance practice developed by men 
performing as female characters in opera does not exist in the Arab performance context. 
  Certain linguistic traits in song lyrics, such as the standard practice of both male 
and female singers using the masculine conjugations,  ḥabībī (my darling) rather than the 
feminine form ḥabībiti, also tend to reinforce the impression that vocal practices of men 
and women (if not necessarily the social consequences of the act of singing) are more 
similar than different.49 But this isn’t to say that the role of male singer and female singer 
are interchangeable.  On the contrary, there are profoundly different expectations placed 
on men and women within both traditional performance and the pop industry, and the 
pressures and incentives involved in musical and televised self-presentation are entirely 
different for women than men.  This dichotomy is not just present in videos, interview, 
and live performances, it is also played out in areas outside of visual presentation, such as 
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song topics and lyrics.  It would for example, be difficult to picture a male star singing 
Haifa Wehbe’s “Bous al wawa” (Kiss the Boo-boo) or Nancy ‘Ajram’s songs for 
children.  Both of these examples come from a subgenre of songs either directed to 
children, or ostensibly directed towards children with a sexualized presentation revealing 
an adult audience.  This subgenre is, I would argue, based to a large extent on the 
simultaneous pressures encouraging women in the Arabic pop industry to present both as 
sexual objects and as respectable family women. 
 
Nevertheless, women are fundamental to the understanding of mass-mediated 
Arabic song to an extent which perhaps belies the ratio of male stars to female ones.  On 
the one hand, technologies of mass media music distribution allowed the possibility of 
women’s public performance without the same level of public criticism on religious 
grounds.  Virginia Danielson describes the impact on women singers in Egypt: 
 
The media had a profound effect on the careers of women singers.  
Whereas formerly their audiences had been restricted primarily to other 
women, with the advent of recoding and radio, they could now sing to 
everybody, which greatly enlarged their audiences, not to mention their 
incomes.  They could also do so without setting foot in the more 
disreputable venues of public entertainment.50 
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Simultaneously, the development of Arabic mass-mediated song is to a large extent the 
story of women, and the individual voices heard most often in Syria and the Arab world 
on both historical and contemporary radio belong to women. 
 
 As Racy has stated in regards to ṭarab performance: 
 
Notwithstanding the historical centrality of the male perspective and the 
tensions that have surrounded female artistry, the ṭarab culture grants 
women qualitative importance in an area considered quintessential to 
affective ṭarab-making, namely singing.51 
 
Perhaps because of the persistent reality that women must in many (but not all) cases 
defy gender expectations and societal pressures in order to perform in public, and in 
doing so enter into a still male-dominated public space, general differences between men 
and women’s singing styles are much smaller in Arabic popular than in many Western 
styles.  Men and women who want to engage with the twentieth century canon of Arabic 
vocal performance sing many of the same songs, often without even the need to change 
the gender in the lyrics, and without the assumption of gender-crossing that occurs in the 
West when a man performs a song made famous by a woman. 
Within the Radio Sawa playlist, a listener is presented with a division of gender 
roles in the English language musical aesthetic that is very different from one presented 
within the Arabic language one.  What’s interesting isn’t necessarily that the gender roles 
                                                 
51
 A.J. Racy, Making Music in the Arab World: The Culture and Artistry of Ṭarab, (Cambridge University 





assigned in Arab and Western popular musics diverg; it is what those contrasting gender 
roles say about pop songs as labor.  By creating a sonic definition of pop singing that 
involves specialized, gendered vocal techniques, I would suggest that the English 
language playlist on Radio Sawa has the potential to imply a musical division of labor 
between varieties of vocal practice that isn’t present in the same way in Arabic song, 
where Racy has pointed out, vocal production and music is understood as an extension of 
the natural properties of speech.52 This division of labor in Anglophone song, wherein a 
performer engages in musical work precisely by differentiating pop singing from regular 
vocalization, carries with it the format of a musical consumer economy: musical labor is 
produced by specialists in order to be consumed by audiences. 
This hermeneutic for interpreting the music on Radio Sawa as an expression of a 
consumerist relationship to music should not be read as an as assertion that the Arabic 
music industry is not highly consumerist, or is not generally viewed as such.  Criticisms 
of the commercial focus of the Arabic music are an ever-present aspect of the discourse 
about music industry, generally focused around music video clips and televised song 
contests.  These critiques often explicitly link consumerism with gender and sexuality, as 
in the following passage from Egyptian literature scholar Abdel-Wahab Elmessiri’s essay 
“Ruby and the Checkered Heart”: 
It is a well-known fact that escalating libidinal voracity is a function of 
consumerism…The viewer is implicitly encouraged to pursue individual 
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pleasures through increased consumption – the unabashed pursuit of 
narrow self-interest through purchase.53 
 
Other criticisms of the televised music industry consider the music an entirely peripheral 
element of the economic process, as with the Syrian singer who describes singing contest 
shows as “Machines for attracting SMS messages.”54  
 
Much of the commentary on Radio Sawa has described it as the logical 
culmination of a certain history of music in American international broadcasting, an 
idealistic venture born out of a belief in music’s power to communicate and connect.  A 
closer listen reveals a theory of music predicated not on the idea that it communicates 
American values or brings listeners closer to some idea of America, but rather on the 
notion that music is a commodity, traded to Arab listeners in the first step of the audience 
manufacture process.   
This process of musical audience manufacture illustrates the concept of 
“metrology,” as defined by Bruno Latour: 
 
Metrology is the name of this gigantic enterprise to make of the outside a 
world inside which facts and machines can survive.  Termites build their 
obscure galleries with a mixture of mud and their own droppings; 
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scientists build their enlightened networks by giving the outside the same 
paper form as that of their instruments inside.  In both cases the result is 
the same: they can travel very far without ever leaving home.55 
 
What I hear with Radio Sawa is music as a metrological force, music creating the world 
within which music can make sense as a commodity, and within which listeners can be 
made into an audience for American political messages.  The question of the efficacy of 
these broadcasts in “moving the needle” of Arab public opinion towards the US is 
somewhat separate from this discussion.  However, it seems worthwhile to note that 
while the idea of turning listeners into consumers to inoculate them against communism 
might have made sense in the context of the Cold War, there is no particular reason to 
believe that being a consumer of American products in 2012 Baghdad, for example, 
makes one any more inclined to view American policy positively.  On the contrary, as 
Timothy Mitchell argues in “McJihad: Islam in the US Global Order”, many groups on 
the other side of the ‘Global War on Terror’ have origins precisely in encounters with the 
particular deficiencies and the illogic of American capitalism in the Middle East.56  
 In Radio Sawa’s daily segment Hikmat al-Youm (“Wisdom of the Day”), listeners 
are presented with a short saying or inspirational quotation from writers and celebrities 
such as Khalil Gibran, Magic Johnson or Henry David Thoreau.  On the day examined in 
this chapter, the particular bit of wisdom was an Arabic saying “al-kalāmu ṣifat al-
mutakkallim” (“Speech defines the speaker”).  While this concept might be embraced by 
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Sawa’s broadcasters for the news they broadcast, when it comes to music, Radio Sawa’s 
musical communication is meant to say little about the speaker.   Rather, we might say 
that al-mūsīqā şifat al-mustami  īn - music defines the audience.  
However, while broadcasters may engage in attempts to define their audiences, 
listeners also define the music through how they listen. The next section of this chapter 
describes some of the specific ways in which Western music, and in particular American 
music and the music played by Radio Sawa, is integrated into Syrian radio categories.   
 
Western Songs and Arabic Radio Taxonomies 
I have argued that foreign music is often understood in the context of Syrian radio 
as part of local categories for radio listening.  As I discuss in Chapter 3, national origin 
can be a significant part of the way in which music is understood, but even for songs in 
language other than Arabic, the ‘foreignness’ or ‘Westernness’ of a song is not a constant 
determined by the biography of the performer or the location of its production.  Rather 
the extent to which the playlist of a station sounds foreign, or in the case of Radio Sawa 
sounds ‘American’ depends not on the relative prevalence of foreign or American songs 
in its playlist, but rather on the prevalence of music that cannot easily be fit into 
established categories of Syrian radio listening.  How then, does American music, and 
specifically the music played on the US-backed Radio Sawa, fit in with this musical 
taxonomy?  I would argue that the most basic way in which Western songs are 
interpreted within the Syrian radioscape is by fitting into one of the musical and 





One of the significant ways is by conforming to some of the aesthetic and stylistic 
standards of these categories.  A song that has English or French lyrics, but which also 
has some musical aspects which can be fit into one of these existing categories, is in 
some ways considered foreign, but not necessarily other.  In Arabic one might say 
ajnabbi but not ujnib - foreign, but not to be dismissed or pushed away.  In his book 
Hybridity or the Cultural Logic of Globalization, Marwan Kraidy describes this 
phenomenon in television genres in Lebanon and the ways in which “young Maronite 
viewers placed Mexican telenovelas within the “Arab” generic category” based on genre 
specifications like story structure, acting style, and the centrality of family relationships 
in plots, despite the fact that these programs were objectively foreign.57  Admittedly, the 
population Kraidy was studying has a complicated relationship with the idea of 
“arabness” where “Arab” is sometimes a descriptor of the self and sometime an other.  
However, I would argue that within the Syrian radioscape all categories consist, to some 
extent, of these kinds of combinations of authenticity and hybridity. 
 
  An similar process to the association of Latin American telenovelas with Arab 
musalsalāt happens with Western music on Arabic radio.  Thus a song like Celine Dion’s 
My Heart Will Go On is now considered fully rūmānsī, even to the point of being 
covered in Syrian colloquial Arabic.  After hearing the Syrian version of the song, I asked 
one aquaintance who had previosuly mentioned to me that he liked Celine Dion’s 
recording if he had heard it sung in Arabic, and if so what he thought of the Arabic 
version.  His reply “Why would we need that?  We have Celine Dion’s recording?” 
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illustrates the condition of a song which has been fully interpolated into a local musical 
framework.  It might have come from another country, and be in a language that one 
doesn’t fully understand, but it is familiar enough and fits well enough into an established 
listening pattern, that attempts to Arabize the song are superfluous. 
 Conversely, Western genre norms for popular music do not necessarily stand once 
a song enters the Syrian radioscape.  Western listeners to Arab media often hear 
combinations and juxtapositions of Western music which can sound odd to our ears, and 
assume that these juxtapositions originate from an unsophisticated understanding of 
Western genre or a lack of knowledge of Western music.  In fact, these juxtapositions can 
become perfectly understandable when heard within the context of locally relevant 
musical categories, rather than Western genre expectations.  In the following section I 
will discuss a few of the basic musical parameters (of course there are social parameters 
as well) for genre construction that we are all familiar with from American pop music 
and address how they can end up with a different valence within the context of Syrian 
Radio.   
In the context scholarly taxonomies of popular music, Fabian Holt has argued that 
stylistic analysis of musical qualities is insufficient to the task of illuminating the criteria 
by which music genres are created and understood:  
 
 A musicological method of defining music is the simple style analysis that 
registers musical qualities in parameters such as form, harmony and so on.  
This is useful for the purpose of giving technical descriptions of some aspects 





simple style analysis confines itself to a rather limited range of aspects and 
has little conceptual space for psychological, aesthetic, and social aspects.58 
 
While acknowledging the limitations of stylistic analysis divorced from a context of 
social practices and values, the scholarship on mass-mediated Arabic popular music 
presents something of the opposite problem.  Due to the dominance of music video 
channels and televised song contests, and the significance of the various political and 
religious battles over depictions of women and women’s bodies on television, the 
discourse around mass-mediated pop music has tended to focus overwhelmingly on these 
visual issues in way which can sometimes obscure the differences existing within even 
the ‘poppiest’ of pop musics.  As scholars of popular music like Ellie Hisama have 
shown, musical analyses addressing the specific sonic characteristics of popular music 
need not be divorced from the race, gender, class, and power issues embedded in the 
discourses and reception of popular music.  On the contrary, these issues are socially 
instantiated and reproduced in music at the sonic level, in addition to the discursive 
level.59 
In the following pages, I will describe some of the musical elements that allow 
Western pop music to appear under an entirely different set of genre expectations and not 
seem out of place: timbre, rhythm, lyrics, song structure and melodic contour, and the 
“Spanish Tinge” in Arabic popular music.  
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Within American pop music, timbre and orchestration are probably the most 
significant ways in which listeners identify musical genre and historical period.60  Other 
factors such as song form, tempos, melodic contour etc. may vary a great deal between 
genres or specific songs, but I would argue that they don’t have the same periodizing 
function within popular music.  Timbre, however, allows radio listeners in the US to 
place a song with a remarkable degree of specificity and accuracy. To give a few 
examples from American pop radio, the guitar tremolo of Dick Dale’s “Miserlou” (1963), 
the combination of guitar and synth patch on Tears for Fears’ “Everybody Wants to Rule 
the World” (1985), or the post-Eddie Veddar vocal timbre of Creed’s “With Arms Wide 
Open” (2001), are all immediately identifiable to certain American radio listeners as 
coming from very specific times and sets of genre associations, such that we don’t need 
any prior familiarity with the individual songs in order to correctly identify when they 
were recorded, and what kind of station or program might play them.  These timbre cues 
aren’t sufficient to describe a genre, but they are often enough to signify a genre, and the 
larger set of associated musical and social ideas around it.  While timbre is also 
significant to genre and temporal differentiation in Syria, Syrian listeners tend to have 
different timbre expectations.   
One common way which the timbral expectations of American and Syria listeners 
differ is in responses to the synthesizer, or org as it is often referred to in Arabic.  To take 
one example out of many, Nancy Ajram’s 2003 hit “Saḥr ‘Uyūnu” begins with an org 
figure which, to someone who grew up in the US in the 1980s, immediately signals the 
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middle years of that decade.61  Until the recent wave of 80s nostalgia in American pop 
culture, the only way that one would hear that timbre on American radio would have been 
in the context of an explicitly 80s themed playlist, though this type of synthesizers timbre 
is widespread in both pan-Arab shabābī music and various types of shaʿbī, more locally 
identified musics.  Describing any timbre is inherently difficult without resorting to 
references or analogies.  This particular song serves as a useful example however, as in 
addition to the synth tone, the actual line played by the org is reminiscent, at least to my 
ears, of a particular kind of keyboard playing popular in the 1980s, and thus a 
transcription might do a bit to imply the timbre.  
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Figure 4.5: Transcription of org introduction to Nancy Ajram’s “Saḥr ‘Uyūnu” 
 
Musicians don’t use these timbres because they are 25 years behind in some 
Western teleology of the keyboard, rather there are specific reasons that these synth 
timbres have remained popular.  As Anne Rasmussen has described in her work with 
Arab-American musicians, synthesizers have become remarkably prevalent in the live 





ability to alter pitches to conform to the quarter-tones of maqāmāt.62  The org was 
originally popularized in Egypt by Hany Shenuda in the context of a series of Arabic-
Western bands, and the ability of the instrument to play both Western associated music 
and Arabic-associated music (maqāmāt with quarter-tones) has been central to the 
popularization of the instrument.63  
The prevalence of these particular synthesizer timbres on the radio is not limited 
to the Arabic-language playlist.  Western music which contains these timbres, often 
meaning songs from the “long 80s” as I discuss in the previous chapter, forms a 
disproportionate percentage of the total Western playlist on Syrian radio.  English 
language songs also form a significant portion of the hādi   (calm) portions of the playlist 
on Version FM.  Here however, they are mixed in with Arabic and Western songs from a 
variety of time periods, with a bias on the Arabic side for more recent songs.  One thus 
hears songs grouped together on Syrian radio in ways which are baffling to western ears, 
but make perfect sense given this taxonomy.  The result of this contrasting set of timbre 
expectations is that Western songs from decades ago often appear in blocks of new 
shabābī (youth-oriented) music, or hādi  music with sonic markers that to Western ears 
would place them in an 80s nostalgic radio format.  
As in much of the world, the synthesizer is also valued for its ability to emulate 
other instruments.  In addition to providing for a cheap substitute for a variety of 
instruments in live performance situations, this capability is especially valuable in 
recording television and radio theme music on a low budget.  Television and radio music 
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is especially important in Syria, which produces many of the popular soap operas viewed 
across the Arab World, and maintains a strong tradition of radio drama, especially during 
Ramadan.  The theme music and underscoring for these programs often is often based on 
synth string patches, though in contrast to much television scoring in the US, relatively 
little attempt is made to disguise the “synth- i-ness” the sounds. 
An example which combines of the prevalence of Western music from the 1980s 
and electronic timbres which dominate television and radio theme music, as well as the 
type of thing which tends come across as absurd to American ears, can be heared in the 
opening music to a program on Syrian state radio (Ṣawt al-Shabāb division) in which 
legal experts explain the meanings of new legal decrees.  As one listens to the 
introduction to the program, and the welcome for the day’s expert, the following melody 
underscores the talk. 
 
 
Figure 4.6:   “Like a Virgin”, played on an electric keyboard as the underscoring for the 






The prevelance of music from this period is not restricted to the predominantly 
Arabophone stations.  As one DJ for MIX FM, the largely Anglophone Syrian pop station 
put it: “This is the golden age of pop music.”64 
To make this discussion  of timbre more complicated, readers who pay attention 
to popular radio in the US, or have seen the film Drive, will have noticed that 80s synth 
sounds have made a big come-back in Western pop music in 2011 and 2012.  Thus to 
some extent American popular music has come around recently to a more Levantine 
timbral aesthetic.65   
Rhythm 
One of the most contested but fluid distinctions in Arab popular music is between 
shabābī youth pop music, and shaʿbī music which maintains a closer relationship to folk 
dance genres (Syria this means primarily dabke and its relatives.) These two categories 
exist on a continuum where a variety of factors including instrumentation, lyric style, and 
melody can all shift a song one way or the other, but one common distinction is rhythmic, 
with a straighter European style dance beat associated with shabābī, and the more 
syncopated patterns of dabke dance forms connecting a song with a “baladī” or rural, 
country feeling, specific to the Levant. 
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 While the modern mass-mediated dabke or shaʿbī music distributed on radio and 
recordings can be made entirely with electronic instruments, rhythm still helps 
distinguish youth pop from folk.  To illustrate this difference, we can examine two 
versions of a dabke song, “Ṭal as-Sahir”, the first recorded by Tony Hanna in the 1970s, 
and the recent, more shabābī pop version recorded by Hanna and Dina Hayek, latter of 
which was in high rotation on Radio Sawa during the sample period.  Here is a 
transcription of the basic rhythm which underscores the verse of the earlier recording. 
 
  
Figure 4.7: Masmūdī rhythm in Tony Hanna’s “Ṭal as-Sahir” 
 
This particular rhythm is an extremely common, baladi rhythm called masmūdī saghīr.66  
In contrast, the following transcription represents the synthesizer introduction and basic 
rhythm underneath the verses of Hayek and Hanna’s more recent recording of the song. 
 
Figure 4.8:  Straight eighth-note rhythm from the introduction to Hayek and Hanna’s “Ṭāl 
as-Sahir” (2011) 
 
To generalize broadly, the syncopated dabke rhythm dominates the more shaʿbī early 
recording versus straight 8ths over a more subtle allusion to the dabke rhythm that 
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informs the latter, more shabābī recording.  The use of more syncopated or elaborate 
īqāʿāt moves a song further down along the shaʿbī-shabābī spectrum towards the shaʿbī 
side, and is this associated with more authentically Arab folk styles. 
According to Silverstein, the most common rhythmic pattern in Syrian dabke is 
nawari.67   Arabic rhythmic patterns are usually described in terms of bass strokes (dum) 
and treble strokes (tak), and thus the basic eight-beat construction of nawari would be 
depicted [tD-t D-t-].   
She states: 
 “In performance practice, the first tak is rarely p1ayed and the first dum is 
emphasized as an offbeat. Nawari most often occurs as a repeating 4-bar 
phrase. [-D--D-t-] [-D--D-t-] [-D--D-t-] [-DDDD-t-].”68 
 
In contrast, much mass-mediated music emphasizes a strong downbeat, [DD-t D-t-] or 
[Dt-t-D-t-]  Although these are two of the most common iqa’at in all sorts of dabke, they 
are particularly common in more shabābī Arab pop, as the 8 beat figures integrate easily 
with Western pop elements.69  In many mass-mediated pop songs, as in more shaʿbī 
dabke performances, the use of these iqa’at varies throughout the course of a single song.  
In general, I would argue that the use of more syncopated rhythmic forms, without the 
underlying straight-eighth pulse which characterizes shabābī dance tunes, is indicative of 
a performance which would be considered further along the shaʿbī end of the shabābī-
shaʿbī spectrum.  
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Two recent examples of this rhythmic signification being employed by singers 
with backgrounds in the televised popular song come from Nassif Zaytoun and 
Mohammed Daqdouq.  Daqdouq, was a contestant on Star Academy in 2008, and Nassif 
Zeytoun was the first Syrian winner on the program in 2010. 
 Both of these songs employ highly syncopated rhythms which at certain points leave a 
great deal of musical space between beats, a style which differentiates them from more 
shabābī songs which tend to fill in the meter with continuous eighth-notes even when 
employing or alluding to shaʿbī rhythmic iqā’āt.  
 
    





 These examples are not the shaʿbī music that would generally be performed live 
at weddings and feasts, and these songs do appear on Syrian radio, as opposed to existing 
primarily in the physical distribution networks of cassettes and cds.  However, they do 
hold a similar kind of position in the musical life of Damascus.  One would hear these 
songs in a servīs, coming from the cab of a truck, or played by a group of young men, but 
probably not in an upscale café or shop, where the dominant programming category is 
more likely to be hadi   or rūmānsi songs.  In the case of Zeytoun and Daqdouq, there is 
probably a level of career calculation in releasing music in this style.  While the shabābī 
and  rūmānsi pop songs allowed them to succeed in pan-Arab singing contests, in order to 
make money playing Syrian weddings, where big stars can command sizeable fees, one 
needs to demonstrate the ability to make music to which people can dabke. 
 Naturally, there aren’t many foreign or American songs which fit into the 
“shaʿbī” or folk category, but this type of rhythmic distinction between folk or regionally 
affiliated pop music does have significance for the ways in which American music enters 
this taxonomy.  When it comes to hip hop and hip hop influenced pop music, for 
example, one often hears rapping vocalities on both Radio Sawa and on local Syrian and 
Lebanese radio.  However, songs which include rapping over a straight-4 dance beat 
enter the shabābī or youth category more easily.  Conversely, hip hop with a more 






Figure 4.10: Rhythmic transcription from Lil Wayne’s “Up and Way”, produced by 
Timbaland 
Hip hop fans still listen to this type of music, but not fitting into the general conventions 
of shabābī, it does not appear as often on regular pop radio, and remains more foreign.70   
LYRICS 
Another aspect of Western songs which has a significant impact for how they are 
interpolated into Syrian radio is lyrical content, and not just for listeners who speak 
English.  While the number of English speakers is growing rapidly as the elite send their 
children to foreign universities, and the middle-class graduates more and more University 
students from English-intensive fields, English language knowledge is much lower in 
Syria than in its immediate neighbors Lebanon and Jordan.71  Still, most  Syrians know at 
least a few words of English; if one knows even a few words of English, these are likely 
to include common love song staples like Love, Heart, Baby, Eyes, Fire, in the same way 
that anyone who has listened to a few Arabic pop songs can recognize ya Habībī, Albī, 
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‘Umrī, or Najm hayyātī.  Ballads in particular tend to have slower, more understandable 
lyrics, which help with the process of picking out occasional words, and identifying them 
with romance.  The following figure takes a love song by Brian Adams and obscures all 
but the most common words. 
 
   
Figure 4.11:  The lyrics from Brian Adams’ “Everything I Do” as heard by a listener with 
limited English. 
One could argue that for many songs, even native English speakers consciously pick out 
only a percentage of lyrics. While for certain highly educated audiences and certain 
songs, the specifc lyrics are central to their experience of the song (at a nightclub in 
Damascus I once witnessed a group of thirty wealthy young Syrians singing along with 
REM’s “Losing My Religion”) but for other audiences, a few recognizably romantic 
words are enough to help categorize a song as rūmānsi, even for listeners with barely any 






Orchestration and Melodic Contour    
Two other aspects of Western songs which tend to ease their integration into the 
rūmānsī or hādi   category are melodic contour and orchestrational style, especially when 
they combine in the romantic “power ballad” style associated with singers like Celine 
Dion and Whitney Houston.  A slow piano introduction is for example is standard fare on 
either an Arabic or Western ballad on Syrian radio.  Most Arabic pop arrangements have 
at least a foot in the world of chordal, functional harmony, but many listeners have a 
relationship with melody that includes maqam-based models of musical construction. 
This includes expectation of longer phrase lengths, an emphasis on melodic variation, and 
and a familiarity with parsing long, linear melodies.72  
 In particular, foreign ballads that heavily feature repeated contours and melodic 
sequences tend to be featured prominantly on Syrian radio.   For example, consider the 
first phrase of Elissa’s “  A Bālī Ḥabībī”: 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Elissa “  A Bālī Ḥabībī” first phrase 
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The melody begins with two short repeated gestures (“‘a bālī ḥabībī” and “aghamrak ma 
atrakak”), built on stepwise motion.   An elaboration of the second  gesture concludes the 
phrase.    The Western ballads in high rotation on Syrian radio similarly tend to be based 
on repeated melodic gestures and stepwise motion.    
 
“Spanish Tinge” 
 In his article “Some Meanings of the Spanish Tinge in Contemporary Egyptian 
Music” Michael Frishkopf explores the role of Latin musical elements in Egyptian pop 
form the 1990s.73  He employs an ethnohistorical methodology to describe some of the 
ways in which fans of Egyptian popular music conceive of this Latin musical influence.  
Through discussions with Egyptian listeners, he addresses a number of possible 
explanations for the “Spanish Tinge” in Egyptian and pan-Arab pop music; of those 
explanations, several are particularly relevant to the Syrian context. 
The first is the historical relationship between Syria and al-Andalus (medieval 
Islamic Spain).  Frishkopf addresses the “Andalusian argument” in his article, noting the 
historical connections with Arab culture, and stating that this interlocutors “hear the ‘ud 
in the guitar, flamenco’s ‘ole’ as a corruption of ‘Allah’.”74  The music-historical 
connection between Syria and al-Andalus is even more fundamental than the Egyptian 
one.  As Jonathan Shannon has noted, the quintessentially Aleppine muwashshah is of 
probably Andalusian origin, and al-Andalus maintains a powerful presence in the minds 
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of Syrians musicians and listeners.75  This is true for popular as well as art music, and 
discussions of Spanish or Latin American music in Syria often refer to Al-Andalus. 
A second, more historically recent avenue for the transmission of the “Spanish 
Tinge” (one not discussed by Frishkopf) is the huge Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian 
diasporic population throughout Latin America.76  The connection between bilad ash-
sham and Latin America is evidenced by innumerable cultural signs, from the countless 
shabāb in Damascus and Beirut who drink Argentinian mate tea through a metal straw, to 
the current Lebanese-Cuban group Hanine y son Cubano, which combines Arabic lyrics 
and vocal style with a Cuban son ensemble.  The multi-directional musical flow between 
Syrian/Lebanon, the US and Europe, and Latin Americas has been a significant fact for 
decades; As Christopher Reed Stone notes of the early careers of the Rahbani brothers in 
the 1950s: “Much of what thay wrote was of the Latin dance music variety that was so 
popular in Europe and the US at this time.”77 
There are also a set of musical overlaps, as Frischkopf notes:  
 
The compatibility is timbral (both musics center on similar stringed 
instruments), rhythmic (Arab cycles such as bamb and malfuf mesh easily 
with clave), and formal. Unlike traditional Arab music, Spanish music is 
harmonic and does not [employ] quartertones; however since the 1970s 
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Arab music has developed harmony, and gradually reduced the use of 
quartertones. Furthermore, two Arabic scales lacking quartertones are 
central to Spanish musics: nahawand (analogous to the Western minor 
mode), and kurd (analogous to flamenco’s Phrygian scale); furthermore, 
these two modes stir musical emotion quickly, an important quality for 
short shabābī songs (in which there is no time for the longer modal 
developments and modulations of older ṭarab music).78 
 
Shayna Silverstein’s discussion of the kinesthetic properties of the 3 against 2 rhythmic 
feel in dabke performance similarly brings to mind the Afro-Caribbean clave.79 
 
The result of these historical and musical connections between Arabic popular 
music and Latin American music is that a wide variety of Latin elements appear both in 
Arabophone popular music and the Anglophone popular music on Syrian and Lebanese 
radio.  Many of the songs in frequent rotation on Radio Sawa during the sample period 
(for example Hany Shaker's "Ahla al-dhikrayyat", Tamer Hosny’s “Smile”, or Anwar El 
Amir's “Kiffo”) feature Spanish or Latin-American style guitars.   
The popularity of these musical elements extends to the Western music appearing 
on local radio.  For example, the Eagles’ “Hotel California” is an incredibly popular song 
throughout the Arab World.  I’ve found that the guitar-heavy Gypsy Kings recording of 
the song appears even more often than the Eagles original on Syrian radio.  
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 Listening to Radio Fann over the internet, between fairūziyyāt was a cover 
version of Michael Jackson’s “Beat It”, featuring an electric keyboard over a calm (hādi  )  
bossa-nova beat.  Though a “Western” song by most definitions, I would consider this 
one of the most representative songs that one could possible hear on Syrian radio, a song 
that is by a performer so popular that his biography and place in an “authenticating 
geneology” (as the “King of Pop”) and known to most listeners.  The familiar keyboard 
timbres, the Latin rhythm, and the hādi   affect all combine to create a song that within 
the Syrian radioscape may be literally ajnabī (foreign) but is absolutely not ujnib 
(foreign, or to be pushed away).  
 
Conclusion 
Scholarship on globalization often explores hybridity and genre mixing at the 
intersections between transnational and local music.  Rather than addressing a hybridity 
of musical genres, this chapter has proposed a hybridity of listening categories, by which 
listeners are able to make sense of a piece of music in multiple ways, and music does not 
have to be a hybrid in the nature of its constituent parts in order to fit into multiple 
cognitive categories. 
 The goal of this analysis is not to identify which songs the US government should 
broadcast to correspond with Syrian tastes.  It is not even clear that such as task would 
bring Radio Sawa closer to its political goals.  Rather, I contend that the extent to which 
the playlist of a station sounds “foreign”, or in the case of Radio Sawa sounds 





playlist, but rather on the prevalence of music that cannot easily be fit into established 
categories of Syrian radio listening. 
This can be illustrated with a graphic map of Radio Sawa’s Levant playlist, using the 
categories introduced in the previous chapter. 
 
Figure 4.13:  Graphic Representation of Radio Sawa’s Levant playlist 
Within the graphic above, the music which programmers, broadcasters, and listeners 
would most readily describe as foreign is that segment of the “Western” circle which 
does not overlap with any other category. 
 






           
 
Figure 4.14: Graphic Representation of a typical private station playlist in Syria. 
 
 While Radio Sawa plays a higher percentage of Western music relative to its 
overall 24 hour playlist, Version FM, along with several other primarily Arabic language 
stations actually plays a similar amount of the Western music which doesn’t fit into the 
other categories.  In the case of Version FM this is largely late night sets of Western 
genres like blues, country, rock music, jazz, instrumental music, etc…  Other Western 
music that appears on the station overlaps with shabābī or hādi‘ categories.   
Other distinctions between Radio Sawa and private stations are more obvious.  
Aimed specifically at youth, the Sawa plays very few ṭarab songs, which would 






 The most audible difference between the musical playlists of Radio Sawa and 
local Syrian stations is not shown in this diagram.   Both state and private Syrian stations 
vary the focus of their broadcasts according to the time of day.  Fairuz in the morning and 
Umm Kulthum in the evening of course, but there might also be an afternoon ṭarab 
block,or a special late-night block of rock or jazz for dedicated fans.   In contrast, the 
playlist of Radio Sawa remains constant, in a 24-hour stream that varies only for the 
occasional long-form news magazine show, replacing the usual 5 or 10 minute news 
break.  Within the Syrian soundscape described in Chapter 2, Radio Sawa is something of 
an outlier in that does not change to conform to any of the various patterns which regulate 
people’s listening habits: Fairuz to wake up and get dressed, talk shows and hits on the 
morning and evening commutes on public transportation, hādi   music for working 
through the day, late night music as background for long conversation. 
 The very consistency of the station’s formatting and musical content sets the 
station apart from other options on the radio dial.  Even the Syrian English language 
station, MIX FM, which uses the distributed production model pioneered by Norman 
Pattiz’ Westwood One (DJs record in Beirut and the Gulf), doesn’t have the 24-hour 
consistency which characterizes Radio Sawa.  This consistency might be an asset to the 
station or a detriment, but it does reveal a fundamental difference between Radio Sawa 
and local stations especially Syrian state radio, which goes beyond the news content that 
Sawa provides. 
Although Syrian and American state-sponsored radio broadcasts are in some ways 
analogous in terms of their aims, the methods employed by the two states are completely 





broadcasts), tasked with mobilizing public opinion and public practice in ways which 
favor the broadcasting state.  In the case of Syrian state radio, this means both providing 
services that are immediately useful to citizens, “addressing the public as social and 
moral agents rather than as mere consumers,” but also creating listeners who in their 
public lives display an acceptance for the symbols of the state, and concomitantly an 
acceptance for the interpretation of events described by the regime.80  While Syrian state 
radio attempts to create and capture audiences using similar methods to any other station, 
and unlike Radio Sawa actually accepts money in exchange for running advertisements, a 
completely consumerist relationship to state radio is antithetical to the nominal ideology 
of the ruling party’s “social market economy.”  More significantly however, a purely 
consumer relationship would negate the type of public performances which the regime 
requires citizens to enact in relation to the state and its organs. 
On the other side, the theory of music suggested by Radio Sawa is one that 
depends on a consumer framework for the creation of its audiences.  Although the station 
makes regular appeals to listeners as moral actors (the “Sawa Chat” segments for 
example) a radio-listener interaction in which listeners act as “mere consumers” is both 
the process and the goal.  A consumer relationship is the method used to create audiences 
who can, in turn, become consumer citizens in the American world and worldview.  This 
comes out of a US Cold War mindset assuming that individuals who consume American 
products are a priori acting in a manner congruent with the social and moral goals of the 
United States.   
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One of the fundamental debates that takes place around American public 
diplomacy and “soft power” (defined by Joseph Nye as “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments”) is over what factors actually ‘move 
the needle’ of Arab and Middle Eastern opinion towards the US.81  Advocates for public 
diplomacy efforts argue that negative opinions of the US come primarily because of an 
inaccurate perception of its policies, goals and motivations, either through outright lies 
and distortion of local media, or an overemphasis on negative news coming out of Iraq, 
Gaza, Yemen, Afghanistan, etc.82  On the other side, the main criticism of American 
public diplomacy in the Arab World states that Arab public opinion is driven by US 
policies and their repercussions, the “facts on the ground.”   
The latter position was expressed vociferously by journalist Moussa As-Sayyid in 
the Syrian daily Tishreen: 
When an Arab hears that nearly a million Iraqi civilians have died between 
the beginning of the invasion and today, and witnesses it, and is shocked 
daily, does he get drunk on American freedom, and lose himself in the 
valleys of forgetfulness?  Not a hundred American satellite channels, and 
not one channel speaking in Arabic, can accomplish the task of improving 
this ugly picture.83 
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Outside of a few extreme voices in the United States who claim that Arab views of the 
United States are completely unrelated to American actions in the region, most scholars 
and policymakers exist somewhere between the two sides.  They maintain that while the 
mass-media (including government directed media) have the ability to drive narratives, 
illuminate or conceal events, educate and mislead, a fundamental disagreement with US 





Chapter 5 – Idhāʿat Sawa and Asymmetric Music Politics 
 
The asymmetry of power and information involved in globalized interactions between the 
centers of power and the periphery, or from the centers of media production to the outlying 
consumer areas, is one that has obvious implications for two of the main areas of concern for this 
dissertation – the transmission of music around the world and across political and cultural 
boundaries, and the use of music and other forms of cultural production to achieve political ends.   
Though some early instances of the literature on the cultural aspects of globalization were 
bogged down in polarized debates of local vs. global, homogenization vs. hybridization, 
domination vs. resistance, or techno-determinism vs. cultural practice, the best examples from 
this literature have grappled with the complexities of this asymmetry, describing both the effects 
of the cultural, economic, and political flows going from the center outwards, and the ways in 
which local actors in the periphery dam, divert, or float along this flow, using it to their own 
particular ends.1 
In the case of Radio Sawa and the larger relationship between the US and the Arab world, 
all sides of the interaction, including the station’s funders, reporters, producers, and listeners, are 
cognizant of these asymmetries to some degree, and grapple with them in various ways.  In this 
chapter, after briefly describing a particular type of media asymmetry relevant to the relationship 
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between the US and the Middle East, I will discuss the music of Kulna Sawa (All of Us 
Together), a rock group from Damascus which has achieved a great deal of success in what some 
local writers have referred to as Syria’s new wave (al-mawja al-jadīda) or alternative music (al-
mūsīqā al-badīla) scenes.2  Through an analysis of Kulna Sawa’s 2009 album Idhāʿat Sawa 
(Radio Together), this chapter will explore the ways that their music explores an asymmetrical 
relationship to the US in the context of a local environment, and the implications these efforts 
might have for the propagandistic project of Radio Sawa. 
I examine the group not because they are an especially representative example of musical 
life in Damascus (except for a slice of the population) but because Idhāʿat Sawa is a useful case 
study in musical politics.  Thus this chapter should not be read as a commentary reflecting 
musical tastes of the average young person in Damascus in 2009 and 2010; these musicians and 
most of their fans are members of a very specific, upper or middle-class, well-educated social 
group, which represents only a small minority of musicians and listeners in Syria.  
Despite often playing a style of music outside the Syrian mainstream, Kulna Sawa makes 
a conscious effort to address both local and international issues from a specifically Syrian 
framework, and this is especially audible on Idhāʿat Sawa.  The concept album imagines a pan-
Arab radio station broadcasting across the Arab World, and integrates a variety of Western and 
Arabic musical styles into a series of politically themed songs.  In this chapter I argue that 
Idhāʿat Sawa demonstrates a particularly Syrian understanding of radio, music, and politics, and 
one that is in stark contrast to that proposed by the American Radio Sawa.  In a reversal of Radio 
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Sawa’s attempt to use a musical frame to move listeners to consider an alternate political reality, 
Idhāʿat Sawa uses a political frame to posit a new musical reality.   
 
Asymmetries and Directed Media 
The most oft-studied examples of international broadcasting come out of the two largest 
conflicts of the radio age, World War II and the Cold War.  It is useful then to highlight the 
distinction between the political situation around Radio Sawa, and those foundational examples 
out of which the use of radio as a political medium arose, and which have driven most of the 
scholarly work on the phenomenon. 
The first conflict involved a number of competing states of roughly the same class in 
terms of wealth and international power; Italy, Germany, Japan, France, Britain, the USA and the 
USSR were each engaged in propaganda efforts directed squarely towards the opposing powers, 
in addition to broadcasts directed to less powerful client and neutral states.  As such, though 
many if not most of the people who listened to international radio broadcasts during WWII were 
not citizens of one of these powerful broadcasting nations, the literature on wartime radio is most 
comprehensive in those areas where Axis broadcasters are communicating to Allied listeners, or 
vice versa.  In Chapter 1 I discussed the history of international broadcasting to the Middle East.  
This literature on this area, however, represents a tiny body of work in comparison to the 
scholarship that has been done on WWII broadcasting within Europe and in the Pacific.  Very 
broadly, most of the discussion of propaganda radio in World War II addresses competition 
amongst roughly equal players, though each is naturally constrained and advantaged by 





USA – dominated both the airwaves during World War II and the subsequent historiography of 
wartime broadcasting.  
 In the case of the Cold War, though the period saw the total number of international 
broadcasts increase dramatically as smaller states joined the airwaves, the main radio 
competition was reduced to the two roughly equal superpowers of the US and the USSR, assisted 
by ideological allies, proxies, and client groups on both sides, most significantly Britain on the 
US side.  Even more than in WWII, it is clear here that the vast majority of listeners were not 
American or Soviet citizens, but rather members of third party (or often “Third World”) polities.  
Even including the Eastern bloc countries, the median radio listener during the Cold War was 
probably not a direct subject of either superpower.  Despite this, historical analyses of Cold War 
radio have tended to frame the discussion either in terms of great power conflicts over Eastern 
Europe, or a small number of proxy battles.3  While understandable given the significance of that 
ideological and political competition, this trend in the literature has given short shrift to many of 
the relationships that radio listeners in the rest of the world, outside the direct control of either of 
the superpowers, would have had with these broadcasts.4  
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Two Paired US Media Asymmetries and Their Relevance to American Diplomacy, Musical 
and Otherwise 
Since the end of the Cold War, the practices of public diplomacy, propaganda, national 
branding, etc., or the various efforts by which states attempt to influence opinion outside of their 
borders, of which Radio Sawa is one example, are in the case of the United States invariably 
conditioned by two related asymmetries.5  The main asymmetry of wealth and power (both 
“hard” and “soft” varieties) between the US and any receiving nation of lesser power status (for 
the period since WWII up until the present, this means any other nation), advantages the US, 
while a converse asymmetry makes the job of influencing public opinion more difficult. 
 The first asymmetry, and the primary advantage that the US has in its efforts at cultural 
diplomacy, comes from its status as the lone economic and mass media superpower.  The 
concentration of wealth and media networks controlled by the US allows American cultural 
products a level of preexisting market penetration around the world that is unequalled by any 
other country.  In economic terms, the effort required to deliver an American product to almost 
anywhere in the world today is significantly less than the inverse, since the marginal nth film, 
song, or TV show is cheaper to market and sell than the first or second.6  The process of selling 
the US through American cultural products is in theory made easier by the fact that so many 
people are used to consuming American products in one way or another, and a certain level of 
demand already exists.   
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However, the very level of familiarity with products and culture from the metropole that 
this asymmetry engenders creates a complication for states attempting to exert political influence 
over periphery through non-coercive means.  Since the flow of cultural information proceeds so 
strongly from rich countries towards the poorer ones, or, to restrict the discussion to the case at 
hand, from the US and Western Europe to the Middle East, the population of the Middle East is 
inevitably more familiar with the culture and politics of Western countries than vice versa.   
This second asymmetry is the counterpart to the one mentioned above, and is especially 
significant for the practice of diplomacy, both “public” and otherwise.  Around the world, but 
especially in the Middle East, the local counterparts to American diplomats are often Western 
educated, English-speaking people who are fluent in both the culture and politics of the US to an 
extent the reciprocal equivalent of which would be unimaginable to all but a few highly 
specialized experts.  To generalize: wherever in the world American policymakers look they will 
find a governing elite, and probably a local population, against whom they are at a relative 
information disadvantage.  Specifically in the Middle East, the higher up the social and economic 
ladder one travels, the more likely one is to come across a person whose familiar ity with the US 
and Western Europe is of a near native fluency.7  The list of the European or American-educated 
amongst recent Arab political figures includes Bashar Al-Assad, King Hussein of Jordan, Rafiq 
Hariri of Lebanon, Saif Al-Islam (son of Muammar Gadhdhafi) and many, many more.  In 
contrast, the fact that President Obama briefly attended elementary school in Indonesia was 
considered nearly a disqualifying factor during his first campaign.8   
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Efforts at non-coercive influence, especially over elites, are made more difficult for US 
by the fact that these efforts will be practiced upon people who know more about Americans and 
how they work than Americans do about them and how they work.  The equation is slightly 
different when attempting to influence a general population, which will not have the same level 
of familiarity with the US that the elite possess, but the asymmetry is still in effect here.  Though 
the highest level of this asymmetry is displayed among the wealthy, it extends to all segments of 
society; an average media consumer in the Arab world will inevitably have a greater familiarity 
with American culture and politics than the average American has about any other country, much 
less those in places as distant culturally and geographically as the Middle East.  Even within the 
State Department, institutional structure mitigates against an equivalence of expertise, since 
Foreign Service Officers will usually rotate out of a position after two years, while many of the 
people they are directly dealing with in the Arab world might have studied English (and 
inevitably American culture) for many years, often in the United States.9 
American attempts at radio diplomacy and propaganda, at least since the early years of 
the Cold War, have largely conceded this asymmetry, and attempted to combat it by 
acknowledging that the only people who consistently express a native level of cultural fluency in 
a target region natives to that region.  Thus the most direct and forceful attempts to influence 
public opinion, such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, tended to rely on foreign nationals 
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(including expatriates or defectors), a model that Radio Sawa has followed in hiring a mostly 
Lebanese staff.10     
This basic asymmetry in information and cultural familiarity in favor of members of 
target countries complicates one of the basic tenets behind the various concepts of “broadcasting 
American values” and “branding America”.  Stated plainly: Why are American policymakers 
and broadcasters so sure that inculcating more knowledge about American culture, politics, and 
history (or music) will create listeners with more favorable attitudes towards US policies, when 
those listeners already know much more about America than America knows about them?11 
With this question in mind we now turn to Kulna Sawa, a group whose members are 
certainly fluent in Western music and culture, but whose use of that musical expertise reflects a 
particularly Syrian set of concerns and interests. 
Kulna Sawa 
In 2009, the Damascene rock group Kulna Sawa released their fourth full- length album, 
Idhāʿat Sawa (Radio Sawa/Together).  The sprawling, 18-song concept album imagines a pan-
Arab radio station, broadcasting from Damascus to Gaza, Baghdad to Tyre.  Individual songs are 
interspersed by news clips, sound effects and dialogue from DJs and callers, critiquing the 
existing blend of regional and international media, while creating a new soundscape to replace it 
with their own brand of Syrian rock music, a political message centered on the band’s particular 
vision of Arab youth in relation to the West, and a criticism of American and Israeli policy.  The 
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terms “radio” and “idhā’a” )broadcast) are used almost interchangeably in Arabic, and one is 
just as likely to hear “radio” as “idhā’a”.  Both translate to “Radio Together”, but for the 
purposes of (relative) clarity I will use “Radio Sawa” when referring to the American broadcast 
and “Idhāʿat Sawa” when referring to the Kulna Sawa album or the fictional radio station it 
describes. 
According to an interview with the band in Al Madina FM: 
The artist Iyad Rimawi is the one who came up with the idea of launching the 
album in the form of a radio station, and we began after this idea to write the 
songs on the album together.  After finishing, we discovered a common message 
among the songs that we wrote, and all of them carry a critical political 
orientation towards what happened in the world of current events and wars.  We 
chose to present these songs in the form of radio, because of its suitability for 
political ideas.12 
 
In a separate interview, Rimawi stated that the album covers:  
The most important events which affected the fate of the world in the 
modern period beginning with the events of September 11th, and ending 
with the July War.  The album resembles a historical document for this 
period, but it a young (shabābī) style.13 
 
The lyrics to Idhāʿat Sawa combine political commentary on regional issues with a 
discussion of the problems and aspirations specific to the young middle and upper class of 
Damascus.  Voiced in Syrian colloquial Arabic, songs are sometimes addressed to Arab listeners 
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to the imagined station, and sometimes to an audience outside of its broadcast and linguistic 
range, whether to an imagined American public (“Anā Irhābī”) or to a thinly disguised “Ruler of 
the world” (“ ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīm”).  
According to keyboardist Marwan Nakhleh:  
The album is distinguished by the presence of songs presenting a single connected 
story, the songs discuss linked events.  It is the first Arabic album which advances 
in this style, and whoever listens to the will hear songs in the form of a virtual 
radio station.14 
 
Despite the coincidence in name with the American-financed pop music station that is the 
main subject of this dissertation, according to members of the band the album is not a direct 
response to America’s “Radio Sawa.”15  Nevertheless, the format of the concept album, and the 
political content of the lyrics, makes Idhāʿat Sawa a remarkable refraction of Radio Sawa’s 
attempts at musical diplomacy.  It is in this context that this chapter will examine the album, as a 
counterpoint to Radio Sawa’s attempts to create a class of listener who is more amenable to 
American policy through the intermediate step of making listeners fans of American music.  By 
describing a version of their own radio station, Kulna Sawa presents one possible response to 
Western broadcasting, a response created by precisely the sort of listeners who are supposed to 
be most susceptible to its political message, young Arabs with a deep interest in American music 
and culture.  
 The stark differences between Radio Sawa and Idhāʿat Sawa are so great as to make any 
direct comparison ludicrous in its asymmetry.  Where Radio Sawa is part of the  $112 million a 
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year Middle East Broadcasting Network, broadcast across the breadth of the Arabic-speaking 
world, backed by the most powerful state on Earth, Idhāʿat Sawa, is an imagined station, 
instantiated only on a single album, recorded by a group of mostly part-time musicians in a small 
Damascus studio.16  As both a synecdoche and extreme case of the larger disjuncture between 
American and Syrian broadcasting and cultural production, however, this example is useful 
because it prompts us to explore the nature of the greater asymmetry between American cultural, 
economic, and state power, and the reciprocal weakness of even the elite members of the states 
which feel the brunt of this power.  
 The musicians of Kulna Sawa, along with their fans, are part the demographic targeted by 
Radio Sawa: young people with an interest and affinity for American cultural products.  
Moreover, members of the Syrian rock scene in particular have a vested interest in recreating 
some aspects of the American cultural industry in Syria.  Though many of these musicians and 
fans are enthusiastic consumers of rock culture from the US and Europe, there is not a successful 
economic model for a Syrian rock band, and in terms of the pure functional basis for a music 
scene, they are often envious of the opportunities in other countries (more on this later).17   
In Chapter 1 I describe two general theories of music’s political utility within American 
international broadcasting, one based on the communicative power of American music to create 
an affinity with America, and the second based on the idea of music as a medium of exchange.  
With their familiarity and audible love for American and Western European musical genres, 
combined with the political acumen and familiarity with Western news sources demonstrated by 
Idhāʿat Sawa, it would appear at first glance that groups like Kulna Sawa and the fans who 
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constitute the Syrian rock scene would represent one aspect of the ideal imagined listeners for 
the first theory.  Reinforced in statements such Willis Conover’s famous quote that “Jazz is its 
own propaganda” musical diplomacy, this basic idea is expressed below: 18 
 
 
Exposure to American Culture          Acculturated Listeners          US sympathetic listeners.  
 
 
  Given the intermediate goal of American broadcasters to foster a class of listeners who 
are familiar with American music and culture, the members of Damascus’ rock scene would 
represent almost the idealized form of music listeners in this intermediate step.  Fully conversant, 
even fluent, in American musical forms and idioms, powerfully and sometimes obsessively 
engaged in the economic structure of music collection, they are, according to this theory, more 
likely to hold views sympathetic to US foreign policy.  However, as my analysis of Idhāʿat Sawa 
will show, Syrian listeners and musicians such as the members of Kulna Sawa are able to 
integrate a deep level of facility with and affinity for Western music into a particularly local 
worldview which expresses their own personal, local, and political concerns that are often 
completely antithetical to the policies of the United States in the region.   
This by itself is nothing new, and much of the musical literature on globalization involves 
the ability of local populations to integrate, hybridize, coopt, or rework foreign or hegemonic 
forms to suite local purposes.  The particular relevance of Idhāʿat Sawa to the American Radio 
Sawa broadcasts is not simply as an example of this kind of resistance.  Structured around the 
idea of a pan-Arab radio station, Idhāʿat Sawa provides a direct counter-narrative to American 
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broadcasting.  Though is full of the specific concerns of a group of real people, it can also be 
heard as a response, as the imagined listeners steeped in American music in turn imagine a 
broadcast of their own.  The following section will examine the album in detail to describe some 




The album begins with sounds of a busy office and a receptionist connecting a caller to 
the station’s request line, followed by a musical greeting. 
Welcome to all listeners 
Thank you for your choice of our station 
… 
Our message is to the new wave 
Our focus is the land 
… 
Radio Kulna Sawa (All of Us together) 
Thank you for your choice of our station. 
Stay with us. 
Live over the air 
To the last moment our signal comes to you 
Stay with Radio Kulna Sawa20 
 
After the musical introduction a friendly female radio voice introduces the first full song “Youm 
elli tghair al-‘ālam” (The day that changed the world).  The song, which begins with synthesized 
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horn hits and four-on-the-snare rock drum propulsion, describes waking up on the morning of a 
momentous event. 
The Day that Changed the World 
 
The day that changed the world 
I was in bed dreaming 
Just late like usual 
Under my eyes the newspaper 
The day that the world changed 
 
Halfway through the song the lyrics drop out and over a descending piano vamp the 
sounds of airplanes and English news clips weave in one on top of the other. 
 
“America came under attack today from international terrorists… 
                          What we can see here is the sections of the other tower are also crumbling….  
                                                                                                More news is coming in… 
    Crashed airliner in Pittsburgh…” 
Terrorist also struck with remarkable ease, at the heart of America’s defense…” 
 
Newscaster voices cascade over one another, and the sound of plane gets louder and louder until 
the engine screeches into the wail of a guitar solo. 
The day that changed the world 
Not one of us could understand 
What was changing, what was beginning? 
How will the story change? 
The day that changed the world21 
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 “The Day that Changed the World” referenced here is clearly September 11, 2001.  Using 
this date as a narrative starting point makes intuitive sense to many Americans, and certainly 
corresponds to American political rhetoric about the “Global War on Terror,” but the idea that 
September 11th was the fundamental turning point in the relationship between the Arab world 
and the US is by no means a universally accepted truth in Syria or the larger Arab world.  Kulna 
Sawa’s choice to begin with those attacks as “The Day that Changed the World” reveals a great 
deal about the way in which the band conceived of this relationship.   
“The Day that Changed the World” as an introduction to the album immediately marks 
the group as fundamentally unsympathetic to the narrative provided by Al Qaeda and similar 
radical groups, who saw the attacks of September 11th as a counterattack in an ongoing wae, one 
said to have begun on different dates according to the political goals and historical ambition of 
the particular rhetorician (1991, 1948, 1492, 1096, etc.)  Though to anyone remotely familiar 
with the social scene of young Damascene rock fans it is unnecessary to have to point out the 
gaping disjuncture between middle and upper class Syrian youth and Saudi extremist jihadis, as 
we shall see with the next song on the album (Ana Irhābī) the group has had experience dealing 
with the assumption that “young Arab = terrorist” and is acutely aware of the prevalence of this 
perception in the US. 
 The historicizing move of this song also places the group in disjuncture with the neo-
colonial narrative of US policies in the region sometimes espoused by the Syrian government in 
regards to the US.  The Syrian government routinely, and with some logic, employs rhetoric 
describing the Iraq War and other instances of US military presence in the Middle East as part of 





orchestrate a coup within Syria, and a long and involved history of interference in the internal 
politics of Lebanon, oft seen as the bailiwick of Syrian power.  Two of the broad 
political/ideological movements that characterized Syria’s international politics during the Cold 
War, and continued subsequently to hold significant sway in Syrian public discourse – Baʿthist 
Socialism and Anti-Zionism – also provide long and intricate histories of US/Syrian or US/Arab 
relations, histories in which September 11th is not seen as a day that fundamentally changed 
anything.   
Kulna Sawa has certainly used their music to express solidarity with Palestinian 
Resistance and to strongly criticize Israel: dedicating the song “Kul Youm b’ul” to the people of 
Gaza, recording a version of “Wain ʿa Ramallah” (“Where? To Ramallah”) and performing it in 
live concerts, writing a thinly veiled attack on Ariel Sharon in “Nā’im ‘alā Shaṭ al Baḥr”, and 
expressing an emotional connection to Southern Lebanon in the song “Ra’ih ‘a al-Janūb” 
(“Going to the South”), an area associated in the Syrian public consciousness with resistance to 
Israel.22   However, the narrative expressed on Idhāʿat Sawa is not however the oft-heard line 
trying America inextricably to Israel often expressed on stations like the (Hizballah affiliated) 
An-Nour or (PLO-GCC affiliated) Al-Quds, nor is it that of Egyptian shaʿbī musicians like 
Sha’ban ‘Abd Al-Rahim, who James Grippo has detailed as advancing a view in which the US 
and Israel are just “two sides of the same coin.”23  
In adopting the notion of 9/11 as the “Day that Changed the World”, Idhāʿat Sawa begins 
a critique of the US based policies of the last decade and their impact on the Arab world, rather 
than its history with Israel or even with Syria.  In this, the band reflects a relationship with the 
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US that I encountered frequently while in Syria, where young people were often highly critical of 
US policies and shortcomings, but viewed the countries through their own relationships with 
cultural products, or through personal experiences, more than through the ready-made historical 
frameworks presented by the local media entities which are most critical of the US. 
 
Ana Irhābī 
In conversations about Syria and Lebanon, where I was often asked the question “What 
do Americans think about Syria?”  I have frequently experienced consternation from young men 
who know from their consumption of American media the simple formula “young Arab male = 
terrorist” in American movies and news, and yet still could not quite believe that anyone would 
confuse them with the Saudi extremists with whom they identified not at all.24  This is doubly 
confusing as the overwhelming majority of Syrian youth not only don’t identify with the men 
who attacked the US, many of them, especially in middle and upper-class Damascus, display a 
level of distain and resentment for Saudis.  This is both political and economic resentment which 
manifests in Saudis being stereotyped amongst certain groups in Syria and Lebanon as both 
religiously fundamentalist and as rich, lecherous, interlopers interested in visiting the region for 
prostitutes, alcohol and weather, in that order.  This stereotype is of course as reductive and ill-
conceived as any other, but it explains why to a young Damascene man the conflation with al-
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Qaeda is nonsensical.25  However, beyond the usual media conflation of all Arab youth, the 
members of Kulna Sawa have personal experience being mistaken for terrorists. 
In 2004, a story appeared on the website womenswallstreet.com about a flight from 
Detroit to Los Angeles in which several passengers became nervous about a group of Syrian 
musicians onboard.26  By the time the story was picked up by a group of popular right-wing 
blogs, the musicians were now “almost certainly (judging from her description) conducting a dry 
run for a repeat of September 11”.27  Based on speculation from a reader, the conservative 
aggregation site littlegreenfootballs.com published a post entitled “Syrians on Jacobsen’s Flight: 
Kulna Sawa”, and another conservative site quickly jumped in with a post titled “Searching for 
Kulna Sawa.”28 
The group of presumed terrorists who were thought to be behaving suspiciously a flight 
(speaking to each other across aisles in Arabic, laughing, getting up in pairs or groups to stretch 
their legs), were a group of Syrian musicians, though not, as it turns out, Kulna Sawa.  The 
members of Kulna Sawa, who were coincidentally planning a “Concert for Peace Tour” in the 
US for November of that year, were in Damascus at the time, witnessing this internet hubbub 
from afar.29  As the members of the band waited in Damascus, practicing for their upcoming tour 
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of US churches, they realized that on the internet at least, they had already gained a degree of 
fame in America, unfortunately as presumed terrorists.  
The band’s musical response to this event is recorded as the fourth song on the album, 
and is entitled “Anā Irhābī” (“I am a terrorist”).  The song is prefaced by the sound of a 
newscaster discussing the band’s alleged hijacking attempt (in Arabic), as the band breaks into 
the first line of the chorus: “Anā Irhābī lākin Ṭayyib” (I’m a terrorist but a nice guy). 
  
 
I'm a terrorist but a nice guy 
 
A terrorist, ascending in the plane with my friends 
My weapon is my guitar, my melodies and my words 
Immediately they know me from the first that they saw me 
The guitar rose and I stood with half the plane, singing 
 
I'm a terrorist but a nice guy 
I play for you before you die 
 
Listen to the last melody of your life and you will travel with us happily 
 
Everyone who was in the plane was afraid of the music 
Afraid of my voice, afraid of the truth 
 
If my art now had left me a terrorist 
 
I will sing at the top of my voice….30 
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“Anā Irhābī” is a lighthearted, upbeat song, befitting the mocking attitude taken towards 
Kulna Sawa’s experience of racial band profiling.  The chorus is a sing-song, almost childlike 
group vocal, with a memorably simple melody that cheerfully ends phrases on the rhymes “you 
die” (tamūt) and “happy” (mabsūṭ). 31 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Kulna Sawa, “Anā Irhābī” (“I’m a terrorist, but a nice guy, I sing for you before you 
die.  Listen to the last melody of your life, and you will travel with us happily.)” 
 “Anā Irhābī” ends with a series of scalar guitar runs ascending over snare-drum quarter-
notes in a bombastic moment powerfully reminiscent of Queen. 
 
Figure 5.2:  Ending guitar solo on “Ana Irhābī” 
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Guitar and drums slow towards the end of the figure, holding the final note as the voice of 
George W. Bush enters over the sounds of a cheering crowd: “We wage a war to save 
civilization itself.”  
 The metaphoric use of music as a weapon here is partially simple mocking of the furor 
around Kulna Sawa’s supposed terrorist episode on America, but the metaphor of “music as 
weapon” allows us to explore what might be different about Kulna Sawa’s musical weapons in 
contrast to the US’s Radio Sawa.  Even if we are reluctant to give credence to Kulna Sawa’s 
metaphor, there is a level at which the music is, if not a weapon, at least being deployed as 
countermove against the mix of American military and media policy which created a War on 
Terror, and then somehow defined the band as part of the “terror” with which it was at war. 
 
ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm - Waṣlu al-ʿAskar -  Nā’im ala Shaṭ al-Baḥr 
 
The song which follows “Ana Irhābī” on the album is similar ly upbeat and sarcastic, horn-heavy 
over a ska beat, but delivers a more general political critique, rather than mocking a specific 
event.   
“Abd al-‘Aẓīm” (Servant of the Great) begins with George W. Bush’s voice, recorded 
from a news broadcast. ”We did not seek it, but we will fight it, and we will prevail” 
triumphantly booms over a wah-wah guitar, horn hits, and an optimistic funk-lite bassline.  The 
singer enters, voicing the praises of a vaguely described ruler - the just and well-spoken ruler of 
the world - but protesting humbly that the average people aren’t worthy of his protection. 
 
The just ruler 
He is generous 






The name “Abd al-‘Aẓīm” is a common one, meaning “servant of the Great” (one of the 
names of God), but in the entirely secular context of the song, we can hear another meaning, 
where the name implies “servant of the great”, a ruler who works in the service of the rich and 
powerful as opposed to the people.  Though the introduction clearly marks the great ruler being 
mocked as President Bush, the lyrics are general enough that they could apply to any number of 
heads of state bent on “humanitarian” uses of violence.  The final verse of the song, however, 
can easily be read as a direct critique not just of American policy, but specifically of American 
counterinsurgency in Iraq.  As the music moves from a bouncy bassline and wah-wah guitar to a 
few moments of mid-tempo swing and walking bass, Bashar Moussa sings: 
 
His eye is upon us, and our protection is on his mind 
He comes to us, he and his men 
The wheels roll on the terrorists 
We don’t know…Who the terrorists are32 
 
Like the previous song, this one remains upbeat and positive sounding the entire time, and the 
last lines are delivered absolutely without anger, just an air of almost amused confusion.  There 
are two ideas worthy of mockery here, first that the “just ruler” actually has “our protection is on 
is mind”, and second that the singers would know who and where the terrorists are. 
At the end of the track a reporter calls in to Idhāʿat Sawa, trying to deliver the news of 
“tens of deaths” over sounds of a battle.  Again Bush’s voice cuts in though, saying “We did not 
seek it, but we will fight it, and we will prevail” as the next song “Waslu al-Askar” (The Army 
Arrived) begins. 
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The use of President Bush speaking directly, in English, about the War on Terror, 
specifies a great deal about the potential listeners to whom the album is addressed.  Most of the 
members of Kulna Sawa have studied English, with a range of facility that goes from halting to 
near-fluency.33  Rock fans in Damascus tend also to have a much better than average grasp of the 
English language, coming primarily from the middle and upper classes with the accompanying 
access to education and travel.  The use of this clip, presented with the speaker unidentified, 
assumes a greater than passing familiarity with the English language; it presumes a level of 
engagement with American politics and international news in English which would be 
considered extremely remarkable were the nations reversed. 
 The lyrics to Idhāʿat Sawa are in Arabic, but listeners are also presented with clips that 
presume that they possess not only the ability to understand the basic meaning of sentences 
spoken in English, but also to recognize the individual voice of the former president of the US.  
The presumption tells us something about the makeup of Kulna Sawa’s audience, but it is also a 
perfect example of the information disconnect embedded in the relationship between the Middle 
East in the US.   
Style and “Al-Aṣbaʿ Al-Banafsajī”  
 
Kulna Sawa’s website features seven core members of the band: Hazem Al-Ani 
(keyboard and piano), Marwan Nakhleh (keyboard), Rafel Haffar (bass guitar), Bashar Moussa 
(lead vocals), Iyad Rimawi (guitar and vocal), Sonia Bitar (vocals), and Ayham Al-Ani (guitar 
and vocals).  However, the band performs and records with a larger number of musicians, 
including two percussionists, trumpet, saxophone, clarinet, and occasionally cello or other 
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instruments.  A May 2010 performance at the Moustapha Ali Gallery in Damascus featured at 
least 12 musicians on stage at all times.34 
The large number of musicians gives the band the ability to move between very different 
styles quickly, with a level of stylistic competence and fidelity that is somewhat jarring to 
American ears.  In “Al-Aṣbaʿ Al-Banafsajī” (“The violet finger”) the group moves between 
horn-driven pop-funk to a children’s commercial jingle sound, to a convincing smooth jazz organ 
solo all in the same song.  Sonia Bitar’s excited voice mockingly celebrates of the Iraqi elections, 
when voters marked their choice with a violet painted finger. 
 
People in the streets 
Their numbers in the hundreds 
In a country bedecked in ash 
That is all of this 
They say it is a new age 
And we pay its price in fire and iron 
In the end you will definitely paint 
Your finger violet35 
 
The chorus is sung by what sounds like a children’s choir, in a style very popular with 
commercials on Syrian radio. 
 
Oh God what’s the sweetest color? 
Forget the world and my cares 
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It deserves, in its honor they die 
My family, my sisters, my uncles 
 
The section is a style parody, but a remarkably effective one.  Much of the album was recorded 
at guitarist Iyad Rimawi’s studio in Mezzeh, where he also produces commercials and television 
music, often using many of the same musicians who play with Kulna Sawa.36  
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the stylistic cues associated with specific genres in the 
West take on different meanings when they appear in the very different musical environment of 
Syria.  Within a listening context conditioned entirely by Western rock music, two most 
immediate impressions of Idhāʿat Sawa would be that the album includes very competent 
recreation of styles which have gone out of fashion, and it is stylistically incoherent.  However, 
in contrast to the examples in previous chapters of American music being integrated into 
preexisting Syrian listening categories, on Idhāʿat Sawa the variety of different musical styles 
are used for effect, highlighting their foreignness and their difference, rather than integrating 
them into Syrian styles. While the abrupt shifts in styles can be jarring, it also serves to reinforce 
the conceit of the album.  The combination of dialogue from the station, and songs and even 
sections of vastly different style, and diegetic sound effects creates a coherent effect out of quick 
changes in affect.  
 Though the use of Western music on display here is very different from that described 
earlier in the dissertation, there are any number of moments which stand out as typical of the 
Damascene rock scene, precisely for the ease with which one can recognize their predecessors in 
American or British rock songs.  The album is littered with moments that are easily associated 
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with well-known metal and hard rock songs.  As mentioned previously, the end of “Ana Irhābī” 
evokes Queen.  The beginning of “Waṣlu al-‘Asker” (“The Army Arrived”) uses the reverb-
heavy picking of Metallica’s “Enter Sandman, and the last third includes a military snare drum 
figure which builds into a wailing guitar solo, reminiscent of the last few minutes of Guns N 
Roses’ “November Rain.”  
  Among the rock musicians and fans I met while in Damascus, the most oft-cited groups 
were hard rock, metal and prog-rock groups.  At a concert I attended by the popular rock-band 
Gene in April of 2010, one of the group’s best received moments was a medley of songs in 
English by Dream Theater, Queen, and Rush.   Bon Jovi, Dream Theater, Metallica, Rush, and 
Queen, all come up quite a bit in conversations with fans about favorite bands.  Kulna Sawa 
tends more towards the pop side of the spectrum, borrowing as well from funk, disco, reggae and 
jazz, but a number of the musical aspects of the album Idhāʿat Sawa display the affinity for the 
1980s rock that characterizes much of the world of Damascus rock fanship.  
  
Potential problems inherent in the focus on Western Musical Styles  
It is important to acknowledge that Kulna Sawa, along with similar rock groups in Syria, 
play a form of music with limited popularity, and a small local audience.  Anas Abu Qaws, a 
Syrian rock musician and son of Sabah Fakhri, one of the most famous traditional Syrian singers 
from the twentieth century, estimated in a conversation with me in 2009 that “there are only 
maybe five or ten thousand fans of this kind of music (Syrian rock) in Damascus.“37  When one 
includes nearby Lebanon and Jordan, the regional market for Arabic language rock, and the 
Syrian diaspora around the world, audience for grows significantly, but the more explicitly rock 
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side of the band’s output has a much smaller audience than the bands arrangements of more 
traditional Syrian, Palestinian, and Lebanese music, like “Almaya” or “Wayn? ʿa Ramallah”, 
although according to guitarist Iyad Rimawi, their arrangements of traditional songs amount to 
only “3 songs out of 50” recorded by the group.38  The well-known singer Lena Chamamyan, for 
example, who comes from the same musical scene, records with many of the same backing 
musicians, and has performed in concert with Kulna Sawa, has achieved a far greater level of 
success both inside and outside of Syria by performing a repertoire of modern jazz arrangements 
of well-known Arabic songs, using a relatively familiar (though also original) Syrian singing 
style to great acclaim.39 
In interviews, band members blame their relative lack of fame with the difficulties in 
involved in coordinating such a large group of musicians, and state that fame is not their primary 
goal, also acknowledging that “The assiduous music which Kulna Sawa produces doesn’t 
normally receive the distribution that ‘pop music’ (mūsīqā al-ḅuḅ) benefits from.”40 Both Kulna 
Sawa and Gene distribute their music through a company called “Mais al-Reem for Media 
Production and Distribution.”  CDs distributed by the company, which is based in the old city of 
Damascus, “near Al Mariameyah Church”, are identified by the bright red sticker placed over the 
outer edge of the CD case.  The sticker ensures that each purchaser has received an original print 
of the album, as opposed to a pirated copy.  Members of Kulna Sawa have spoken out in 
interviews about the opinion that piracy represents a significant problem for Syrian musicians, 
and stated in one interview that the income from  one interview that the income from Idhāʿat 
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Sawa did not cover the cost of printing the small run of CDs.41 Despite this lack of financial 
success, the band has received a remarkable amount of positive media exposure in Syria.  They 
have been interviewed and profiled in the Damascus papers (Baladna, Tishreen, al Thawra), and 
been interviewed on a number of radio and television stations.42 
Stylistic criticisms of Kulna Sawa that one might hear in Syria are exemplified by a 
comment found on the youtube video of “Kul yūm ya’ul”, where one poster stated that the song 
was “beautiful, but sadly there is nothing in it – no melody or performance – that is Arab.  You 
feel like you are listening to a song that was originally translated.”43  The band is fully aware that 
a certain portion of their audience will feel this way, and during live performances in Syria 
includes a mix of traditional or well-known songs in more traditional styles.   At their concert in 
May of 2010, the band’s new rock songs were well received, but the greatest applause and 
audience participation came when they performed a series of arrangements of famous songs from 
Algeria, Lebanon, and Palestine.44 
There is a significant and growing body of films, academic literature, and journalism 
which deals with Arab musicians in Western genres, which includes the documentaries “Heavy 
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Metal in Bagdad”, “Slingshot Hip-Hop”, and books including Mark LeVine’s Heavy Metal 
Islam.45 The discussion of Arab musicians who perform in these genres tends to come from a 
particular liberal political direction which, with excellent intentions, hopes to counter negative 
media narratives about Arabs and emphasize their humanity by detailing musical expressions of 
that humanity that are understandable and digestible for Western audiences.  The positive 
reception of these studies publicly and in the academy reveals that the demand exists for 
precisely this kind of humanizing gesture, and a great deal of this work is excellent.  However, in 
journalistic accounts especially, the humanizing, de-othering move is often combined with an 
emphasis on the political valence of certain musical genres, hip hop and rock especially, which 
not coincidentally flatter a Western audience by allowing the West to remain the source of 
musical tools for political uplift, democratization, feminist reform, etc.   
As the post-Said discourse on Orientalism and Middle Eastern historiography makes 
clear, this kind of focus on Western associated aspects of Middle Eastern culture and society 
carries with it a profound risk of distorting the realities of Middle Eastern subjects on order to 
make their cultural output serve certain Western liberal or neoliberal purposes.  One man from 
North-Eastern Syria with whom I spoke, who preferred more “Eastern” styles over the Damascus 
rock, commented on a song by the progressive rock band Gene which deals with the problem of 
so-called “honor killings”:  “Those guys don’t come from families, from towns, where there are 
honor killings.  They come from Mezzeh (a wealthy neighborhood of Damascus, near the 
university).  What do they know about honor killings?  Who do they think is listening to 
them?”46 This listener wasn’t critical of the need to discuss violence against women; rather he 
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was suspicious of people whom he perceived as taking an easy political stance which might seem 
brave to outsiders, but had little to do with their actual lives.  Regardless of the accuracy of this 
listener’s perceptions of social class as it pertains either to the band Gene or to “honor killings” 
(and certainly the phenomenon of culturally sanctioned violence against women exists in various 
forms, including legal ones, across a much broader swath of society than is generally 
acknowledged), the comment does illustrate one of the potential problems that can accompany 
Western attention on non-Western performers of Western-associated musical styles. 
 The “concerts” page of Kulna Sawa’s website lists past performances going back to 2003, 
averaging about two a year.  This is typical for Syrian rock bands, due the extreme difficulties 
involved in organizing a rock concert (discussed in Chapter 2).  The fact that Kulna Sawa has 
been able to put on concerts with a relatively high level of visibility, such as performing for 
Radio Monte Carlo, or performing at the MTN sponsored opening ceremony for the public 
World Cup viewings at the Damascus fairgrounds, is indicative of the class of people and social 
contacts that the band associates with, rather than a measure of their popularity.   
Travelling in Syria in January of 2009 I saw large number of billboards for Idhāʿat Sawa 
on the road between Damascus and Beirut, a route travelled by the wealthy of both countries for 
both business and pleasure, as well as Syrians looking for work.  At the time those posters 
seemed like blatent attempts to cross the distance between the very different soundscapes, and 
different rock music scenes.  Where as the most successful rock bands in Damascus play a few 
concerts a year, Beirut has a thriving rock and experimental scene.47  Though Kulna Sawa has 
access to quality recording studios and well-organized, if occasional, high-profile performances 
in Syria, the cultural capital required to operate a rock band in Damascus does not necessarily 
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transfer over into the Lebanese music scene, and it is worth further discussing the larger 
relationship between Syria and Lebanon. 
Globalization, Asymmetry and Syria 
In Modernity at Large, Arjun Appadurai states: 
 
…it is worth noticing that for the people of Irian Jaya, Indonesianization may be 
more worrisome than Americanization, as Japanization may be for Koreans, 
Indianization for Sri Lankans, Vietnamization for the Cambodians, and 
Russianization for the people of Soviet Armenia and the Baltic republics.  Such a 
list of alternative fears to Americanization could be greatly expanded, but it is not 
a shapeless inventory: for polities of a smaller scale, there is always a fear of 
cultural absorption by polities of larger scale, especially those that are nearby.  
One man’s imagined community is another man’s political prison.48 
 
  With Appadurai’s point in mind, it is important to take into consideration Syria’s 
particular historical relationship to both of the concept of coloniality and post-coloniality, and its 
place in the culture industry.  Specifically, the cultural history of Syria since independence has 
been conditioned not just by its relationship to France and Turkey, its former colonizers, but by a 
number of other relationships, both regional and worldwide.  These include the extremely 
important regional relationships with Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt, a country 
with whom it shared a brief union from 1958 to 1961.49 
Syria and Lebanon 
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Most significant of Syria’s regional relationships for the purposes of popular musical 
culture is with Lebanon, its most politically, economically, and culturally intertwined neighbor, 
and a place that has had at various moments in recent history, a greater impact on popular 
consciousness than the US, Russia, even Turkey, or any large but more culturally distant powers.   
In his biography of Hafiz al-Assad, Patrick Seale describes the historical relationship 
between the two countries: 
Syria’s interest in Lebanese affairs [in the 1970s] did not arouse surprise in either 
country, for in the general perception Syria and Lebanon were members of the 
same body.  Within living memory, the French had enlarged autonomous Mount 
Lebanon, the home of Maronite Christians and Druzes, to create the Republic of 
Lebanon by the addition of territories inhabited, as it happened, mainly by Sunni 
and Shi’I Muslims.  The inhabitants of the coastal cities – Tripoli and its 
hinterland, Beirut itself, Tyre and Sidon – as well as the Biqa’ valley and the 
south thought of themselves as belonging to a larger entity which they called 
Syria.  In culture, religious diversity, ethnic background, spoken dialect, even in 
what they ate and drank, Syrians and Lebanese were much of a piece.  The 
populations of the two countries were thoroughly intermingled, with countless 
families straddling the French-drawn frontier.50 
  
Despite the affinities of the two countries, the relationship between them has been asymmetrical, 
though not in a way that fits into a center-vs-periphery paradigm.  In recent decades the 
economically weaker but far larger and more militarily powerful Syria has taken the role of 
occupier and most significant foreign power, a positioned maintained most directly by the 30 
year presences of the Syrian Army in Lebanon from 1976 to 2006.  Despite this, the much higher 
per-capita wealth of Lebanon, and its status as a cosmopolitan center for Arab and Mediterranean 
culture has allowed it, even with hardships of the Civil War, to maintain a cultural and economic 
influence over Syria disproportionate to its size and population. 
Military 
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The initial entry of Syria into the Lebanese Civil was profoundly shocking to many, as 
Asad positioned Syria against the Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, who he had previously armed 
and given vocal support of in the context of resistance to Israel.  Seale writes of Asad’s motives 
that “Asad sent the army into Lebanon to teach the Palestinians sense and the keep the Christians 
Arab”,51  but perceptions of the Syrian reasons for the initial incursion vary; the public pretense 
given by the Syrian government was to defend Maronite Christian communities ,52 and the 
“defense of Lebanese” explanations is persuasive to a certain segment of the population.  
Meanwhile Syria’s most fearful critics both in Lebanon and in the US presume behind every 
move a goal of establishing a “Greater Syria” Bilad Ash-Sham, the stated goal of the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party,53 though scholars of Asad and the Syrian Ba’th maintain that pan-
Arabist affinity, resistance to Israel and purely Syrian real-politick interests motivated Syrian 
policy more than any dreams of Greater Syria.54 
Regardless of the leadership’s real vision for Lebanon, Syria maintained a large military 
presence through the duration of the Civil War.  The Syrian military influence in Lebanon only 
increased with the end of the war, the signing of the Taif Accord in 1989 and the failed rebellion 
against Syria led by Michel Aoun in 1989-1990.55  The Syria’s place within Lebanese borders 
was formalized in 1991 under the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination” and 
“Defense and Security Pact”, wherein Syria was granted the right to station troops in the Baqa’a 
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Valley.56  The occupation and political domination of Lebanon continued until the assassination 
of Rafiq Hariri in 2005, whereupon popular pressure within Lebanon, backed by international 
pressure such as United Nations Resolution 1559, forced Bashar Al-Assad to remove Syrian 
troops entirely from Lebanon in April of 2006.57 
The impact of this military occupation of Lebanon on Syrian culture is multiple.  In 
Syria, where every male must either serve in the military or buy his way out of it, countless 
members of the population have served or trained in Lebanon, in a variety of contents ranging 
from rural stations in the Baqa’a Valley to the front lines of an occupying army.  These former 
soldiers have some familiarity with Lebanon, and are cognizant of being perceived by some in 
Lebanon as threatening.   
Economic 
Culturally and economically, the asymmetry between Syria and Lebanon is reversed, as 
the music, literature, film, and from Lebanon has had more regional and global success.  The 
much higher per capita GDP of Lebanon means that a huge number of Syrian workers earn their 
livelihood in that country, where a Syrian accent is associated with low economic status.  Despite 
the military influence of Syria in Lebanon, the economic and cultural capital of Lebanon often 
inverts the relationship in cultural domains.  The astounding popularity of Fairuz in Syria, for 
example, has no reciprocal equivalent in Lebanon. 
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Al-Bayt - Adsiyya 
 Though the political focus of the album travels around the Arab world, only one song is 
directly set in Damascus, “Adsayya” (or Qudsaya the name of a neighborhood in Damascus, it 
means roughly “holy”).  It is one of the few love songs on the album, along with “Shabbākak 
Maṭfy” (Your window is dark) a song dedicated by an Iraqi woman to her love who had fled 
Iraq, and “Samā” (Sky), a lullaby written for the son of Hazem Al-Ani.  In an interview with the 
Daily Star, singer Sonia Bitar stated: “We sing about things that relate to our generation in the 
region, such as social and economic difficulties,” says Bittar. “We rarely sing about love.”58  
Despite this claim, the songs above especially are among the more popular from the album, and 
“Shabakek Maṭfy” was sung on an episode of the popular “Star Academy Lebanon” by Syrian 
contestants Zeina Aftimos and Nassif Zeytoun, who went on to win in 2010. 
 While “Adsiyya” is named for a specific part of Damascus, the song which is most 
reminiscent of Damascus might be “al-Bayt”, a song which is simultaneously a very clear 
metaphor for the political situation in Lebanon, and a description of a quotidian problem facing 
Damascus’s upper-middle class. 
 The song tells the story of a father who died without leaving a will, leaving behind the 
house he was born in and in which he lived his whole life.  Meeting at the house after his death, 
his three sons disagree over who should inherit the home.  The first two claim ownership for 
themselves, and the third wants it divided and sold. The story is a clear allegory for the political 
situation in Lebanon, and the ongoing fights over its control by various confessional groups, in 
this case told by a group of Syrians whose one country has (until recently) been able to maintain 
a façade of secular unity over a set of sectarian divides with the potential to cause similar 
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problems if managed incorrectly.  The song also describes a very real situation that exists 
amongst certain classes of Damascenes, especially the older families for whom the dispensation 
of valuable homes combined with the need to find housing for sons wanting to start families is a 
pressing problem.59  
Despite its relatively small audience compared to video clip friendly pop singers, the 
band does receive some airplay on Syrian radio (I have personally heard their music on Version 
FM, al Madina FM and Radio Fann for example), but it does not fit easily into the taxonomy 
described in previous chapters.  While Kulna Sawa is part of a “Syrian new wave”, and is 
extremely engaged with addressing the deficiencies of the local music scene, and the issues of 
the “Syrian song” described in previous chapters,60 much of the band’s music registers as 
Western or foreign to most listeners, as is made clear by the way that the music is presented on 
Syrian radio.  I was listening to Sham FM via the internet one evening when I heard the opening 
horn hits for “The Day that the World Changed” underneath an advertisement for a medical 
advice program called “Mubasharatan min Amreeka (Direct from America) with Doctor Hany 
Haidar.”  Since several members of Kulna Sawa work in music production for radio and 
television, I initially thought that this might have been the case of some musical recycling to 
speed up a production job for an ad.  However, Iyad Rimawi confirmed that Kulna Sawa’s music 
was used without their knowledge or permission.61  The fact that Kulna Sawa’s music has, 
unbeknownst to the group, been made by one station into a musical signifier for America, 
indicates the complicated situation that they find themselves in within the Syrian radioscape.   
                                                 
59
 According to Bassam Haddad, “Real Estate in Damascus is now among the most expensive in the world, certainly 
making the top-ten list. Haddad, Business Networks in Syria, 15. 
60
 See for example the proposal for a music venue/studio/mentoring space put together by vocalist Bashar Moussa’s 
arts management agency Ninawa Creative Units.  “Music Shelter http://music-shelter.com/ (accessed June 10, 
2012). 
61






The radio station described in Idhāʿat Sawa is one that combines Western and Arabic 
musical styles with news reports from across the Arabophone world, encourages and features 
calls and feedback from listeners, is basically secular in orientation, consisting of Muslim and 
Christian members, and is predicated on a critique of the existing media landscape in the Middle 
East.  Boiled down to that kernel description, and absent all of the context of its reality as an idea 
dreamt up by a few musicians in Damascus, rather than by a few legislators, officials, and 
businessmen in Washington, the station seem remarkably similar to Radio Sawa.   
A kaleidoscopic refraction of the idea behind Radio Sawa, seen through the lens of a 
particular musical scene, Idhāʿat Sawa displays all of these similarities, while at the same time 
managing to present a political viewpoint in direct opposition to the policy priorities defended by 
the American broadcast.  While refusing to place itself into the role of the US’s opposition in the 
Global War on Terror, Idhāʿat Sawa repudiates the Iraq War (Waṣlu al-ʿAskar), and mocks the 
US run constitution and election process (al-Aṣbaʿ Al-Banafsajī), criticizes the confessional 
government system in Lebanon (al-Bayt), calls US ally and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon a War Criminal (Nā’im ʿala Shāṭ al-Baḥr) romanticizes resistance to Israel in southern 
Lebanon, and mocks the Arabophobia of American media (Ana Irhābī). 
 At the same time, the creators of Idhāʿat Sawa demonstrate an understanding of 
American culture and musical styles that is far beyond what any advocate of “Brand America” 
could hope to achieve through radio broadcasts.  The very act of reproducing a variation of 
Radio Sawa’s form and concept, and the style and forms of American music, with completely 
antithetical political content calls into question some of the principles behind the use of music in 





 The two “stations” both employ a mix of music and political content, but the roles of 
these two elements, and the presumed listening pattern associated with the two sources, couldn’t 
be more different.  The political content on Idhāʿat Sawa - antipathy towards US and Israeli 
policies, sympathy for victims of war in Iraq, Gaza, and Southern Lebanon, desire to end 
sectarianism in Lebanon – are all built around areas of agreement with the band’s young Arab 
audience.  Not trying to persuade or convince skeptical listeners, Kulna Sawa addresses a local 
audience who will presumably have similar views and sympathies on these issues.  Instead, the 
task for the band is to convince a larger Syrian audience of the relevance of its musical style, in a 
region where there exists is a larger audience for the band’s political message than for its mix of 
Western rock styles.   The members of Kulna Sawa are fully aware that rock music is not the best 
way to spread a message (political or otherwise) to the general populace, and yet they envision a 
pan-Arab station which does exactly that, broadcasting across the breadth of the Arab world.  
Idhāʿat Sawa is certainly an example of a resistance to Western narratives about political 
justice and just force, but it is more than simply an inversion of the Radio Sawa and America’s 
political positions.  In a reversal of Radio Sawa’s attempt to use a musical frame to move 
listeners to consider an alternate political reality, Idhāʿat Sawa uses a political frame to posit a 
new musical reality.  It crystallizes the essential differences between American and Syrian 
historical conceptions of the radio.  Americans tend to imagine radio as fundamentally musical, 
and only occasionally political.  In the penetrated system of Middle Eastern politics, radio is 






Chapter 6 - Conclusion: Sound Shifts and the Syrian Uprising  
قشمد يف 
ءامسلا ريست 
ةميدقلا تاقرطلا ىلع 
ةيفاح ,ةيفاح 





the sky walks 
barefoot on the old roads, 
barefoot 





Mahmoud Darwish – from The Damascene Collar of the Dove1 
At the weekly poetry night in Damascus, Bayt al-Qasīd, a long-running event 
popular amongst poets, actors, university students, and foreigners looking for a fix of 
formal Arabic, the poem “Tawq al-Hamāma al-Dimashqi”(The Damascene Collar of the 
Dove) by Mahmoud Darwish, was a recurring refrain.  The city of Darwish’s ode is the 
Damacus not just of Damascenes, but of travelers, strangers, and pilgrims. On the many 
nights I attended Bayt al-Qaseed in 2009 and 2010, those who brought the poem to the 
podium were usually from outside of Damascus, and often outside of Syria.  Visitors 
from Aleppo, Amman, Beirut and Baghdad all came prepared with at least a few of the 
twenty-two stanzas, each beginning with “Fī Dimashqa” (“In Damascus…”).2   
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The city of the poem is also the city of a listener and music-lover, where “speech 
softens, and I hear the sound of blood in the marble veins,” where “the dialogue goes on, 
between the violin and the oud, about the question of existence, and about endings,” and 
“the flute completes its habit, of longing for what is present in it, then cries in vain.”  
Spoken aloud at Bayt al-Qasīd, the poem was brought into being in an interaction 
between text, voice and listeners.  Depending on the respect afforded to the visiting 
reciter, and the mood of the crowd, the opening lines could incite anything from 
respectful silence to mocking group recitation along with the speaker, to gleeful 
corrections of grammar should a speaker drop his or her vowels).3   Few readers would 
recite the full poem, and with each new selection of lines, new voice, and new interaction 
between speaker and audience, a fresh portrait of the city was created from Darwish’s 
sketch. 
 In Damascus 2012, in the midst of the crisis, Bayt al-Qasīd has been shut down, 
the stream of foreign visitors has dried up, and some of the regular attendees have fled 
the city or the country, but the sound of this particular poem can still be heard every day 
on the radio.4  On Sham FM, the most overtly nationalistic of the Syrian private radio 
stations, a recording of Darwish reading “Tawq al-Hamāma al-Dimeshqi” is in high 
rotation, used along with a number of poems about Damascus and Syria as interstitial 
material between music programs and newscasts.  As the crisis in Syria has developed, 
the resonance of the symbols of Syria has shifted, and so has the sound of the Syria 
radioscape. 
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Rather than concluding with an overview of the ground covered in this 
dissertation, in the following pages I describe some of the ways that the Syrian 
soundscape has changed between spring 2011 and summer 2012.  Given the current 
turmoil in Syria -- a situation which at this point can only be described as a civil war -- 
and the inherent problems in writing about the country from afar, this section can only be 
a gesture towards future scholarship.  Nevertheless, I hope to point towards some ways 
that the previous chapters in this dissertation may be relevant to thinking about music and 
radio broadcasting in the midst of conflict.5 
 
The Syrian Regime and Media Responses to Threats 
The Syrian revolution began in earnest in March of 2011 over a year after the 
beginning of the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia, a period in which many foreign observers 
predicted that the revolutionary wave would leave the Asad regime unscathed.6  Between 
March 2011 and August 2012 (the time of this writing), the crisis progressed through a 
series of demonstrations and violent crackdowns by the regime to a state of civil war 
between the Syrian army and a variety of rebel militias.7  Hundreds of thousands of 
Syrians have fled, more have been internally displaced, and significant parts of the 
country, including areas in the largest cities of Aleppo and Damascus, are in a state of 
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open war.8  The mere names of towns in Syria - Homs, al-Houla, Darāya – have become 
shorthand for the unimaginable violence perpetrated by the Syrian regime against its own 
citizens.   
Before moving to a discussion of radio and music during the uprisings, it is useful 
to give a brief overview of Syrian media’s public response to internal threats.  Before the 
current crisis, the events which had presented the greatest domestic challenge to the 
Syrian Ba’thist regime and the rule of the Asads was the Muslim Brotherhood-led 
uprising between 1977-1982, which culminated in the 1982 massacre of Brotherhood 
forces as well as thousands of civilians in Hama. Writing about Syrian state-controlled 
media’s depiction of the events at Hama, Lisa Wedeen states: 
 
 The ways in which events at Hama were portrayed exemplifies how the 
regime uses partial truth-telling, prohibitions against speech, and 
iconography to provide a consensually understood formula for proper 
articulations of the conflict.  The events at Hama represent perhaps the 
most significant domestic conflict of Asad’s rule.  They could not be flatly 
ignored, and they prompted a public, official explanation that included the 
usual rhetoric accusing Zionists and Americans of intervening in Syrian 
internal affairs and marking the Brotherhood as agents of Western 
imperialism.  However, the account went beyond these rhetorical 
conventions and divulged partial details of what happened.  The choice of 
details reveals how the regime offers a formula for staying safe during 
                                                 
8
 “Syria refugee numbers ‘surpass 200,000’” Al Jazeera  August 25, 2012. 






especially troubled times, both communicating the official terms of 
national membership and also interpolating “citizens” in the narrative by 
occasioning their participation in its reproduction.9 
 
While in the 1980s some media from outside of the country (significantly radio) were 
available within the country, and presented information and views conflicting with that of 
official outlets, it was possible for the state to create a media climate in which the official 
narrative was, if not the only one available, at least the only one which could be discussed 
in the public sphere.  According to Wedeen, rather than aiming for strict “legitimacy”, or 
even necessarily for individual belief in state media’s version of events, the purpose of 
regime media is to regulate the public discourse and the practices of public 
communication: 
 
The regime’s representation of events at Hama demonstrates the ways in 
which the official narrative clutters public space and provides a formula 
for public speech.  The regime puts forth the exemplary rhetoric to be 
imitated and thereby orients would-be commentators.  It also 
communicates its intolerance of alternative symbols, discussions, and 
language.  The rhetoric’s flexibility allows definitions to remain slippery, 
and it uses paradox and hyperbole to construe events in terms of 
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preexisting categories, including assumptions of harmonious unity, 
Ba’thist control, and [Hafiz] Asad’s infallibility.10 
 
One significant difference between the Syrian regime’s media response to the opposition 
of the early 1980s and the current crisis is in the relationship of official and de facto state-
controlled media to outside media.   In contrast even to a few decades ago, the addition of 
satellite television and the internet to the Syrian mediascape makes the illusion of a 
unitary depiction of events within Syria an impossible fiction to maintain.  Syria has been 
accused (along with Iran) of attempts at jamming satellite signals, including those 
carrying Al-Hurra and the satellite stream of Radio Sawa, and pro-regime news outlets 
are forced to address the coverage by channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya, 
consistent advocates of the Syrian uprising.11  The official website of the Syrian General 
Organization for Radio and Television acknowledges the reality of foreign media 
consumption, and even provides links to the website of some of the outside media outlets 
which have been blocked in the past, and lists the major Arabic-language Lebanese 
newspapers (al-Akhbar, An Nahar, As-Safeer), as well as the BBC, CNN, and the major 
pan-Arab dailies published in London (al-Hayat, ash-Sharq al-Awsat.)12   
 While the Syrian mediascape has changed significantly since the early 1980s, 
Wedeen’s insight that the regime-controlled media are not primarily concerned with 
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achieving legitimacy or belief remains valid in the summer of 2012, with a difference 
being that to a greater extent than in previous crises, the public discourse is created with 
the availability of outside information sources as an openly acknowledged factor.  Early 
on in the current crisis, several articles in the Western press described Syrian media 
outlets as attempting to ignore the situation, and provide an illusion of calm, but in 
sampling Syrian radio and television from the US (and more briefly from Lebanon and 
Jordan) via satellite television and the internet, I have not found this to be the case.  
Instead the Syrian regime has attempted to create a public narrative of the crisis in 
opposition to foreign news outlets, and discredit the pan-Arab satellite stations. With the 
majority of the Saudi and Gulf-financed media arrayed against the Syrian regime (and the 
financial assistance coming from these countries to some of the Syrian rebels), the Syrian 
media attacks not just Western powers, but pan-Arab media as part of a global conspiracy 
to wage a “psychological and media war” alongside the traditional US, Zionist, and 
Islamist enemies invoked in political rhetoric. 
An examination of the state media rhetoric in regards to Syrian uprising is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, but one can broadly describe the Syrian regime-controlled 
media in 2011 and 2012 as attempting to portray the demonstrators and (later) rebel 
fighters as foreign or foreign-backed terrorists, and a threat to the secular, multi-ethnic 
Syrian society.  The relationship between Syrian minority groups (including Christian, 
Druze, Ismaili and Twelver Shia in addition to the Alawis, who form much of the 
military and security apparatus of the state) and the Syrian regime since the assumption 
of power by Hafiz al-Asad has been a complicated one.  As numerous scholars of Syria 





the state as the secular defender of minority rights, while also appeasing the majority 
Sunni population.13  In terms of mass media, both of these efforts have intensified during 
the uprising.  In an attempt to retain the loyalty of Sunni allies, the regime for the first 
time sponsored religious satellite television and radio stations (Nour ash-Sham), in a deal 
with Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan Al-Buti in 2011.14  While decrying sectarianism 
as part of an extreme Islamist plot to divide the Syrian state, and observing the general 
prohibition against the discussion of sectarian affiliation in public life, Syrian radio and 
television have made obvious attempts to stoke the fears of minority groups in the 
country.  For example, after a bombing in a Christian neighborhood in Damascus in April 
2012, Syrian state television preceded an interview with a local church official by 
broadcasting scenes of a beaten and crucified Jesus from the film The Passion of the 
Christ, directly linking the rebels and their potential ascension to power with the 
persecution of Christians.15  These fears of an Islamist takeover among many Syrians 
(including many Sunnis as well as religious minorities and secularists) have made it 
easier for the state to paint media coverage by pan-Arab satellite stations (backed by 
conservative Sunni-dominated Gulf states) as sectarian and ideologically motivated.   
As Wedeen argues, the point of Syrian propaganda is not necessarily to convince 
or persuade citizens of the accuracy of its depiction of the world but instead to provide “a 
formula for public speech,” and at times Syrian television and radio stations do not even 
                                                 
13
 See Leon T. Goldsmith, “The Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: Alawite  ’Asabiyya and the Rise and 
Decline of the Asad Dynasty of Syria” (PhD dissertation: University of Otago, 2012); Patrick Seale, Asad 
of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Nikolaos Van 
Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria-Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba’th Party  (London: IE 
Tauris, 1996); Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad  (London: IB Tauris, 1997). 
14
 Phil Sands, “Assad Government Enlists Imams to calm Sunni Majority ,” LebanonWire.com April 8, 
2011 http://www.lebanonwire.com/1104MLN/11040824TN.asp 
15
  Syria TV, April 7, 2012.  Mel Gibson (director), The Passion of the Christ, DVD (20th Century Fox 





seem to be trying very hard to create a convincing narrative.  The “paradox and 
hyperbole” in public depictions of events in Hama in 1982 is equally present in discourse 
about the current Syrian Uprisings, and much of what pro-regime media outlets have 
broadcast in 2011 and 2012 must be unbelievable even to ardent supporters of the regime.  
Rather than competing with outside media sources for the most believable narrative, part 
of its task is to create a climate in which all media is assumed to be propagandistic, or to 
use the terminology outlined in the introduction, all media is directed media (al-  ilām al-
muwajjah).  This skeptical view of media has the benefit of being true, both in the broad 
sense that all communication is political, and in the more narrow sense that it would be 
hard to watch or listen to the major Arabic-language news networks (al-Jazeera, al-
Arabiyya, al-Hurra, etc…) without perceiving an editorial slant in favor of revolution in 
Syria.16   
Embedded in L. Carl Brown’s “penetrated system” of Middle Eastern politics, 
Syrians are certainly more accustomed than most audiences to listening between the notes 
and assuming political motivations behind all media.17 In a context where the assumed 
dominance of state media and its narrative of reality has broken down, the task is not to 
convince listeners that, for example, the Syrian opposition consists of foreign jihadis.  
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The goal of the state is to to convince listeners that “acting as if” that were true is safer, 
or more directly in their interests, than acting as if it were not true, that associating with 
the public formula of the Syrian state’s directed media is a better bet than associating 
with (equally politically motivated) outside and opposition media.  The assessment of this 
type of media environment requires a kind of skeptical listening on the part of the 
audience.  The listener is primed to interpret not just the news content of a broadcast, but 
also the political position of the broadcasts, and the particular type of public performance 
desired by the broadcasters. 
 
Radio during the Syrian Uprising 
قشمد يف 
دئاصقلا فشت 
ةيدسج يه لا 
ةيبهذ يه لاو 
ىدصلا لوقي ام اهنإ 
...ىدصلل 
In Damascus 
poems become diaphanous 
they’re neither sensual 
nor intellectual 
they are what the echo 
says to the echo 
 
Mahmoud Darwish – from The Damascene Collar of the Dove18 
 
 The shift in the Syrian radioscape has been gradual.  Over the course of 2011 
Syrian private radio stations began broadcasting more and more political news, a practice 
from which private stations are ostensibly banned under the licenses granted by the 
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government.19 In the early months of the uprising in Syria, the news broadcasts on private 
music stations attempted to maintain a veneer of impartiality or objectivity, maintaining a 
level of brand differentiation from official state radio while simultaneously reinforcing 
the narratives espoused by official state outlets.  Rather than directly report on official 
statements, the private radio stations would often cite Western or non-Syrian sources like 
the BBC or CNN, and quote politicians or officials from outside Syria (Russia, China, 
and Turkey especially) describing elements of the opposition as “armed terrorists.”  For 
several stations including al-Madina FM, Syria al-Ghad radio, and Arabesque, the early 
response to the uprising took the form of talk shows where listeners could call in to report 
on the “real situation.”  In April of 2011, the station manager of Radio Arabesque stated: 
  
 Radio Arabesque is in solidarity with the other domestic media agencies in 
confronting the false content broadcast by some unprofessional media 
organizations. Arabesque engages in this opposition in a number of ways, 
including by opening free lines to the citizens of all provinces to connect 
with “Syria, My Love” and speak about their situation, so that everyone 
can be reassured of the stability of the situation in all provinces.20 
 
 As the crisis progressed and became bloodier, private radio has increased news 
coverage, and that coverage has come to more closely resemble the traditional regime-
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controlled news outlets.  Sham FM, the station which embraced its new role as a news 
source most enthusiastically, broadcasts short news segments around the clock, in 
addition to longer daily broadcasts under the heading “M  alūmāt Akīda” (Accurate 
Information).  Other stations, including Melody FM, Version FM, and Radio Fann, 
broadcast weekly political news and current events shows, or Q&A programs with the 
mas’ūlīn, government and party officials (literally: the responsible people).   
 According to Honey al-Sayed, a former morning show host for al Madina FM 
who fled Syria to the US in January of 2012: 
 
My show turned political, and every show turned political because there 
was an elephant in the room you needed to talk about…but when you talk 
about it, you have to say, 'It's terrorists.' All media became state media, 
whether you liked it or not.21 
 
These stations do not have an independent newsgathering infrastructure, and the 
broadcasts draw on the same government-run Syrian Arab News Association (SANA) 
that provides reporting for Syrian newspapers.  The increase in demand for newsreaders 
on private radio has also taxed the pool of experienced broadcasting talent.  As stations 
previously restricted to music and entertainment news began broadcasting current events 
and political news, a listener could frequently hear novice radio broadcasters struggling 
to maintain their control over the language and diction associated with a serious 
newscaster.  Although it would be impossible for regime censors to monitor every station 
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around the clock to ensure that the government line is followed, Article 15 of the Syrian 
law governing private radio states that stations must continuously record their broadcast 
and maintain a digital record of one month, to be delivered to the Ministry of Information 
upon request.22 
 In contrast to the partial shift towards political news amongst Syrian private 
stations, Radio Sawa has retained the same format throughout the Arab uprisings, with 
the same ratio of music to news content, though revolutions across the Arab world have 
naturally dominated Radio Sawa’s news broadcasts.  The appearance of Radio Sawa in 
relation to local stations has shifted, however, in that the basic format of Radio Sawa, the 
combination of popular music and news, has been adopted by Syrian private stations, 
which for the first time are allowed and required to report on politics (albeit with a single 
perspective).  With reduced public spending on advertising in the failing Syrian economy, 
the private stations have come to mirror Radio Sawa in another way, almost parodying 
consumer capitalism in the face of economic crisis through programming and format 




  Syrian private stations have also shifted on a musical level during the period 
since the beginning of the uprisings.  Most audibly, there has been an unsurprising 
increase in explicitly nationalistic and patriotic songs (Āghānī Waṭaniyya).  Already 
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inclined towards patriotic slogans (even the English language, Western-music focused 
station Mix FM uses the slogan “Proud 2B Syrian”), stations have increased patriotic 
rhetoric and to a lesser extent shifted their playlists towards songs which explicitly 
reference Syria.24  For example, for several months (between at least February and June 
2012), the “Top Five Songs” listed on Al Madina FM’s website consisted exclusively of 
patriotic and nationalistic songs.   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Screenshot of the “Top 5 Songs” Al-Madina FM website (English page). 
March 22, 201225 
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Figure 6.2: Screenshot of “Top 5 Songs” from the website of Al-Medina FM . June 5, 
2012 (same five songs listed).26 
 
Some of these āghānī waṭaniyya have come from Lebanese or other non-Syrian 
singers, and were recorded well before the Arab Uprisings.  Although the performers of 
these older songs have come under some criticism in their home countries, before the 
beginning of the Syrian revolution these songs were often understood to be the price of 
admission for artists wanting to perform concerts in Syria.27   
In 2011, before the violence in Syria had spread to Damascus and Aleppo in a 
large way, there was an explosion in nationalistic and directly pro-regime songs.  The 
flood of pro-regime songs was particularly evident on the Arabic-language internet, 
where Youtube was flooded with both new songs and home-edited pro-Bashar videos set 
to old songs, and numerous websites like Ṣawt el Ghad Syria focused primarily on the 
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distribution of Syrian patriotic and political songs.28   There have been numerous articles 
in the Western press with titles like “the Soundtrack of the Revolution” since the 
beginning of the popular uprisings in Tunisia and their spread around the Arab world, and 
there are certainly a large number of songs expressing solidarity with the Syrian 
revolutionaries.29  However, there has been very little mention of the counter-
revolutionary or pro-regime music which, at least when it comes to Syrian mass-media 
and the internet, probably comprises a majority of that soundtrack.  Of particular surprise 
to Western popular music scholars might be the significant number of pro-Bashar hip-
hop, including for example the song “ḍid al-balad” (“Against the Country”) by the group 
Murder Eyez, listed incorrectly on the Al-Madina Top Five chart above as “Ana Sūri” by 
Abd al-Rahman (one of the members of the group).  The song decries sedition (fitna), and 
namechecks “God and Bashar”, while accusing the opposition of hypocrisy and 
criminality, and the international media of propaganda. 
… 
You complain about cleanliness, 
You need to first clean up your door, your house, your history, and then your separatism 
You complain about bribes,  
You need to first stop your cheating,  
your piracy and your smuggling and tell me who will stop you 
 
Al Jazeera, al-Arabiyya, and the BBC don’t describe you 
A media war from the lobby, leading to your destruction 
You complain about security 
We are forcing a lesson upon you.…30 
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The song “diḍ al-balad” is an interesting example in terms of where it falls stylistically 
relative to the standard playlists on Al-Madina FM and private radio.  Arabic-language 
rap is very rarely heard on Syrian radio, and in periodic spot checks of the Al-Madina 
Top Song chart between 2010 and 2012, this is the only song found featured on the list 
featuring a rapped vocal style.  Here as with the discussion of Idhāʿat Sawa in Chapter 5, 
we have an instance in which the political content of the songs allows for the dispersal of 
a less popular musical style 
It is important to mention that one cannot use the prevalence of pro-regime songs 
at a given point in time, or the ratio of pro vs. anti-Bashar comments on YouTube, as a 
proxy for the political opinions of the Syrian people.  Access to both recording 
technology and the internet is disproportionally available to Syria’s wealthy in Damascus 
and Aleppo, groups who are usually assumed to support the Asad regime at a higher rate 
than the poor and people outside of those two cities.  In addition as with most public 
professions of allegiance to the Syrian regime, there are also multiple incentives at play 
here beyond the articulation of political affiliation.  For example, in an April 2012 
interview with al-Watan, composer Sadiq Dimeshqi criticized the “wave of patriotic 
songs” as largely comprised of transparent attempts to achieve fame while there was 
interest and demand for that genre.31 
As mentioned above, there have also been a significant number of musicians to 
come out against the regime, including both musicians like Samiḥ Shuqair, and pop star 
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Asala Nasri, who performed concerts in the US to raise money for the opposition.32  
Shayna Silverstein has also written on oppositional performances in a summer 2012 
article on “Syria’s Radical Dabke.”33  While I don’t mean to diminish the significance of 
this oppositional music, pro-revolution songs are unsurprisingly absent from Syrian radio 
(nor for that matter do they appear with any frequency on Radio Sawa), and as such, have 
limited relevance to the current discussion.  Artists are often pressed to make political 
statements, and blacklists are being kept on both sides.34  Directly pro-regime music, 
though increasingly present during the Syrian uprising, does not actually comprise a very 
large segment of the playlists on Syrian private stations, or even the states’ Ṣawt ash-
Shabāb for that matter, and instead there have been subtler shifts in existing playlists and 
programming. 
 The percentage of foreign language songs may have decreased slightly in relation 
to the playlists that were used when I was in Syria in 2010 as the regime’s rhetoric 
against foreign instigators and conspirators has increased, but not to a remarkable extent.  
There has however been a small but audible shift within the foreign language playlist, 
conforming to the process of Syrian genre assimilation described earlier.   Though in my 
listening since Spring 2011 I have found foreign song prevalence only slightly lower, the 
number of foreign songs which might be categorized as fully Western, not fitting easily 
within Syrian radio genres, has decreased more noticeably.  Thus while continuing to 
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program nearly the same quantity of non-Arabic songs, I would argue that the playlists on 
Syrian radio have become audibly less foreign.  
Using the taxonomies and visualizations from Chapters 3 and 4, Figure 6.3 
represents a typical pre-2011 playlist for Syrian private ratio, while Figure 6.4 would 
represent a playlist with a slightly shifted content of foreign songs. 
 
 
                





                 
Figure 6.4: Graphic Representation of a playlist on Syrian private radio in 2012. 
 
I would characterize the shift in the Western playlist as moving into a position of further 
overlap with rūmānsī/hādi  , and shabābī categories.   To put this into familiar stylistic 
terms, more of the Western songs played in 2012 are familiar hits from the 1980s and 
1990s, and fewer of them are new songs in Western styles (guitar-based rock and 
rhythmically syncopated hip-hop) which are less associated with other radio categories.  
While this analysis represents a subjective interpretation of an extremely large pool of 
musical data, there are daily uses of music on Syrian radio which are significantly less 
subtle.  Listening to the Syrian radio since March of 2011 provides numerous cases in 
which the choice of existing music, even within a set of radio genre expectations, is 






Each morning on Sham FM a woman’s voice greets listeners across the country, 
saying “Sabāḥ al- Khayr”(Good Morning) to a city over the introduction to each song.  
The station’s morning playlist is typically Fairuziāt and music from the 50s, 60s, and 
70s.  On a particular Friday morning (September 6, 2011) she greets the following cities 
one by one over the course of the morning, each salutation moving smoothly into a love 
song by Fairuz or her male contemporaries: 
 
Sabāḥ al-Khayr Ṭarṭūs… 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr Qudsayya… 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr Mhardeh… 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr Baniyas… 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr Sweida… 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr Idlib … 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr Raqqa … 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr ya Sham… 
Sabāḥ al- Khayr ya baladi (my country) 
 
The final two cities are greeted over the same song, a male voice backed by a chorus, a 
martial rhythm and stomping percussion.  Wind instruments accompany the drums, and 
echoes of a marching army reverberate as the chorus repeats the words of the leader.  The 
song is “Ṭallu Ṭallu As-Siyādi” (“They come, they come, the hunters”) by Nasri Shams 
ad-Deen.  The cities are Homs and Hama, two historical centers of opposition to the Asad 
regime, and two cities which on the day I was listening were in open revolt against the 
regime, and under constant threat of bombardment from the Syrian army.   
 
Sabāḥ al-Khayr Homs 
 
They come, They come, the hunters, and their weapons are shining  





From one valley to another, the hunters couldn't get her  
I promise to get you oh little bird35 
 
Sahab al-khayr Hama 
 
This song can be heard as a love song, but paired with the cities of Hama and Homs, the 
effect is unquestionably threatening.  A listener has a clear idea of who the symbols of 
the song represent, and is given a clear choice of identifying with the hunters, or 
identifying with the bird. 
 
Conclusion 
  That Syrian commercial stations exist at the pleasure of the Asad regime is 
surprising to absolutely no one in Syria, but the fact that these stations are now making 
their political affinities audible through broadcasting news, and through their musical 
choices, has changed the radioscape significantly.  Where does this leave Radio Sawa and 
America’s attempts at musical diplomacy? Apart from the increased relevance of its news 
content, the programming aimed at the Levant has not changed all that much since the 
beginning of the Arab Uprisings.  Where a listener might have previously differentiated 
Radio Sawa on the basis of its mix of music and news, the station now has no obvious 
format differentiation with local music stations.  As such, the significant differentiating 
factor for the station becomes the news content, the direction of the “directed media,” as 
skeptical listeners perceive the station as a foreign-funded version of local Syrian 
pop/news equivalents with a particularly American political thrust. 
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In conversations with radio listeners in Damascus in 2010, the American Radio 
Sawa was occasionally confused with a local station entitled “Radio Samar” (the station 
has since changed its name Radio Nujoom), a name that isn’t really very similar, but can 
be confused in the context of a station bumper over loud, fast-paced backing music.  It is 
hard to imagine listeners making that mistake now.  Though increased news content on 
Syrian private radio has brought these stations closer to the format of Radio Sawa, the 
political distinction between the US and the Syrian directed media is made crystal clear 
by listening for more than a few minutes. 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the question of how “American” a 
station sounds is determined not by the prevalence of American songs, but rather by the 
relationship of those songs to local contexts, local listeners, and local listening practices. 
Musically, the shifts during the conflict have had the strange effect of making the 
Western music in Syrian radio noticeably more “Syrian,” at least in terms of its 
relationship to Syrian programming categories, and the reciprocal effect of making 
American radio sound relatively more “American.”  The combination of heightened 
musical contrast between the foreign playlists of Radio Sawa and local stations, and the 
increased awareness of all media outlets as politically motivated, creates a situation in 
which Sawa might be interpreted as advocating American culture more forcefully in 2012 
than it did in 2010, relative to the background radioscape.  The meaning of this music for 
listeners, and therefore its political resonance and its power to persuade listeners or 





As I write these final pages, drawn away periodically by the appalling news of the 
latest massacre in Daraya, it is impossible to predict what will happen in Syria.36  As an 
analysis of the role of music and political radio in the Syrian Revolution, this short 
chapter can only point towards future scholarship.  There are, however, signs in the 
Syrian mediascape that a tectonic shift is immanent.  A spate of Syrian broadcasters from 
both state and private stations have recently abandoned the regime, and the important 
Syrian soap opera industry is shutting down, Addounia television has ceased broadcasting 
on Arabsat and Nilesat, and there are signs that the media elite in Damascus and Aleppo 
are falling away from Asad.37  The state radio and television building in Damascus was 
attacked in early August 2012.38  Musically, the wave of pro-Bashar songs has receded 
somewhat, and Al Madina FM’s Top Songs chart no longer exclusively features āghānī 
wataniyya.  I come across fewer pro-Bashar songs via the internet and social media in 
August 2012 than I have for the past year and a half, though it is impossible to tell 
whether this is the result of a shift in public opinion and the beliefs among music 
producers about who is likely to prevail, or because violence has forced studios and at-
home producers in Syria to shut down; certainly both explanations are at play. 
The shape that Syria will take in the coming months and years is unclear.  So too 
the contours of the future Syria’s media and radioscapes are impossible to predict.  If the 
recent history of policy in the Middle East is any guide, however, we can confidently 
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predict that US policymakers will attempt to shape these future topographies through 
every means at their disposal, be it economic sanctions or incentives, traditional 
diplomacy, “coercive diplomacy” and the threat of force, or subtler means like the 
musical and public diplomacy of Radio Sawa.  In this dissertation I hope to have shown 
that these efforts need to be understood not just in terms of foreign policy and political 
“facts on the ground”, but of local media and musical life, and ways of listening and 
understanding music.  While these sonic projections of the state become less audible 
amidst the din of bombs and bullets, they are nevertheless a real part of the way that 
states exert power over their own people and the people of foreign countries.    Taking 
cultural diplomacy seriously as an exercise of political power means taking listening 
seriously, and recognizing efforts to shape the practice of listening for what they are: 
















 A large-scale project like this dissertation inevitably involves a distillation 
process, as one attempts to winnow research threads and trails of inquiry into a coherent 
set of arguments and ideas.  Over the course of the five years since I began formulating 
my dissertation project my focus has shifted, from an interest in America’s political 
broadcasts in the Arab World and the broader use of popular music as a political tool to a 
fascination with popular music in Syria and the ways in which it is packaged, broadcast, 
discussed and heard over the radio.  To the extent that this dissertation represents a 
synthesis between the broad issues of music and political radio and the specifics of the 
Syrian radioscape, I hope to have shown that the meanings of these large-scale efforts at 
political broadcasting and musical diplomacy are contingent on the local radio 
environments, sounds, and practices which define popular music in any specific place.   
In Chapter 1 (Learning to Broadcast) I began with the history of international 
broadcasting in the Middle East, analyzing the institutional theories with which music has 
been employed as a tool of American foreign policy.  These theories became a focus 
again in Chapter 4 (Radio Sawa, Sonic Consumerism, and Western Music in the Syrian 
Radioscape), where I argued that Radio Sawa operates under a theory of musical utility in 
which the efficacy of music depends not on its communicative power, but on the 
possibility of conditioning audiences to hear music and cultural products in a consumerist 
mindset. I further argue that his theory of of musical utility is based on an American 






As a music scholar, one of my hopes is to bring an increased focus on sound to 
the interdisciplinary discussion of public culture.  Most significantly in this dissertation, I 
have described some of the aural signifiers that differentiate and classify various types of 
popular music, both local and Western, as they appear on Syrian radio.  Chapter 2 
(Damascus Radioscape) addressed the auditory practices, histories of radio, and theories 
of music through which listeners in the sonic environment of Damascus create locally 
relevant meaning out of music and radio.  I expanded this description of the Syrian 
radioscape in Chapter 3 (Popular Music in Syrian Mass Media Discourse) drawing on the 
Arabic-language public and mass-media discourse to outline a taxonomy of popular 
music in terms of how it is programmed, discussed, and heard over the radio.  In the 
second half of Chapter 4, I returned to this taxonomy in order to describe some of the 
musical attributes through which Western songs fit into Syrian radio categories.  In 
Chapter 5 (Idhāʿat Sawa and Asymmetric Music Politics) I addressed the Damascus rock 
scene, and a specific case in which a Syrian rock band, in the act of reproducing a 
variation of Radio Sawa’s form and concept – with the style and forms of American 
music but antithetical political content – called into question some of the principles 
behind the use of music in Radio Sawa and American international broadcasting in 
general.    
In the final chapter of the dissertation (Conclusion: Sound Shifts and the Syrian 
Uprising) I detailed the changes that have taken place in the Damascus radioscape 
between December 2010 and August 2012, since the beginning of the Arab uprisings.  
Here I described the current radioscape in relation to a practice of ‘skeptical listening’, 





which may be at odds with those meant by the producers, as the political valences of 
messenger and media become a fundamental part of both the content and the act of 
listening.  
 Moving towards post-dissertation research, I anticipate two contrasting directions 
for my future work: broadening the scope outside of Syria to explore contrasting 
examples of radioscapes within the Arab World, and zooming in to conduct more 
ethnographically-focused work with individual listeners.  Towards the first goal, I have 
begun work on the radioscape in Beirut, Lebanon, a city where regulatory, linguistic, 
political, historical, and social frameworks for the production and consumption of radio 
music are very different than those in Syria.  Having conducted some field recording in 
Amman, Ramallah, and Cairo as well over the past few years, I am also exploring the 
possibility of adding a third site and corresponding radioscape to my continuing analysis 
of Radio Sawa and international broadcasting.    
 The second goal, of incorporating a more individual, listener-centered analysis to 
supplement the media analysis of Chapter 3, has been complicated by the particularities 
of working on Syria.  When I visited Damascus on my initial research trips in Winter 
2008- 2009 and began focus on Syria as a primary research site, I was aware that working 
on Syria would present certain difficulties.  In particular, the kind of ethnographic, 
listener-centered work which I consider to be a necessary next step for this project was 
made difficult for a number of reasons.  The first was the danger of doing politically-
focused research in Syria.  I did conduct ethnographic work in Damascus in 2010, but 
despite the fact that this dissertation rests heavily on the guidance and insight of the 





and nightclubs, these individuals by and large do not appear as characters in this 
dissertation, for a variety of reasons which I discuss in the introduction.  The second 
factor, of course unanticipated at the time, was the political upheaval and subsequent 
violence which has precluded work in Syria since Spring 2011.  When I left Syria in the 
summer of 2010, I anticipated making a research trip the following year to focus in on a 
few specific settings for collective radio listening, and the way that listeners interact with 
and describe the radio.   
 The dissolution of the Syrian state, and of the 2010 Damascus soundscape that I 
describe in Chapter 2, ended immediate plans for further research into listening within 
Syria.  Not only has it become impossible to conduct research in the country, but many of 
the very people with whom I spent my time listening in Damascus are no longer there.  
Among the Syrians with whom I have kept in contact, I know individuals and families 
who have fled to Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Europe and elsewhere, not to mention 
those internally displaced within Syria.  At the moment then, plans for research into 
personal listening habits include working with Syrians in exile, especially in Lebanon, 
even as their experiences of listening (to music, the news, recordings, radio, to each 
other) has been profoundly disrupted, and the act of listening takes on a variety of new 
meanings in the context of the catastrophe in Syria. 
 The ethnographic present in which parts of this dissertation were written has 
definitively ended in Syria, and as with any work of scholarship on contemporary life, the 
dissertation became a historical document as soon as it was completed.  On a basic level, 
this dissertation documents a historical moment from the end of the approximately six-





private radio, and retreated slightly from the state domination of public culture.  As I 
hope that I have demonstrated, mass-mediated musical life in Syria during this period 
was much more complicated than the simple juxtapositions of state vs. private, Syrian vs. 
foreign that might be implied by that description.  The radioscape that was accessible to a 
Syrian listener during this period involved more than a mix of local, international, and 
hybrid musical genres and styles, and a range of political goals behind the programming 
of music on the radio; it provided the site for a variety of complex listening possibilities 
and ways of creating meaning from popular music.  The exploration of these possibilities 
for listening – hybrid and conservative, local and cosmopolitan, overt and covert – is 
fundamental to our understanding of what music means as it travels across borders and 
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———. Colors of Enchantment: Theater, Dance, Music and the Visual Arts of the 







adhān – call to prayer 
ajnabi – foreign, foreigner 
idhāʿa  – radio 
Buq‘at Dau’ – Spotlight (Syrian comedy program) 
al-Baʿth – Syrian ruling party (lit. renewal) 
baladī – country  (adj. i.e., simple, unsophisticated, folklike) 
bilād ash-Shām – greater Syria 
dabke  - traditional Levanting group dance 
dabkāt – (pl. of dabke) dabke songs or dances 
fairūziyyāt – songs sung by or associated with Fairuz 
fann – art 
hādi   - calm 
ḥadīth – new, modern (also the Islamic prophetic tradition) 
al- iʿlām al-muwajjah – directed media 
al-ikhtirāq - penetration 
inshād (or anashīd, plural of nashīd) - a religious songs or chants 
iqā‘āt – rhythmic modes 
isnād – chain of transmission of tradition (usually refers to the transmission of hadīth) 
jeel – generation 
lafẓ - pronunciation 
maqām (pl. maqāmāt) – melodic mode 





mudhī’īn – broadcasters 
mukhābarāt – secret police 
mujaddad – new or renewed  
mūsīqā – music (more often referring to instrumental music) 
muṭrib/a – singer (of ṭarab) 
nashīṭ - lively 
nāy – end blown flute 
org – electric organ, synthesizer 
sawā – together 
ṣawt – voice 
Ṣawt al-‘Arab – Voice of the Arabs (Egyptian transnational radio station) 
shabābī – youthful  
shaʿbī – popular (of the people) 
Sharq al Ādnā – Radio Near East (clandestine British Station) 
ṭabla – drum 
ṭarab – state of musical ecstasy (also a descriptor for the associated music, singers and 
songs) 
turāth –heritage  
ughniyya (pl. aghānī) - song 





 1 .2102 ,3 lirpA margorP yliaD māhS-hsa rūN ta  ahdI – 1 xidneppA
 
 2012/  4/  3  الثلاثاء برنامج يوم
 نوع البث الحلقة المادة التوقيت
 0عرض    الافتتاح بالنشيد العربي السوري 11.01
 0عرض   رول عرض الوقائع 21.01
 0عرض   الكريمتلاوة من القرآن  41.01
 إعادة   برنامج عائلتي 18.01
 0عرض   أكنان النور / جامع العثمان / 38.51
 مباشر   برنامج صباح الشام 11.10
 0عرض 3 سلسلة محمد رسول الله / نساء النبي / 81.00
 0عرض   برنامج مع الشعر 28.00
 0عرض   برنامج علوم القرآن 11.20
 0عرض   التاريخبرنامج أغاليط  42.20
 0عرض   مواقيت الصلاة + أذان الظهر + دعاء 24.20
 0عرض   برنامج دراسات قرآنية 11.01
 0عرض 8 سلسلة عصر الخلفاء 83.01
 إعادة 02 برنامج مأثورات عربية 02.21
 0عرض   برنامج روائع إسلامية 83.21
 إعادة   ندوة احتضنتهم الشام 11.31
 0عرض   القرآن الكريمتلاوة من  11.41
 0عرض   مواقيت الصلاة + آذان العصر + دعاء 80.41
 0عرض  02 الأدب المفرد 02.41
 0عرض 4 درس الجامع الأموي / ولي الدين فرفور / 13.41
 إعادة   برنامج مع الشعر 80.81
 إعادة   برنامج روائع إسلامية 03.81
 0عرض   تلاوة من القرآن الكريم 11.01
 إعادة   برنامج الشمائل المحمدية 23.01
 0عرض   مواقيت الصلاة + آذان المغرب + دعاء 21.01
 إعادة   أغاليط التاريخ 10.01
 إعادة   برنامج دراسات قرآنية 13.01
 0عرض   تلاوة من القرآن الكريم 11.01
 0عرض   مواقيت الصلاة + آذان العشاء + دعاء 00.01
 0عرض 02 المفردالأدب  02.01
 إعادة 0 درس الجامع الأموي / عادل أبو شعر / 13.01
 0عرض 28 برنامج يوميات اقتصادية 80.51
 مباشر   برنامج القانون والناس 13.51
                                                 
1






 0عرض   سهرة الإنشاد 13.10
 إعادة   برنامج مع الشعر 11.20
 0عرض   برنامج أسماء الله الحسنى 10.20
 إعادة   الشامبرنامج صباح  03.20
 0عرض   تلاوة من القرآن الكريم 03.01
 إعادة   برنامج روائع إسلامية 03.21
 إعادة   برنامج دراسات قرآنية 01.31
 0عرض 8 سلسلة عصر الخلفاء 03.31
 0عرض   تراحيم الفجر 22.41
 0عرض   مواقيت الصلاة + آذان الفجر + دعاء 28.41
 0عرض   الكريمتلاوة من القرآن  11.81
 إعادة   برنامج تواصل 11.01
 إعادة 4 درس الجامع الأموي / ولي الدين فرفور / 11.01











Tishreen (FM Syria Poll) DamasPost.com  
1 Radio Arabesque 1 Sham FM 
2 Syria al-Ghad 2 Al-Madina FM 
3 Version FM 3 Farah FM 
4 Al-Madina FM 4 Radio Arabesque 
5 Al-Madina FM* 5 Radio Fann 
6 Ṣawt ash-Shabāb 6 Syria al-Ghad 
7 al-Quds Radio 7 al-Arabiyya 
8 Radio Shabha 8 Rotana Style 
9 Ninar FM 9 Melody FM 
10 Rotana Style 10 Version FM 
11 Farah FM 11 Ninar 
12 Melody FM 12 Stars (previously Samar FM) 
13 Radio White  
 14 Mix FM  
  





                                                 
1
 Notice that the two surveys did not include the same stations, much less achieve similar results. 
2
 Nour ash-Sheik, “Arabesk al-idhāʿa al-sūriyya al-oula li-ʿām 2011” Tishreen, April 3, 2011 
http://tishreen.news.sy/tishreen/public/read/225465 (accessed June 10, 2012); );  
Saddam Hussein, “al-idhaʿāt al-khāṣṣa ghuruf liltenjīm wa al-shaʿūdha wa al-fann al-hābiṭ .. wa ṣalūnāt lil-











Radio Kulna Sawa 
 
Welcome to all listeners 
Thank you for your choice of our station 
… 
Our message is to the new wave 
Our focus is the land 
… 
Radio Kulna Sawa, Thank you for your choice of our station. 
Stay with us. 
Live over the air, To the last moment our signal comes to you 
Stay with Radio Kulna Sawa 
 




The Day that Changed the World 
 
The day that changed the world 
I was in bed dreaming 
Just late like usual 
Under my eyes, on the newspaper 
The day that the world changed 
 
The day the world changed 
Not one of us could understand 
What was changing, what was beginning 
How the story will change 
The day that the world changed 
 





I'm a terrorist 
 
I'm a terrorist but a nice guy 
A terrorist, ascending in the plane with my friends  
My weapon is my guitar, my melodies and my words  
Immediately they know me from the first that they saw me 
Idhaʿat Kulna Sawa 
 
āhlan bikul al-mustamiʿ īn 
shukrān li ikhtityarkun maḥaṭatnā 
… 
 irsālnā ʿal-mūja al-jadīda 
markaznā huwa al- arḍ 
… 
idhaʿa kulnā sawā .. shukrān li ikhtiyarkun maḥaṭatnā 
khalīkun maʿna 
mubashratin ʿal-hawā   .. lakhir laḥẓa 
btwaṣlkun  ishāratnā 
khalīkun mʿa idhaʿat kulnā sawā 
 
kalimāt wa ālḥan Iyad al- Rimawi 
 
 
Youm Elly Taghayyir alʿalem 
 
Yūm ellī taghayyir al-ʿālam 
kuntu btekhtī ʿam āḥlam 
faqat m  akhir mitl alʿ āda 
fataḥt ʿayūnī ʿal-jarīda 
yūm ellī taghayyir al-ʿālam  
 
yūm ellī taghayyir al-ʿālam 
ma ḥadā minā qadr yafham 
shū  ellī taghayyir shū ellI tbadl 
kayf al-qiṣa raḥ tatḥawwal 
youm ellī taghayyir alʿ ālem 
 







Irhaby wa ṭālʿ  ʿaṭṭiyyāra mʿa rif  ātī 
slaḥi ghītarī wa alḥanī wa kalimatī 
faūrān ʿarfūny min āwal mā shāfūnī  
ṭālʿ āt al-ghītār wa waqft bnāṣ  aṭṭiyyāra ghanī 
ةعاذإ انلك اوس  
 
لاهأ لكب نيعمتسملا  
اركش نكرايتخلا انتطحم  
… 
انلاسرإ ةجوملاع ةديدجلا  
انزكرم وه ضرلأا  
… 
ةعاذإ انلك اوس  ..اركش نكرايتخلا 
انتطحم 
نكيلخ انعم  
ةرشابم اوهلاع  ..رخلآ ةظحل نكلصوتب 
انتراشإ 
نكيلخ عم ةعاذإ انلك اوس  
 
تاملك ناحلأو دايإ يواميرلا  
 
 
موي يللا ريغت ملاعلا  
 
موي يللا ريغت ملاعلا  
تنك يتختب مـع ملحأ  
تقف رخأم لتم ةداعلا  
تحتف ينويع ةديرجلاع  
موـي يللا ريغت ملاعلا  
*** 
موي يللا ريغت ملاعلا  
ام ادح انم ردق مهفي  
يللاوش ريغت يللاوش لدبت  
فيك ةصقلا حر لّوحتت  
موي يللا ريغت ملاعلا  
 




انأ يباهرإ  
 
يباهرأ و علاط ةرايطلاع عم يتاقفر  
يحلاس يراتيغ و يناحلأ و يـتاملك  
اروف يـنوفرع نـم لوأ اـم يـنوفاش   
تعلاط راـتيغلا و تفقو صنب ةرايطلا 







The guitar rose and I stood with half the plane, singing 
I'm a terrorist but a nice guy 
I play for you before you die 
 
Listen to the last melody of your life and you will travel with 
us happily 
 
Everyone who was in the plane was afraid of the music 
Afraid of my voice, afraid of the truth 
If my art now had left me a terrorist 
 
I will sing at the top of my voice…. 
 
I'm a terrorist but a nice guy 
I play for you before you die 
 
 
Listen to the last melody of your life 
and you will travel with us happily 
 
 







The Just Sultan 
 
He is generous 
But we aren’t worthy 
… 
His eye is upon us, and our protection is on his mind 
He comes to us, he and his men 
The wheels roll on the terrorists  
None of us know who the terrorists are. 
… 
 




ānā irhābī lakin ṭayyib 
bʿaziflak  ͗abl mā tamūt 
 
samīʿ  ākhir laḥn biḥayyatak wa ḥatsāfir mʿanā mabsūṭ 
 
 
kul ellī bil-ṭiyyāra khāfu min al-musiqa 
khāfu min ṣawtī khāfu min al-ḥaqīqa 
īdhā fanī hela  ṣār yakhalīnī īrhābī 
 
raḥ ghanī b- aʿlā ṣawtī .. 
 
ānā irhābī  
ānā irhābī lakin ṭayyib 
bʿaziflak  ͗abl mā tamūt 
 
samīʿ  ākhir laḥn biḥayyatak  
wa ḥatsāfir mʿanā mabsūṭ 
 
 










bas mā mnistāhal 
… 
ʿayūnī ʿalīna wa ḥaṭeṭna bibālu 
wajāiyya lʿ annā huwe wa rijālu 
da’r yadawwir ʿal-īrhābiyyīn 
ma ʿadnā naʿrif al-īrhābī mīn 
… 
 





انأ يباهرأ نكل بيط  
كلفزعب لبق ام تومت  
 




لك يللا ةرايطلاب وـفاخ نم اـقيسوملا  
وفاخ نم يـتوص وـفاخ نـم ةـقيقحلا  
اذإ ّينف قـله راص ينيلخي يـباهرأ  
 
حر ينغ ىـلعأب يـتوص  .. 
 
اـنأ يـباهرأ  
انأ يباهرأ نكل بيط  
كلفزعب لبق ام تومت  
 
عامس رخآ نحل كتايحب  
و رفاستح انعم طوسبم  
 
 




دبع ميظعلا  
 
دبع ميظعلا  
ناطلسلا لداـعلا  
 
وه ميرك  
سب ام لهاتسنم  
… 
وـنيع اـنيلع و انططاح وـلابب  
ةياجو ّاـنعل وـه و وـلاجر  
رـياد رّودي نـييباهرلأاع  
ام اـندع فرـعن يـباهرلأا نيم  
… 
 
تاملك ناحلأو دايإ يواميرلا  








The Violet Finger 
 
The people dead in streets  
Their numbers in the hundreds  
 
In a country wearing the color of ash 
What is all of this 
 
They say that it is a new age 
And we pay its price, fire and steel 
 
In the end you will definitely paint 
Your finger violet 
 
O God what’s the sweetest color 
Forget the world and my cares  
 
It deserves/in its honor  they die 
My family, my sisters, my people 
… 







Al-Aṣbaʿ Al-Banafsajī  
 
an-nās al-mātet ʿaṭurqat 
 āʿdādhun ṣāret b-al-miyyāt 
 
bi-balad lābis lūn ar-ramād 
shū kul ha-ashshay 
 
qālū inhu fī ʿaṣr jadīd 
ḥa nadfʿa thamnu nār wa ḥadīd 
 
bil-ākhir btlaun akīd 
aṣbʿatek banafsajī 
 
ya Allah mā āḥlā lounu 
nasānī addunya wa hamīmī 
 
bistahal karmālu yamūtu 
ahlī ikhwātī wa ʿamūmī 
… 
kalimat wa alḥan Ayhem al-ʿAni 
 
 
عبصلإا يجسفنبلا  
 
سانلا تتاملا تاـقرطع  
نـهدادعأ تراص تاـيملاب  
 
دـلبب سـبلا نول دامرلا  
وـش لـك يشلاه  
 
اولاق هنإ يـف رـصع دـيدج  
ح عفدن هنمث راـن و ديدح  
 
رخلآاب نوـلتب دـيكأ  
كـتعبصإ يـجسفنب  
 
هـللاي اـم ىـلحأ هنول  
يـناسن هـيندلا يمومهو  
 
لهاـتسيب هلامرك اوتومي  
يـلهأ يتاوخإ و يمومع  
… 
تاملك ناحلأو مهيأ يناعلا  
 
 
 
